在公司治理與智慧資本皆備受重視的環境下，公司治理機制是否對智慧資本的發展產生影響逐漸受到關切。公司治理機制會影響管理者的決策裁量權，一味地加強公司治理而抑制了管理者之決策裁量權，是否反而傷害企業的價值創造？基於治理機制可能透過對經理人決策權之干擾而影響智慧資本的投入及發展所產生之效益，本研究將樣本公司依公司治理強度區分為強、中與弱三群，探討不同公司治理強度下，智慧資本與公司市場價值及財務績效間的關係是否有所不同，以及高強度的公司治理是否會干擾智慧資本與績效間的關係。本研究以美國高科技產業之上市櫃公司為研究對象。實證結果顯示，美國效率市場對企業投入智慧資本有正向反應，且存有遞延效果，然而智慧資本效益則尚無法顯現於當期財務績效；至於公司治理強度的干擾效果方面，實證結果顯示，公司治理強度對顧客資本及創新資本與市場價值間之關連性具有干擾作用，且皆是在「中度公司治理強度」之下，顧客資本及創新資本對市場價值有最強的正向影響；於智慧資本與財務績效間之關連性方面，則未見公司治理對其有干擾作用。上述結果有兩種意涵：一為公司治理強度影響管理者裁決性支出行為，且公司治理強度應以適中為宜，另一為美國資本市場是一有效率的市場。

Recently, people care about corporate governance and intellectual capital, and pay more attention to whether the intellectual capital will be influenced on corporate governance.  Because of the influence of corporate governance on discretion, company enhanced the corporate governance may reduce manager’s discretion and hurt the future value of the company.  On the grounds that corporate governance may influence the benefit of developing intellectual capital through interfering manager’s discretion, this study divided samples into three groups based on the intensity of corporate governance to examine the association between intellectual capital and business performance in terms of corporate governance, and whether the high level of corporate governance reduce the benefit of developing intellectual capital.  The sample of this study was publicly traded companies in U.S.A.  The empirical results show that the efficient capital market of America reacts to intellectual capital positively and there are deferred effects.   However, the benefit of intellectual capital is still unable to appear on financial performance.  As for the moderating effect of corporate governance, the results show that the intensity of corporate governance has moderating effect on the association between customer capital, innovative capital, and firm’s market value, and firm’s market value will be positively influenced on customer capital and innovative capital strongest under medium intensity of corporate governance.  As to the association between the intellectual capital and firm’s financial performance, the results show that the intensity of corporate governance has no moderating effect on it.  The results have two implications: One is that intensity of corporate governance affects the behavior of managers’ discretion, and the medium intensity of corporate governance is adaptable to enterprise. The other is that the capital market of USA is an efficient market.

目  錄

第壹章  緒  論	1
第一節 研究背景與動機	1
第二節 研究目的	3
第三節 研究流程	3
第貮章  文獻探討與假說發展	5
第一節 控制理論	6
第二節 公司治理	9
第三節 智慧資本之基本概念	14
第四節 公司治理與市場價值及財務績效相關文獻	20
第五節 智慧資本與市場價值及財務績效相關文獻	22
第六節 公司治理與裁量權相關文獻	23
第參章  研究設計	27
第一節 樣本選取與資料來源	27
第二節 公司治理強度構面之決定	29
第三節 研究變數定義	31
第四節 公司治理強度之評分方式	37
第五節 實證模型之建立	38
第肆章 實證結果與分析	43
第一節 敘述性統計分析與相關係數	43
第二節 公司治理強度差異檢定	47
第三節 智慧資本與市場價值及財務績效關連性之探討	49
第四節 迴歸係數差異性檢定	58
第五節 敏感性分析	63
第伍章 結論與建議	70
第一節 結論	70
第二節 建議	73
第三節 研究限制	75
參考文獻	76


圖目錄

圖1-1  研究流程圖	4
圖2-1  觀念架構圖	5
圖2-2  控制的效能與控制成本的關係	9
圖2-3  公司治理架構圖	12
圖4-1  2003年公司治理總得分折線圖	45


表目錄

表2-1  公司治理評等比較	13
表2-2  智慧資本之描述或定義	17
表3-1  樣本公司產業分佈表	28
表3-2  公司治理強度各構面變數彙總表	34
表3-3  公司價值與財務績效變數彙總表	36
表4-1  2003年至2005年研究樣本觀察值之各變數敘述統計分析	44
表4-2  2003年公司治理總得分之基本統計量	45
表4-3  研究樣本之皮爾森相關係數矩陣－當期市場價值及財務績效模型	46
表4-4  研究樣本之皮爾森相關係數矩陣－遞延一期市場價值模型	46
表4-5  研究樣本之皮爾森相關係數矩陣－遞延二期市場價值模型	47
表4-6  強、中公司治理企業樣本觀察值之敘述統計及差異檢定	48
表4-7  中、弱公司治理企業樣本觀察值之敘述統計及差異檢定	48
表4-8  強、弱公司治理企業樣本觀察值之敘述統計及差異檢定	49
表4-9  智慧資本與當期市場價值－權益市值 (MKVALIT) 之迴歸係數	54
表4-10 智慧資本與當期市場價值－市場附加價值 (MVAIT) 之迴歸係數	54
表4-11 智慧資本與市場價值－遞延一期之權益市值 (MKVAL I, T+1) 之迴歸係數	55
表4-12 智慧資本與市場價值－遞延一期之市場附加價值 (MVA I, T+1) 之迴歸係數	55
表4-13 智慧資本與市場價值－遞延二期之權益市值 (MKVAL I, T+2) 之迴歸係數	56
表4-14 智慧資本與市場價值－遞延二期之市場附加價值(MVA I, T+2)之迴歸係數	56
表4-15 智慧資本與當期財務績效－每股盈餘 (EPSIT) 之迴歸係數	57
表4-16 智慧資本與當期財務績效－股東權益報酬率 (ROEIT) 之迴歸係數	57
表4-17 智慧資本與當期市場價值之迴歸係數差異檢定結果	61
表4-18 智慧資本與遞延一期市場價值之迴歸係數差異檢定結果	61
表4-19 智慧資本與遞延二期市場價值之迴歸係數差異檢定結果	62
表4-20 智慧資本與財務績效之迴歸係數差異檢定	62
表4-21 分組方式敏感性分析－當期市場價值	66
表4-22 分組方式敏感性分析－遞延一期市場價值	67
表4-23 分組方式敏感性分析－遞延二期市場價值	68
表4-24 分組方式敏感性分析－財務績效	69

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