本研究主要探討的議題是台灣上市公司之高階經理人薪酬調整誘因，是否與投資對內部自由現金流量之敏感度所產生之代理問題有關。公司經理人所衍生之代理問題，可分為過度投資與投資不足問題。而我們即針對這兩項投資問題來探討經理人薪酬誘因與其之關聯性。由於台灣之公司目前尚未普遍使用股票與選擇權做為經理人之酬勞。故本文不同於國外文獻皆是以經理人之權益誘因作為研究之變數，而是採用公司經由外部經理人勞動市場之薪酬水準，所決定之經理人薪酬變動值，作為我們的衡量工具。
    本文之實證結果證實了經理人薪酬誘因與投資對現金流量敏感度之關聯性。我們的主要發現為：公司在調整高階經理人之酬勞時，若決定將薪酬調升，選擇告知經理人其薪酬增加是與市場薪酬水準比較而得到，可迅速改善其投資不足的問題；相反的，公司若是經由公司與經理人特性所得到之薪酬增加，可使經理人增加投資之速度較為緩慢。若公司決定降低經理人薪酬時，訴諸於經由與市場薪酬水準比較而得到之薪酬減少，經理人增加投資之速度會較緩慢，因而較可避免過度投資之傾向。

This study focused on the question of Taiwan's listed companies of high-level managers pay incentives, and whether the internal investment of free cash flow generated by the sensitivity of the agent issue. Manager of the company by the derivative of the agency problem can be divided into over-investment and insufficient investment issues. And we view that the two investment managers to discuss the issue of pay incentives for its relevance. Since the Taiwan company has not yet widespread use of stock and options as a manager of the reward. Therefore, this paper is different from all foreign literature is the manager of the rights and interests of incentives as a study of the variables, but the company through the use of external managers of the salary standard of the labour market, determined by the managers of the pay changes, as our measurement tools.
In this paper, the empirical results confirmed the manager's pay incentives for investment and cash flow sensitivity of relevance. Our main findings were: high-end adjustment in the manager's reward, if the decision will pay raise, the manager informed choice to increase their pay is compared with the market rate and are standard, can quickly improve its problem of insufficient investment ; On the contrary, if the company by the company and the manager of the pay received by the increase will enable the manager to increase investment in the relatively slow speed. If the company's decision to reduce the manager's salary, through resort to the standard of comparison with the market rate and receive a salary reduction, the manager of the investment rate will increase more slowly and thus may be more inclined to avoid over-investment.

目錄
第一章  緒論…………………………………………………………1
  第一節  研究動機與目的……………………………………………….1
  第二節  論文架構……………………………………………………….5
第二章  文獻回顧……………………………………………………6
第三章  研究設計……………………………………………………11
  第一節  模型設立……………………………………………………….11
第二節	資料來源及說明………………………………………………...21
第三節	變數定義………………………………………………………...22
第四章  實證結果…………………………………………………….28
  第一節  基本統計量……………………………………………………..28
  第二節  現金流量與投資敏感度之迴歸結果…………………………..32
  第三節  經理人薪酬調整對投資與現金流量敏感度之迴歸結果……..36
第五章  結論………………………………………………………….47
  第一節  結論……………………………………………………………..47
  第二節  後續研究與建議………………………………………………..48
參考文獻……………………………………………………………….49
圖目錄
圖4.1  經理人薪酬(與市場薪酬水準比較)與投資對現金流量敏感度
       之關係..........………………………………………………………...45
圖4.2  經理人薪酬(公司與經理人特性)與投資對現金流量敏感度之
       關係………………………………………………………………….45
圖4.3  公司薪酬政策流程圖……………………………………………….46
表目錄
表3.1  Chen (2007)變數估計係數與標準誤……………………………….13
表3.2  變數定義與預期符號表………………………………………….....26
表4.1  變數之基本統計量---總樣本年度(民國87年到93年)……………31
表4.2  現金流量與投資敏感度之迴歸結果(3.1式)……………………….35
表4.3  經理人薪酬對投資與現金流量敏感度之迴歸結果………………..37
表4.4  經理人薪酬正、負項對現金流量與投資敏感度之迴歸結果……..39

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