本研究旨在探討台灣上市櫃公司執行盈餘管理的程度，與企業社會責任報告書之第三方確信者及其特性之選擇關係。研究期間為2012年至2016年，試圖驗證盈餘管理程度越高的管理階層，在決策企業社會責任報告書第三方確信者時，會因其為認證機構、會計師或會計師之特性而有所變化。本文使用裁決性應計項目及實際交易活動將盈餘管理分為兩種模式進行分析。實證結果發現，(1)利用裁決性應計項目程度越高的企業，與企業社會責任報告書之確信服務提供者及其特性間無顯著的選擇偏好。(2)實質盈餘管理程度越高的企業相較於會計師，偏好委任確信業務於認證機構。此外，操弄實際交易越多的企業，當期傾向聘請非查核自身財務報表之會計師提供確信服務，但顯著多聘請產業知識較為豐富的會計師。因此預期查核財報之結果不被影響之前提下，企業社會責任報告書與確信會計師的專業能力除了可提升確信效率外，亦可被管理階層視作一項用來提升企業聲譽並獲得利害關係人支持之機制。

This paper investigates the relationship between earnings management and assurance providers' choices. More specifically, this paper attempt to figure out the degree of earnings management affects the company choosing a certified public accountant (CPA) or a certification organization and the characteristics of assurance provider with a sample of companies listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange and the Over-the-counter market during 2012-2016. We present two models each using discretionary accruals and the proxy for real activities manipulation, in order to capture the different effects in two kind of earnings management. Our empirical results show that: first, there are no statistically significant relationship between discretionary accruals and assurance providers, including the characteristics of assurance providers. Second, companies engage in real earnings management prefer verifying the CSR reports by hiring certification organizations instead of CPAs. On the other side, if the companies choosing CPA, the evidences show that companies engage in real earnings management are inclined to hire CPAs without audit their financial statements in the same time and it's significant positive correlation between real earnings management and CPA’s industry experience, therefore, we infer that managers may view CSR or assurance report as an instrument to promote reputation and increase the stakeholder's support by taking advantage of CPA's expertise.

目錄
第壹章	緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究架構與流程 4
第貳章	文獻探討與假說發展 6
第一節 企業社會責任 6
第二節 盈餘管理與企業社會責任之關聯 16
第三節 產業專精對盈餘管理及CSR確信的影響 19
第四節 假說發展 21
第參章	研究方法 24
第一節 樣本選取與資料來源 24
第二節 實證模型與變數定義 26
第肆章	實證結果 33
第一節 敘述性統計 33
第二節 迴歸結果 39
第三節 額外分析 43
第伍章	結論與建議 46
第一節 研究結論 46
第二節 管理意涵 47
第三節 研究限制與建議 48
參考文獻 49

表目錄
表2-1 國內外學者及機構組織對企業社會責任之定義 6
表2-2 Wood (1991)企業社會績效模型 9
表2-3 確信(保證)準則整理 15
表3-1 觀察值篩選過程表 25
表3-2 年度樣本分佈 25
表3-3 控制變數及變數定義 31
表4-1 敘述性統計量 35
表4-2 差異性檢定 36
表4-3 有第三方確信之相關係數矩陣 37
表4-4 會計師確信之相關係數矩陣 38
表4-5 應計基礎盈餘管理之迴歸結果 41
表4-6 實質盈餘管理之迴歸結果 42
表4-7 拔靴法下應計基礎盈餘管理之迴歸結果 44
表4-8 拔靴法下實質盈餘管理之迴歸結果 45

圖目錄
圖1-1研究流程圖 5
圖2-1 Barnett (2007)企業資源配置類型 10

中文文獻
吳泰霖與、林竹軒，2016，出具經認證的企業社會責任報告書與盈餘管理之關聯，國立成功大學會計學系研究所碩士論文。
李永全、林秀柑與黃偉傑，2013，會計師事務所獨立性和專業能力對實質盈餘管理 的影響，僑光學報，第36期：91-106。
李宜樺、張瑞婷與柯沛均，2014，如何提升企業社會責任報告的公信力，會計研究月刊，第340期：69-75。
林凱薰、孔繁華與林貞靜，2017，企業社會責任與實質活動盈餘管理：中國之實證，中華會計學刊，第12卷S期：537-574。
翁子涵與、黃惠君，2015，實質盈餘管理與會計師產業專業及審計公費之關聯性：公司管理階層對審計品質之認知，當代會計，第16卷第2期：211-249。
翁望回，1987，企業正當性之實證研究：社會責任的觀點，國立政治大學企業管理研究所博士論文。
高希均與林宜諄，2008，企業社會責任入門手冊，台北：天下遠見。
張振山與包幸玉，2004，我國資訊公開制度之探討，證券暨期貨月刊，第22卷，第4期：15-24。
張瑞生，2010，企業實踐社會責任之歷程及模式建構研究－以臺灣電子科技為例，國立臺灣師範大學社會教育研究所博士論文。
曾乾豪、張瑀珊與薛敏正，2012，個別會計師查核簽證家數與企業盈餘品質，中華會計學刊，第8卷第2期：217-256。
黃正忠，2001，企業社會責任-滿足變遷中的期望，台北：社團法人中華民國企業永續發展協會。
黃雅芸與、林谷峻，2015，企業負面事件與盈餘管理之關聯，淡江大學會計學系碩士班碩士論文。
黃鈺娟、吳冠勳、陳韻珊與石又澄，2016，企業社會責任績效對資訊不對稱之影響：從公司治理機制作分析，商業現代化學刊，第8卷第2期：355-370。
楊雅雯與、姜家訓，2005，會計師事務所之產業專精及查核年資與盈餘品質之關係，當代會計，第6卷第1期：23-60。
楊維仁與蘇淑慧，2014，盈餘管理、財務績效與企業社會責任之關聯性研究，國立臺中科技大學會計資訊碩士班。
廖婉鈞、林月雲與虞邦祥，2009，知覺組織利害關係人重要程度與組織績效之關係：企業責任作為之中介效果，管理學報，第26卷第2期：213-232。
劉謹銓，2015，強化CSR報告書的公信力－透過獨立公正的第三方查證，BSI，第131期電子報。
鄧雨賢、杜榮瑞與許文馨，2017，企業社會責任報告書之確信服務提供者、確信程度及產業專家與可信度之關聯：實驗研究，中華會計學刊第12卷第S期：503-536。
錢為家，2009，企業社會責任實務全書，台北：商周出版。

英文文獻
Ackerman, R. W. 1975. The social challenge to business. Cambridge, MA: Harard University Press.
Baber, W., P. Fairfield and J. Haggard. 1991. The Effect of concern about reported income on discretionary spending decision: The case of research and development. The Accounting Review 66(4): 818-829.
Balsam, S., J. Krishnan, and J. S. Yang. 2003. Auditor industry specialization and earnings quality.  Auditing: A Journal of Practice and& Theory 22(2): 71-97.
Barnett, M. 2007. Stakeholder influence capacity and the variability of financial returns to corporate social responsibility. Academy of Management. The Academy of Management Review 32(3): 794-816.
Bowen, H. R. 1953. Social Responsibilities of the Businessman. New York: Harper.
Cahan, S. F., C. Chen, L. Chen, and N. H.Nguyen. 2015. Corporate social responsibility and media coverage. Journal of Banking and Finance 59: 409-422.
Carcello, J. V., and A. L. Nagy. 2004. Client size, auditor specialization and fraudulent financial reporting.  Managerial. Auditing Journal 19(5): 651-668.
Carcello, J., and A. Nagy. 2002. Auditor industry specialization and fraudulent financial reporting. Proceedings of the 2002 Deloitte and Touche/ University of Kansas Symposium on auditing problems.
Carlson, S. J., and C. T. Bathala. 1997. Ownership differences and firms’ income smoothing behavior.  Journal of Business Finance and& Accounting 24(2): 179-196.
Carroll, A. B. 1979. A three-dimensional conceptual model of corporate performance.  The Academy of Management Review 4(4): 497-505.
Carroll, A. B. 1991. The pyramid of corporate social responsibility: toward the moral management of organizational stakeholders.  Business Horizon 34(4): 39-48.
Clinch, G. 1991. Employee compensation and firms’ research and development activity. Journal of Accounting Research 29: 59-78.
Cohen D. A., and P. Zarowin. 2010. Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings.  Journal of Accounting and& Economics 50(1): 2-19.
Davis, K. 1960. Can business afford to ignore social responsibilities? California Management Review 2(3): 70-76.
Dechow, P. and R. G. Sloan. 1991. Executive incentive and the horizon problem: an empirical investigation.  Journal of Accounting and Economics 14(1): 51-89.
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1995. Detecting earnings management.  The Accounting Review 70 (2): 193-225.
Dhaliwal, D. S., R. Suresh, A. Tsang, and Y. G. Yang. 2012. Nonfinancial disclosure and analyst forecast accuracy: International evidence on corporate social responsibility disclosure. The Accounting Review 87(3): 723-759.
Drucker P. F. 1974. Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices. New York: Harper and Row.
Frederick, W. C. 1960. The growing concern over business responsibility. California Management Review 2(4): 54-61.
Graham, J. R., C. R. Harvey, and S. Rajgopal. 2005. The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 40(1-3): 3-73.
Guay, W. R., P. Kothari, and R. L. Watts. 1996. A market-base evaluation of discretionary accrual. Journal of Accounting Research 34: 83-105.
Hemingway, C. A., and P. W. Maclagan. 2004. Managers’ personal values as drivers of corporate social responsibility. Journal of Business Ethic 50(1): 33-44.
Hong, Y. and M. L. Andersen. 2011. The relationship between corporate social responsibility and earnings management: an exploratory study. Journal of Business Ethics 104(4): 461-471
Huang, X. B. and L. Watson. 2015. Corporate social responsibility research in accounting. Journal of Accounting Literature 34: 1–16.
Kim, Y., M. S. Park, and B. Wier. 2012. Is earnings quality associated with corporate social responsibility? The Accounting Review 87(3): 761-796.
Kothari, S. P., A. J. Leone, and C. Wasley. 2005. Performance matched discretionary accrual measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39(1): 163–197.
Krishnan, G. V. 2003. Does big 6 auditor industry expertise constrain earnings management?  Accounting Horizons 17: 1-16.
Liao, Y. S., L. H. Kao, T. S. Shan, and K. H. Wu. 2014. Corporate social responsibility and accounting conservatism. Journal of Commercial Modernization 7(4): 129-160.
Mcwilliams, A., D. S. Siegel, and P. M. Wright. 2006. Guest editors’ introduction corporate social responsibility: Strategic implications. Journal of Management Studies 43(1): 1–18.
Miguel, A., J. Pindado, and C. de la Torre. 2004. Ownership structure and firm value: New evidence from Spain. Strategic Management Journal 25: 1119–1207.
Musteen, M., D. K. Datta, and B. Kemmerer. 2009. Corporate reputation: do board characteristics matter? British Journal of Management 21(4): 498–510. 
Neubaum, D. O., and S. A. Zahra. 2006. Institutional ownership and corporate social performance: The moderating effects of investment horizon, activism, and coordination. Journal of Management Journal of Management 32(1): 108-1–31.
Nisbett, R. E., and T. D. Wilson. 1977. The halo effect: evidence for unconscious alteration of judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35(4): 250-256.
Porter, M. E., and M. R. Kramer. 2002. The competitive advantage of corporate philanthropy. Harvard Business Review 80 (12): 56-68.
Preston, L. E., and J. E. Post 1975. Private management and public policy: the principle of public responsibility. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Prior D., J. Surroca, and J. A. Tribó. 2008. Are socially responsible managers really ethical? Exploring the relationship between earnings Management and corporate social responsibility. Corporate Governance: An International Review 16(3): 160-177.
Roychowdhury, S. 2006. Earnings management through real activities manipulation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42: 335-370.
Schwartz, M. S., and A. B. Carroll. 2003. Corporate social responsibility: a three-domain approach. Business Ethics Quarterly 13(4): 503-530.
Simunic, D. A. 1984. Auditing, consulting, and auditor independence. Journal of Accounting Research 22(2): 679-702.
Solomon, I., M. D. Shields, and O. R. Whittington. 1999. What do industry-specialist auditors know? Journal of Accounting Research 37(1): 191-208.
Thorndike, E. L. 1920. A constant error in psychological ratings. Journal of Applied Psychology 4 (1): 25-29.
Walton, C. C. 1967. Corporate social responsibility. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman. 1978. Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards. The Accounting Review; Sarasota 53(1): 112-134.
Wood, D. J. 1991. Corporate social performance revisited.  Academy of Management Review 16(4): 691-718.
Zahra S. A., R. L. Priem, and A. A. Rasheed. 2005. The antecedents and consequences of top management fraud.  Journal of Management 31(6): 803-828.
Zang, A. Y. 2012. Evidence on the trade-off between real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management.  The Accounting Review 87(2): 675-703.