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系統識別號 U0002-2007200512273400
中文論文名稱 高階主管薪酬、研究發展支出、股權結構與公司價值間關聯性之研究
英文論文名稱 The Association among the Reward of the Executive Management Officers, Research & Development Expenditure, Ownership Structure, and the Corporate Value
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accounting
學年度 93
學期 2
出版年 94
研究生中文姓名 吳梅英
研究生英文姓名 Mei-Yin Wu
學號 791470056
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2005-06-13
論文頁數 114頁
口試委員 指導教授-葉金成
委員-張石柱
委員-溫博仕
中文關鍵字 高階主管薪酬  研究發展支出  股權結構  公司價值  結構方程式 
英文關鍵字 Compensation of CEO  Research & Development expenditure  Ownership Structure  Corporation Value  SEM 
學科別分類 學科別社會科學商學
中文摘要 過去研究探討高階主管薪酬、研究發展支出、股權結構與公司價值四者間關聯性,大多數採用多元或聯立迴歸估計方式,僅對各觀察變項逐項探討兩兩間的關聯性,忽略了具有「潛在」概念的研究變項是由多個觀察指標共同組合,且具有同時存在的現象及高階主管薪酬、研究發展支出、股權結構三者間透過彼此的中介作用,間接影響公司價值的關係,本研究以結構方程式(SEM)探討其直接與間接關係。以民國87年01月01日至92年12月31日持續在台灣上市上櫃公司為研究對象。
實證結果顯示: (1)直接效果: 研究發展支出、高階主管薪酬、股權結構與公司價值間均呈現非常顯著的正向關係。 (2)交互效果:(a)整體產業中高階主管薪酬與研究發展支出間具有非常顯著的正向交互作用。(b)高科技產業中股權結構與高階主管薪酬間具有顯著的負向交互作用。(3)中介效果:(a)研究發展支出對「高階主管薪酬與公司價值之關係」具有顯著的正向中介作用。(b)高階主管薪酬對「研究發展支出與公司價值之關係」具有顯著的正向中介作用。(c)高科技產業中高階主管薪酬對「股權結構與與公司價值之關係」具有顯著的負向中介作用。(4)在整體產業、高科技產業與非高科技產業中創造公司價值的最佳解釋模型皆有不同的要徑。(5) 並未發現不同的經濟景氣因素對高階主管薪酬、研究發展支出、股權結構三者與公司價值間的關係,會產生不同的效果。
英文摘要 In the prior researches study the associations among the compensation of executive officer (CEO), R&D expenditure (R&DE), ownership structure (OS), and corporation value (CV) that emphasizing the associations of both of them. The results of researches are not consistent. This thesis focuses the simultaneous phenomenon among the first three factors and their direct and indirect effects on the corporation value. By utilizing the structure equation modeling (SEM) instead of the multiple regression analysis, the aims are to realize the structured relationships among the above four factors under various industry and business cycle. The samples form the corporations listed continuously on the Taiwan Stock Exchange form January 1st, 1998 to December 31st, 2003.
The results of research show as follows: (1) there are significantly positive direct effects of the associations between both of the first three factors on the corporation value. (2) There is a significantly interactive positive effect of the association between CEO and R&DE on the corporation value in all samples (industries) case, however , only in high-tech industry OS and CEO effect to be negative. (3) There are significantly positive intermediation effects of the association between CEO and R&DE on the corporation value in all samples case, however, only in high-tech industry OS and CEO effect to be negative. (4) There is the optimum model to achieve the best corporation value, but is different in all sample case and high-tech industry. (5) In the different business cycle, they don’t cause different effect.
論文目次 目 錄

第一章 緒論……………………………………………………... 1
第一節 研究背景與動機……………………………………………..…. 1
第二節 研究目的……………………………………………………..…. 3
第三節 研究流程…………………………………………………..……. 4
第二章 文獻探討………………………………………………... 6
第一節 研究發展支出內涵……………………………………………... 6
第二節 代理理論內涵……………………………………………..……. 8
第三節 高階主管薪酬內涵…………………………………………..…. 10
第四節 相關實證文獻………………………………………………..…. 13
第五節 研究之延伸……………………………………………..………. 32
第三章 研究設計……………………………………………..…. 34
第一節 概念架構…………………………………………………..……. 34
第二節 研究假說……………………………………………………..…. 34
第三節 研究變數定義………………………………………………..…. 39
第四節 研究期間與對象……………………………………………..…. 45
第五節 資料分析方法………………………………………………..…. 46
第六節 實證模型………………………………………………………… 48
第四章 實證結果與分析……………………………………………… 53
第一節 鈙述性統計分析……………………………………………… 53
第二節 多元常態性檢驗……………………………………………… 61
第三節 驗證性因素分析……………………………………………… 63
第四節 SEM結構模型實證結果與分析……………………………… 73
第五節 敏感性分析……………………………………..……………… 82
第五章 結論與限制……………………………………………… 101
第一節結論…….……………………………………………… 101
第二節 研究限制及建議……………………………………………… 103
參考文獻……………………………………………………………………… 106




表 目 錄
表3-1 :中華民國88年至92年景氣對策信號綜合判斷分數…………………… 44
表3-2 :研究變數彙總說明表…………………………………………………… 44
表4-1 :整體樣本產業分佈彙總表………………………………………… 53
表4-2A:整體產業主要觀察變數鈙述性分析彙總表…………………………… 55
表4-2B:高科技與非高科技產業主要觀察變數鈙述性分析彙總表…………… 57
表4-2C:經濟景氣佳與經濟景氣不佳期間主要觀察變數鈙述性分析彙總表…… 59
表4-3 :整體產業主要觀察變數常態性檢定分析彙總表…………………….… 62
表4-4A:整體產業驗證性因素(CFA)分析之參數估計彙總表………………. 65
表4-4B:整體產業樣本多元平方複相關(SMC)估計彙總表表………………….. 66
表4-4C:高科技產業與非高科技產業多元平方複相關(SMC)估計彙總表…… 68
表4-4D:高科技產業與非高科技產業CFA模型適配度估計彙總表…………… 70
表4-4E:經濟景氣佳與經濟景氣不佳期間多元平方複相關(SMC)估計彙總表 71
表4-4F:經濟景氣佳與經濟景氣不佳期間CFA模型適配度估計彙總表…………. 71
表4-5 :整體產業SEM結構模型參數估計結果彙總表………………………. 81
表4-6 :跨產業樣本平均數結構因素恆等性驗證性分析彙總表…………….. 84
表4-7 :跨產業樣本SEM結構模型研究結果分析彙總表…………………….. 90
表4-8 :跨經濟景氣樣本平均數結構因素恆等性驗證性分析彙總表…………….. 93
表4-9 :跨經濟景氣樣本SEM結構模型研究結果分析彙總表……………….. 99



圖 目 錄

圖3-A :觀念性架構圖…………………………………………………………… 34
圖3-1 :研究發展支出之測量模型………………………………………… 49
圖3-2 :高階主管薪酬之測量模型……………………………………… 49
圖3-3 :股權結構之測量模型……………………………………………… 50
圖3-4 :公司價值之測量模型……………………………………………… 50
圖3-5 :CFA假設潛在變項共變矩陣結構方程模型…………………………… 51
圖3-6 :以研究發展支出為中介變項之結構模型方程式…………………… 51
圖3-7 :以高階主管薪酬為中介變項之結構模型方程式………………… 52
圖3-8 :以股權結構為中介變項之結構模型方程式 ……………………… 52
圖4-1 :驗證性因素分析(CFA)各參數路徑圖……………………………………. 64
圖4-2 :整體產業修正後CFA完全標準化路徑圖…………………………… 67
圖4-3 :區分「高科技產業與非高科技產業」修正後CFA完全標準化路徑圖….. 69
圖4-4 :區分「經濟景氣佳與經濟景氣不佳因素」修正後CFA完全標準化路徑圖……………………………………………………………… 72
圖4-5 :整體產業以研究發展支出為中介變項之SEM實證結果路徑圖……… 73
圖4-6 :整體產業以高階主管薪酬為中介變項之SEM實證結果路徑圖……… 73
圖4-7 :整體產業以股權結構為中介變項之SEM實證結果路徑圖……………. 74
圖4-8 :高科技產業與非高科技產業以研究發展支出為中介變項之SEM實證結果路徑圖……………………………………………………………… 85
圖4-9 :高科技產業與非高科技產業以高階主管薪酬為中介變項之SEM實證結果路徑圖……………………………………………………………… 85
圖4-10:整高科技產業與非高科技產業以股權結構為中介變項之SEM實證結果路徑圖………………………………………………………………… 86
圖4-11 :經濟景氣佳與經濟景氣不佳期間以研究發展支出為中介變項之SEM實證結果路徑圖………………………………………………………… 94
圖4-12:經濟景氣佳與經濟景氣不佳期間以高階主管薪酬為中介變項之SEM實證結果路徑圖………………………………………………………… 94
圖4-13:經濟景氣佳與經濟景氣不佳期間以股權結構為中介變項之SEM實證結果路徑圖……………………………………………………………… 95
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