本研究主要在探討公司治理與政治關聯性對中國企業海外上市決策之影響。中國政府自證券市場發展初期即選擇部分國有企業赴海外證券市場上市以其改善國有企業的公司治理，因此預期海外上市公司的公司治理機制優於其他中國上市公司。另外，由於海外上市公司大多為國有企業之性質，其海外上市決策易受政治因素影響，包括達成經濟計劃目標、提升國際聲譽、改革國有企業績效及提升政府人物影響力等目的，因此預期海外上市公司會比其他中國上市公司存在較高程度的政治關聯性。第二部分，本研究探討中國海外上市公司是否隨中國的法規制度改革，改善公司治理，因而提升會計資訊品質；以及海外上市後，公司治理是否會因遵循上市地較嚴格的監管規範而改善。
本研究針對2003年至2008年在香港交易所上市之H股公司為研究對象，主要研究發現為(1) H股公司比A股較少存在控制股東、存在較高程度股權制衡、存在較多獨立董事人數以及較少存在董事長兼任總經理。(2)H股公司比A股公司存在較多管理階層或董事長具備政府官員或軍方職務的經歷及較大之規模。第二部分的實證結果並未支持H股公司具備盈餘穩健性，另結果證實了H股公司會計盈餘穩健性的程度優於A股公司。

This study examines the effect of corporate governance and political connection on overseas listing decision of Chinese H-share companies. At the initial stage of securities market development, Chinese government picked some state-owned enterprises to go public in overseas securities markets for improving their corporate governance. Therefore, it is expected that the corporate governance mechanisms of overseas listed companies will be superior to other Chinese listed companies. Besides, as most of the overseas listed companies belong to state-owned enterprises, their overseas listing strategies, for realizing economic planning goals, raising international reputation, improving their performances and enhancing political figures’ influence, are susceptible to political factors. Therefore, it is expected that these overseas listed companies will have higher-degree political connection than other Chinese listed companies. In its second part, this study explores whether the Chinese companies listed overseas will make reform according to relevant Chinese regulation systems to improve their corporate governance, and thus further to improve the quality of accounting information. Besides, it explores whether the Chinese companies listed overseas will obtain improvement in corporate governance due to abiding by relatively strict supervision norms in the listing places.
Taking the H-share companies listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2008 as research objects, this study reaches the following major findings: (1) H-share company has fewer controlling shareholders than A-share company, with higher-degree of check-and-balance of stock ownership, more independent directors and fewer presidents serving as general manager concurrently; (2) H-share company has more management hierarchies or its president has experience in serving as   government official or holding a military post and it has larger scale than A-share company; (3) The empirical results of the second part of this study doesn’t support that H-share company has earnings conservatism, and the results demonstrate that the  degree of the earnings conservatism of H-share company is better than that of A-share company.

目錄
目錄I
表目錄II
圖目錄III
第壹章　緒論1
第一節　研究背景與動機1
第二節　研究目的4
第三節　研究架構5
第四節　研究流程6
第貳章　文獻探討與假說建立7
第一節　中國資本市場發展及海外上市公司背景7
第二節　公司治理與中國企業海外上市決策14
第三節　政治關聯性與中國企業海外上市決策21
第四節　海外上市公司盈餘品質23
第參章　研究方法29
第一節　研究模型及變數定義29
第二節　樣本選取與資料來源33
第肆章　實證結果與分析34
第一節　敘述性統計	34
第二節  迴歸結果分析38
第三節  敏感性測試	43
第伍章　結論47
第一節  研究結論47
第二節  研究限制與研究貢獻49
參考文獻50
中文部分50
英文部分51
 
表目錄
表1  H股公司產業分布情形12
表2  H股公司之規模12
表3  H股與A股整體融資額之比較(單位:億人民幣)13
表4  本研究樣本上市地點之分布33
表5  公司治理及政治關聯性之敘述性統計量35
表6  盈餘對訊息反映時效不對稱性之敘述性統計量36
表7  公司治理及政治關聯性之相關係數37
表8  公司治理與政治關聯性對中國企業海外上市決策之影響－LOGISTIC迴歸結果 40
表9  H股公司會計盈餘穩健之整體分析41
表10 H股及其他A股公司會計盈餘穩健性分析42
表11 LOGISTIC迴歸結果(敏感性測試)44
表12 H股公司會計盈餘穩健之整體分析(敏感性測試)45

 
圖目錄
圖1 研究流程圖6

參考文獻
中文部分
余雪明，2002，臺灣新公司法與獨立董事(上)，萬國法律，123 期，63頁。
沈紅波，2008，中國企業雙重上市與企業溢價研究，北京大學出版社。
林烱垚，1994，大陸證券市場現況，行政院大陸委員會。
康榮寶，2001，大陸上市公司治理結構之探討，證交資料，470期，1-23頁。
劉宏儒，1997，資本市場與利用外資－中國企業海外上市的背景與經過，論文導刊第7期。
潘越，2007，中國公司雙重上市行為研究，北京大學出版社。
英文部分
Ball, R., and Shivakumar, L., 2005. Earnings quality in UK private firms: comparative loss recognition timeliness. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39(1): 83-128.
Ball, R., Kothari, S. P., and Robin, A., 2000. The effect of international institutional factors on properties of accounting earnings. Journal of Accounting and   Economics 29(1): 1-51.
Ball, R., Robin, A., and Wu, J., 2003. Incentives versus standards: properties of accounting income in four East Asian countries. Journal of Accounting and   Economics 36(1-3): 235-270.
Bartov, E., and Bodnar, G., 1996. Alternative accounting methods, information asymmetryand liquidity: theory and evidence. The Accounting Review 71(3): 397-418.
Basu, S., 1997. The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings.  Journal of Accounting and Economics 24(1): 3-37.
Beasley, M. S., 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review 71: 443-465.
Beaver, W. H., and Ryan, S. G., 2005. Conditional and unconditional conservatism: concepts and modeling. Review of Accounting Studies 10(2-3): 269-276. 
Berle, A., and Means. G., 1932. The modern corporation and private property. MacMillan, New York, N. Y. Vol. 5.
Boone, J., and Ramam, K., 2001. Off-balance sheet R&D assets and market liquidity. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 20(2): 97-128.
Bushman, R., Chen, Q., Engel, E., and Smith, A., 2000. The sensitivity of corporate governance systems to the timeliness of accounting earnings. Working paper, University of Chicago.
Bushman, R. M., and Piotroski, J. D., 2006. Financial reporting incentives for conservative accounting: the influence of legal and political institutions. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42(1-2): 107-148.
Chen, C. J. P., and Jaggi, B., 2000. Association between independent nonexecutive directors, family control and financial disclosures in Hong Kong. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 19: 285-310.
Chtourou, S. M., Bedard, J., and Courteau, L., 2001. Corporate governance and earnings management. Working Paper, University of Laval.
Clasessens, S., Djankov S., Fan, JPH., and Lang LHP., 2000. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of finance 57: 2741-2771.
Coffee, J., 1999. The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications. Northwestern University Law Review 93: 641-708.
Coffee, J., 2002. Racing towards the top? The impact of cross-listings and stock market competition on international corporate governance. Columbia Law Review 102: 1757-1831.
Cull, R., and Xu, L. C., 2005. Institutions, ownership and finance: The determinants of profitre investment among Chinese firms. Journal of Financial Economics 77: 117-146.
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., and Ellstrand, A. E., 1999. Number of directors and financial performance: a meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal 42: 674-686.
DeFond, M., Wong, T., and Li, S., 2000. The impact of improved auditor independence on audit market concentration in China. Journal of Accounting and Economics 28(3): 269-305. 
Ding, Y., and Su, X., 2008. Implementation of IFRS in a regulated market. Account  Public Policy 27: 474–479. 
Ezzamel, M., Xiao, J. Z., and Pan, A., 2007. Political ideology and accounting regulation in China. Accounting, Organizations and Society 32(7-8): 669-700.
Faccio, M., 2002. Politically connected firms: can they squeeze the state? Unpublished Working Paper. University of Notre Dame, Indiana.
Fama, E. F., and Jensen, M. C., 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Lawand Economics 26: 301-325.
Fan, P. H., and Wong, T. J., 2005. Politically-Connected CEOs, Corporate Governanceand Post-IPO Performance of China's Newly Partially Privatized Firms. working paper.
Fan, J., Wong, T., and Zhang, T., 2007. Politically-Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance and Post-IPO Performance of China’s Newly Partially Privatized Firms. Journal of Financial Economics 84: 330-357.
Foerster, S. R., and Karolyi, G. A., 1999. The effects of market segmentation and investor recognition on asset prices: Evidence from foreign stocks listing in the U.S. Journal of Finance 54(3): 981-1013.
Giner, B., and Rees, W., 2001. On the asymmetric recognition of good and bad news in France, Germany, and United Kingdom. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 28(9-10): 1285-1331.
Gul, F. A., 2006. Auditors’ response to political connections and cronyism in  Malaysia. Journal of Accounting Research 44(5): 931-963.
Higgs Report, 2003. Review of the role and effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors. Department of Trade and Industry, London.
Huijgen, C., and Lubberink, M., 2005. Earnings conservatism, litigation, and contracting: the case cross-listed firms. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 32(7-8): 1275-1309. 
Hung, M., Wong, T. J., and Zhang, T., 2008. Political relations and overseas stock   exchange listing: evidence from Chinese State-Owned Enterprises. Working   Paper, University of Southern California, The Chinese University of Hong Kong and City University of Hong Kong, http://www.eern.com (August 2008 version accessed 2 September 2008).
Jensen, M. C., 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance 48: 831-880.
Jensen, M., and Meckling, W., 1976. Theory of the film: Managerial behavior, agency costsand ownership structure. Journal of Financial economics 3: 305-360.
Kadlec, G., and McConnell, J., 1994. The Effect of Market Segmentation and Illiquidity on Asset Prices: Evidence from Exchange Listings. Journal of Finance 49: 611-636.
Lai, C., and Taylor, S., 2008. Estimating and validating a firm-year specific measure of conservatism: Australian evidence, Paper presented at AFAANZ conference, Sydney, Australian, 6-8 July.
Lang, M. H., Raedy, J. S., and Yetman, M. H., 2003. How representative are firms that are cross-listed in the United States? An analysis of accounting quality. Journal   of Accounting Research 41: 363-386.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, F. A., and Vishny, R. W., 1997. Legal Determinants of External Finance. Journal of Finance 52: 1131-1150.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, F. A., and Vishny, R. W., 1998. Law and Finance. Journal of Political Economy 106: 1113-1155.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A., 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance 54: 471-517.
Lau, S., Diltz, D., and Apilado, V., 1994. Valuation effects of international stock exchange listings. Journal of Banking and Finance 18: 743-755.
Lee, I., 1991. The impact of overseas listings on shareholder wealth: The case of the London and Toronto stock exchanges. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 18: 583-592. 
Leuz, C., and Oberholer-Gee, F., 2006. Political relationships, global financing, and corporate transparency: Evidence from Indonesia. Journal of Financial Economics 81: 411-439.
Mittoo, U. R., 1992. Managerial Perceptions of the Net Benefit of Foreign Listing: Canadian Evidence. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting 4: 40-62.
Moel, A., 1999. The Role of Information Disclosure on Stock Market Listing Decisions: the Case of Foreign Firms Listing in the U.S. Working Paper, Harvard Business School, Boston, M A, 1999. 
OECD. 1999. Principles of Corporate Governance.
Pagano, M., and Röell, A., 1998. The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring and the Decision to Go Public. Quarterly Journal of Economics 113: 187-225.
Pagano, M., Röell, A. A., and Zechner, J., 2002. The geography of equity listing: Why do companies list abroad? Journal of Finance 57: 2651-2694.
Pearce, J. A., and Zahra, S., 1992. Board composition from a strategic contingency perspective. Journal of Management Studies 29: 411–438.
Pope, P., and Walker, M., 1999. International differences in timeliness, conservatism and classification of earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 37(3): 53-99.
Pound, J., 1988. Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 237-265.
Rechner, P. L., and Dalton, D. R., 1989. The impact of CDO as board chairperson on corporate performance: Evidence vs rhetoric. Academy of Management Executive 3: 141-143.
Roychowdhury, S., and Watts, R. L., 2007. Asymmetric timeliness of earnings, market-to-book and conservatism in financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 44(1): 2-31.
Shari, M., 1998. A tycoon under siege. Business Week. 28/09/1998, 26.
Sarkissian, S., and Schill, M., 2004. The overseas listing decision: New evidence of proximity preference. Review of Financial Studies 17: 769-809.
Sharma, V. D., 2004. Board of Director Characteristics, Institutional Ownership, and Fraud: Evidence from Australia. Journal of Practice & Theory 23(2).
Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R., 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 94: 461-488.
Standard and Poor’s. 2002. Corporate Ratings Criteria. New York. 
Stapleton, D., and Subrahmanyan, M., 1977. Market imperfection, Capital Market E- quilibrium and Corporate Finance. Journal of Finance 32: 307-319.
Sterling, R. R., 1970. The theory of the measurement of enterprise income. University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, KS.
Stulz, R. M., 1999. Globalization, Corporate Finance, and the Cost of Capital. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 12: 8-25.
Sun, Q., and Tong, W., 2000. The effect of market segmentation on stock prices: The China syndrome. Journal of Banking & Finance 24(12): 1875-1902.
Sun, Q., Tong, W., and Wu, Y., 2006. The choice of foreign primary listing: China’s share-issue privatization experience. Working Paper, Hong Kong Polytechnic University.
Sunder, S., 1997. Theory of Accounting and Control. South-Western, Cincinnati, OH.
Torabzadeh, K., Bertin, W., and Zivney, T., 1992. Valuation effects of international listings. Global Finance Journal 3: 159-170.
Varela, O., and Lee, S., 1993. International listings, the security market line and capital market integration: The case of U.S. listings on the London stock exchange. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 20: 843-863.
Watts, R. L., 2003. Conservatism in Accounting Part I: Explanations and Implications. Accounting Horizons17 (September): 207-221.
Wiwattanakantang, Y., Kali, R., and Charumlind, C., 2006. Connected lending: Thailand before the financial crisis. Journal of Business 79 (1): 181–217.
World Bank. 1999. Corporate Governance: A Framework for Implementation- Overview, The World Bank, Washington D. C.
Xiao, J., Zhang, Y., and Xie, Z., 2000. The making of independent auditing standards in China. Accounting Horizons 14(1): 69-89. 
Xie, B., Davidson, W. N., and DaDalt, P. J., 2003. Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of Corporate Finance 9: 295-316.
Xu, L. C., Zhu, T., and Lin, Y. M., 2005. Politician control, agency problems, and firm performance: evidence from a national survey of ownership restructuring in China. Economics of Transition 13 (1): 1–24.
Yang, T., and Lau, S. T., 2006. Choice of foreign listing location: Experience of Chinese firms. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 14: 311-326.