Thakor (2005)所發表的文章 “Do Loan Commitments Cause Overlending?”，主要是在探討銀行的放款承諾是否會造成過度放款的相關問題。然而，該篇著作所得到的結論為，當在整體經濟是處於一個經濟繁榮期時，銀行的放款承諾是會造成過度放款的問題。本文是從銀行機構的角度進行探討，故不同於Thakor (2005)所探討的經濟週期的宏觀經濟條件。而本文旨在探討當銀行對於其權益報酬風險認知的不確定性，以及運用內部及外部資金來進行銀行的放款承諾，是否也會造成銀行過度放款的問題。

    在此種觀點本文提出，若銀行真的發生過度放款的情況，風險認知從微觀的權益風險認知轉換成宏觀的經濟週期，會造成銀行經營更無效率。本文的結論指出，在低度風險狀態時，放款承諾是有可能造成銀行過度放款的情況發生，故銀行必須審慎地檢視放款承諾借款人的財務背景及還款能力，否則將會使信用過度擴張，導致銀行有發生財務危機的風險。

Do loan commitments cause overlending?  Thakor (2005) argues that the answer is positive during economic booms.  Our paper uses a micro-level economic risk realization, unlike the paper Thakor (2005) used before.  Under this view, if there is real overlending, realization switched to the business cycle from the equity return risk could lead to large bank inefficiencies.  The conclusion is if the bank is in a less risky state of the world, loan commitments will cause overlending.  Under this view, our paper offer some suggestions to bank managers, in order to avoid the highly credit expansion and financial losses.

中文摘要	.............................................II
英文摘要.............................................III
目錄 .................................................IV
圖表目錄 .............................................VI

第一章  緒論 .........................................	1
第一節  研究動機 ......................................2
第二節  研究目的 ......................................5
第三節  研究方法 ......................................6
第四節  研究架構 ......................................7

第二章  文獻探討 .....................................10
第一節  選擇權評價模式與利率制定之相關文獻 ...........10
第二節  銀行放款承諾之相關文獻 .......................16
第三節  風險變動與銀行利率制定行為之相關文獻 .........21

第三章  模型架構與假設 ...............................27
第一節  架構概念 .....................................28
第二節  模型假設 .....................................33
第三節  選擇權評價模式 ...............................39
第四節  模型建立 .....................................42

第四章  均衡模型條件與比較靜態分析 ...................50
第一節  均衡模型條件 .................................50
第二節  比較靜態分析 .................................53
第三節  動態調整 .....................................60
第五章  結論 .........................................64
參考文獻 .............................................67

圖表目錄

圖1-1：本文研究架構 ..................................9
圖3-1：銀行利潤函數 .................................42
圖4-1：最適放款利率調整過程：邊際淨負債觀點 .........61
圖4-2：最適放款利率調整過程：邊際放款收益觀點 .......61
圖4-3：最適放款承諾利率調整過程：邊際淨負債觀點 .....62
圖4-4：最適放款承諾利率調整過程：邊際放款收益觀點 ...63
表2-1：選擇權評價模式與利率制定之相關文獻 ...........15
表2-2：銀行放款承諾之相關文獻 .......................21
表2-3：風險變動與銀行利率制定行為之相關文獻 .........25
表3-1：生產性廠商與金融性廠商之比較 .................33

中文部份

丁美蓉(2001)，「存款保險、銀行隱藏行為與利差管理」，淡江大學國際企業學研究所碩士論文。

王惠光(1992)，「公司債權人、受託人的地位與權限」，證券市場發展季刊，第13 期，頁40-56。

王韻婷(2005)，「資本管制與存款保險下之銀行最適利差與違約風險：選擇權評價分析」，淡江大學國際貿易學系國際企業學研究所碩士論文。

呂麒麟(1997)，「不對稱資訊下之放款承諾：廠商觀點」，中山大學企業管理研究所博士論文。

林炯垚(1988)，「公司代理關係對股東權益的影響」，證券管理，第12 期，頁2-6。

林峻嘉(2000)，「銀行廠商的存款、放款行為決策－或有請求權分析法」，淡江大學國際貿易學系國際企業學研究所碩士論文。

周繼儒(2003)，「銀行利率制訂行為與金融電子商務涉入決策－選擇權訂價模式分析」，淡江大學國際貿易學系碩士在職專班碩士論文。

胡貞如(2005)，「銀行對生產性廠商之投資策略分析－以權益評價模式分析」，淡江大學國際貿易學系國際企業學碩士班碩士論文。


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