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系統識別號 U0002-2001202016501000
中文論文名稱 銀行監督與掏空之關係
英文論文名稱 Bank Financing and Tunneling Effect of Listed Companies
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 經濟學系經濟與財務碩士班
系所名稱(英) Master's Program in Economics and Finance, Department of Economics
學年度 108
學期 1
出版年 109
研究生中文姓名 沈珺瑜
研究生英文姓名 Chun-Yu Shen
學號 604570142
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2019-12-27
論文頁數 37頁
口試委員 指導教授-林亦珍
委員-廖惠珠
委員-孫育伯
中文關鍵字 掏空  銀行監督  公司治理 
英文關鍵字 Tunneling  bank supervision  corporate governance 
學科別分類
中文摘要 上市(櫃)公司掏空案迭傳,不僅損及公司及股東之權益,更打擊投資人對資本市場的信心。公司的監管機制出現漏洞雖為主要原因,而金融機構未能有效監督也是推波助瀾的角色。本文提出以下研究結果:(一) 透過支配長期貸款,台灣金融機構對公司治理扮演監督角色。(二) 嚴格的發行條件且須擔保下,發行公司債對公司治理能有效監管。(三) 債務融資代理成本較低的長期借款,對公司治理的監督鬆散。(四) 董事席次過多削弱其對公司的監督力。
英文摘要 There has been many listed companies' accounting scandals in recent years. Tunneling – the transfer of assets and earnings out of the firm for the benefit of those control the firm. Tunneling has not only harmed the rights of the company and shareholders, but also investor confidence in the capital market. The weak regulatory mechanism of companies and ineffective financial institutions’ supervision may also encourage tunneling. This study yields the following findings: (1) Taiwan’s financial institutions play a supervisory role in corporate governance by allocating long-term loans. (2) Because the requirements of corporate bonds issuance are strict and collateral are required, corporate bonds can effectively impede tunneling. (3) The lower cost of long-term debt financing loosens the supervision of corporate governance. (4) Excessive number of directors tends to weaken corporate governance.
論文目次 第一章 緒論 1
第二章 文獻探討 2
2.1 掏空之定義與揭露 2
2.1.1 掏空之定義 2
2.1.2 以其他應收款衡量掏空行為 2
2.2 銀行監督 3
2.3 公司治理結構 4
2.3.1 董事會組成 4
2.3.2 股東持股占比 5
2.3.3 董監事及經理人持股占比與經營績效 5
2.3.3.1 正相關 5
2.3.3.2 負相關 6
2.4 關係人交易 7
2.4.1 關係人之定義 7
2.4.2 關係人交易 8
第三章 研究方法 9
3.1 變數定義 9
3.2 迴歸模型設定 11
3.3 研究方法 14
3.3.1 零膨脹貝塔迴歸模型 14
3.3.2 截斷式模型 14
第四章 樣本資料與變數定義 15
4.1 樣本及變數 15
4.2 樣本敘述統計 19
第五章 實證結果 21
5.1 銀行借款與其他應收款項 21
5.2 銀行借款與關係人之其他應收款項 26
第六章 結論與建議 32
參考文獻 34

表目錄
表 3-1 研究變數代號與單位 10
表 4-1 公司財務資料之樣本敘述統計 16
表 4-2 公司治理結構之樣本敘述統計 19
表 5-1 銀行借款及其他負債與其他應收帳款之關係 21
表 5-2 銀行及其他可作為監督掏空行為債權角色與其他應收帳款之關係 23
表 5-3 銀行借款及其他負債與關係人之其他應收款之關係 27
表 5-4 銀行及其他可作為監督掏空的債權角色與關係人其他應收帳款之關係 29

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