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系統識別號 U0002-2006201116581500
中文論文名稱 高階經理人異動之決定因素及其對績效之影響
英文論文名稱 The Determinants of Managements’ Turnover and Its Impact on Firm Performance
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 產業經濟學系碩士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Industrial Economics
學年度 99
學期 2
出版年 100
研究生中文姓名 翁浩綿
研究生英文姓名 Hao-Mien Weng
學號 698540316
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2011-06-07
論文頁數 44頁
口試委員 指導教授-陳明園
共同指導教授-洪小文
委員-陳業寧
委員-林佩蒨
中文關鍵字 企業績效  高階經理人異動 
英文關鍵字 Top Executive Turnover  Firm Performance 
學科別分類 學科別社會科學經濟學
中文摘要 隨著時代的進步,各產業的競爭愈趨激烈,加上世界一家、全球化的趨勢下,企業朝向多角化與擴大規模的經營,因此,提高企業經營專業化的需求,逐漸演變成企業經營權與所有權分離的特性。經營之決策由經理人決定,董事會與股東則扮演監督之角色。
績效為衡量公司價值的指標(Fama, 1980),所以過去對於經理人更換的研究中,大部分以探討公司績效或其他變數與經理人更換(CEO turnover)可能性之間的影響關係。過去公司績效對於經理人更換機率的相關討論,Weisbach (1988)和 Murphy and Zimmerman (1993),發現經理人更換與盈餘變動呈負相關;Kaplan(1994)也提出無論以日本公司或美國公司為研究對象,經理人更換與公司績效間皆呈負向關係。經理人異動之決定因素包含股權結構、董事會結構及經理人個人特質等,其對經理人異動有顯著之影響。而後,我們探討經理人異動過後,董事會所期望看到的績效正向變化是否顯著,不少文獻認為更換經理人後,下一期之企業績效將顯著獲得改善,但也有相反的觀點認為企業績效當每況愈下,本文亦好奇這樣的觀點是否可信,期望透過我們模型找出有說服力的實證結果。
本文採用綜合資料(panel data) 的處理效果模型(treatment effects model),將考慮更換經理人行為的前因後果,用一個較有系統的計量模型,將兩者連結,並考慮每家企業為異質的,將其個別企業特質同時納入模型中,期望透過不同的計量分析方法,一窺經理人更換與企業績效變化之全貌。
本文得到的幾個實證結果如下:1.前期企業績效與經理人更換有負向顯著的關連,當前期績效不佳時,董事會很可能做出更換經理人之決策。2.家族成員任職董事時,在董事會做更換經理人決策時的獨立性受到挑戰,實證結果發現,家族成員任職董事與經理人更換有顯著的負向關係,即使企業績效不佳時,家族成員任職董事與異動經理人之負向關係會愈趨強大。3.董事會的規模也深深影響經理人的更換決策,本文發現董事會規模與經理人異動有顯著的負相關,也就是說當董事會規模較小時,經理人可能較容易被更換。4.經理人異動後,企業績效不會立即改善,但隨著時間經過,無論會計績效或市場績效都會有些許好轉的現象。
英文摘要 An issue, which has recently assumed importance, is the studying of the effectiveness of corporate governance from the point of managements’ turnover. Published paper has shown that the likelihood of top executive turnover is negatively related to firm performance in an effective corporate governance situation. This paper researches the effectiveness of internal corporate governance and external corporate governance in relation to top executive turnover in Taiwan stock-listed firms. First we test top executive in relation to the firm’s performance. Furthermore, we examine the impact of the interaction of management ownership, external corporate governance and firm performance on top executive turnover. Finally, this paper tests the improvement in firm performance subsequent to top executive turnover.
We find that the turnover of top executive is significantly higher in poorly performed corporations. As the board composition has top executive’s family member, the negative relationship between corporation performance and top executive turnover increase. Besides, we discover that board size and top executive turnover have significantly negative relation. However, after the top executive leaves, the market performance and the accounting performance won’t improve immediately.
論文目次 目錄

第一章 緒論 .......................................................... 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 ................................................................................................. 1
第二節 研究方法 ...................................................................................................4
第三節 本文架構 ...................................................................................................4
第二章 文獻回顧與假說建立 ........................................ 6
第一節 經理人更換決策之決定因素 .................................................................... 6
第二節 經理人更換與企業績效之關連 ............................................................. 11
第三章 實證模型與變數定義 ......................................... 13
第一節 模型設計 .................................................................................................. 13
第二節 變數定義 .................................................................................................. 15
第三節 資料來源與樣本選取 .............................................................................. 20
第四節 基本統計量 .............................................................................................. 22
第四章 實證結果 ................................................... 26
第一節 高階經理人異動之決定因素 .................................................................. 26
第二節 高階經理人異動對企業績效之影響 ...................................................... 36
第五章 結論 ....................................................... 40
參考文獻 .......................................................... 42

表目錄

【表3-1】 變數定義 …………………………………………………………………… 19
【表3-2】 第一階段變數之基本統計量 ……………………………………… 24
【表3-3】 第二階段變數之基本統計量 ……………………………………… 25
【表4-1】高階經理人異動之決定因素PROBIT估計 ………………………… 33
【表4-2】高階經理人異動之決定因素PROBIT估計—加入績效之交叉項 … 34
【表4-3】高階經理人異動之決定因素PROBIT估計—加入績效之交叉項(續) 35
【表 4-4 】處理效果下更換經理人對績效變化之影響 …………………… 39
【表 4-5 】處理效果下更換經理人對績效變化之影響(續) ……………… 39
參考文獻 參考文獻
中文文獻
徐木蘭,1994,「企業經營者道德標準與企業倫理規範之關連性研究」,行政院國家科學委員會。
陳金鈴,1997,「台灣上市公司股權結構之研究分析」,國立成功大學會計研究所碩士論文。
李佳玲、葉穎蓉與何晉滄,2005,「績效、公司治理與高階管理者離職關係之實證研究」,中山管理評論,第十三卷第一期:頁75-106。

英文文獻
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