論文提要內容：

   美國從艾森豪政府時期開始逐漸涉入越南事務，一九四五年至一九五四年第一次印度支那戰爭期間，艾森豪總統越南政策採取「越戰國際化」方針，給予法國龐大經濟與軍事支援，期待法國消滅越南共黨勢力，然而一九五四年越盟於奠邊府擊敗法國，造成法國勢力撤出越南。法國撤出越南象徵艾森豪「越戰國際化」策略的失敗，爾後美國利用日內瓦會議防止共黨赤化越南，並且在一九五五年支持吳廷琰在北緯十七度線以南建立越南共和國，艾森豪總統欲利用「爭取時間」策略幫助南越建國，因此美國與吳廷琰展開長達八年合作。
    甘迺迪總統於一九六一年上任後，雖未全盤接收艾森豪越南政策，卻支持艾森豪總統不對越南採取軍事干預越南的精神。甘迺迪政府初期，美國東南亞政策焦點在於寮國內戰，使得美國對南越歷經數個月模糊態度。一九六一年五月美國副總統詹森造訪南越，詹森此行應允吳廷琰增加美對越援助，強化美國對南越之承諾。甘迺迪總統於一九六一年十月派遣泰勒與羅斯托前往南越考察，兩人探知南越內部獨立建國意願，建立獨立暨非共南越成為甘迺迪越南政策理想性目標，而兩人考察報告的中心思想「有限夥伴關係」成為越南政策務實性方針，「有限夥伴關係」方針乃避免軍事干預越南的最佳選擇。
    美國越南政策於一九六一年年底確立方針後，華府開始尋求鞏固南越政府的方法，雖然艾森豪時期利用「爭取時間」策略為南越建立獨立自主政府，由於艾森豪與吳廷琰過度強調南越內部安全而忽略南越政治、經濟的發展，使得南越政府極度缺乏民意支持，美國於一九六二年規劃「市民行動計畫」、「戰略村計畫」兩項具體政策期望為南越爭取民意。南越在實施此兩項計畫的過程中，吳廷琰扭曲美國對此兩項計畫的原意，將此兩項計畫視為控制南越人民的手段，加上吳廷琰推動此兩項計畫過快，造成此兩項計畫無法達成其目的。華府在一九六二年除尋求鞏固南越政府的方法外，南越在一九六二年軍事方面有大幅度進展，使得美國對於南越抱持樂觀態度，甚至擬定階段性撤出駐越軍事顧問團，但是一九六二年年底美國駐越媒體大幅報導南越政府負面消息與曼斯菲爾參議員南越考察報告，替美國對南越情勢評估帶來變數。
    美國與南越關係於一九六三年產生劇烈變化，由於南越內部佛教徒危機，吳廷琰處理佛教徒危機的反應與態度，讓美國與南越之間產生不信任感，南越社會內部開始動盪不安。同年八月二十四日國務院對駐越大使館發出一封支持軍事政變的電報，使得南越軍方開始規劃軍事政變，同年九月至十月，華府內部為是否支持吳廷琰展開一系列辯論，最後華府決定不積極支持軍事政變，並且給予吳廷琰挽救情勢的機會，然而美國卻未積極阻止南越軍方推動軍事政變。一九六三年十一月初南越爆發軍事政變，吳廷琰政權遭受推翻，南越情勢急轉直下，甘迺迪越南政策未達成協助南越獨立建國的目的，美國與南越雙方皆需要為政策失敗負責。

Abstract:
    The Americans gradually intervened in Vietnamese Affairs from the Eisenhower Administration. During the First Indochina War, President Eisenhower exploited“Internationalization of the Vietnam War”. He gave France economic and military support in order to defeat the Vietnamese communists. However, the French forces were defeated by Vietminh in Dienbienphu, which prompted France to retreat from Vietnam. The retreat of France represented the failure of Internationalization of the Vietnam War. Hereafter, the Americans used the Geneva Conference to prevent Vietnam from being communized. After the Gevneva Conference ended, the Americans supported Ngo Dinh Diem in establishing the Republic of Vietnam in Southern Vietnam in 1955. President Eisenhower wanted to exploit this as a well of“buying time”to build an independent South Vietnam and thus, started to cooperate with Diem for the next eight years.
    Kennedy succeeded Eisenhower as American President in 1961. He did not accept all of Eisenhower’s Vietnam policy fully, but his Vietnam policy succeeded Eisenhower’s    spirit--- American forces did not enter Vietnam. At the beginning of the Kennedy Administration, American Southeast Asia policy focused on Laos. Thus, American and South Vietnamese relations had been in ambiguity for several months in 1961. In May 1961, American Vice President Johnson visited South Vietnam, and he agreed with Diem , when  Diem asked for extra aid in Johnson’s trip. In this way, the Americans added their promise to the South Vietnamese. President Kennedy sent Taylor and Rostow to inspect South Vietnam in October 1961. Taylor and Rostow received South Vietnamese active responses of building an independent country. Therefore, building an independent and noncommunist South Vietnam became the idealism for American Vietnam policy. The central thought of Taylor-Rostow Mission report focused on limited partnership, and this was the pragmatism of American Vietnam policy. “Limited partnership” became the best reason to avoid sending American forces to Vietnam.
    After having a definite direction to Vietnam policy in late 1961, Washington started finding ways to strengthen the South Vietnamese government. Although President Eisenhower wanted to build an independent South Vietnam, its government was still lacking civilian support, because Eisenhower and Diem over-emphasised on security problems and ignored political and economic developments in South Vietnam. The Americans designed two concrete plans, firstly, the “Civic Action Program” and secondly, the “Strategic Helmet Program,”to attract civilian support for the South Vietnamese government. However, Diem curved the original purposes of the two plans, and considered them as ways of controlling the South Vietnamese. Besides Diem’s attitude toward the two plans, they operated too fast to fulfill their purpose. In 1962, America was optimistic about military advancement in South Vietnam, all except finding ways to strengthen the South Vietnamese government. Thus, America started to plan to retreat its Military Assistance and Advisory Group from South Vietnam in phases. However, news from American reporters’ about Diem regime and Senator Mansfield Report brought negative effects to America’s evaluation of the situation in South Vietnam.
   American and South Vietnamese relations changed drastically in 1963, because the Buddhist Crisis burst out in South Vietnam. Washington and Saigon did not trust each other due to Diem’s stubborn attitude towards the Buddhist Crisis, and the harmony of South Vietnamese society was crushed down. In August 24th 1963, the Department of State passed a telegram to the American embassy in Saigon which announced support for a coup in Vietnam. Thus, South Vietnamese military officials started planning a coup. In Washington, the officials argued that if Diem should be overthrown at a series of conferences in September and October 1963. Finally, America decided not to support a coup actively and gave Diem’s regime a chance to save the situation. However, America did not stop the development of a coup in South Vietnam. A coup occurred in early November 1963 in Saigon. After Diem was overthrown, the situation in South Vietnam rapidly worsened. To sum up, Kennedy’s Vietnam policy did not live up to its purpose. Both Washington and Saigon should be held responsible for the failure of American Vietnam policy.

目  錄

第壹章 緒論..............................................1

第貳章 後日內瓦會議時期(一九五五年至一九六 O年)之美越關係.13

第一節 日內瓦會議後美國對南越政局規劃...................14
第二節 後日內瓦會議時期艾森豪政府越南政策...............20
第三節 艾森豪政府越南政策遺緒(legacy)...................28

第參章 從模糊態度轉向「有限夥伴關係」的越南政策.........35

第一節 寮國危機.........................................36
第二節 從模糊態度至深化承諾的轉變.......................43
第三節「有限夥伴關係」政策之醞釀與定調..................50

第肆章 加速鞏固南越政府.................................58  

第一節  尋求鞏固南越政府之方............................59
第二節  戰略村計畫......................................65
第三節  充滿樂觀與不確定性之南越局勢....................73

第伍章 美國對越南外交政策之逆轉.........................81

第一節 美越關係之摩擦與佛教徒事件之影響.................82
第二節 華府對吳廷琰政權存廢之辯論.......................90
第三節 吳廷琰政府崩潰與其遺緒...........................98

第陸章 結論.............................................104

參考書目................................................109

參考書目
壹、	中文部分

書籍與專著

徐正明。美國對越南政策(一九五四年至一九六三年)之研究。台北：政治大學政治研究所碩士論文，民國五十八年。

周順發。對美國政府越戰政策的檢討。台北：中國文化大學中美關係研究所碩士論文，民國六十九年。

林澤男。從新現實主義、理性主義、博奕理論看越戰。台北：淡江大學美國研究所碩士論文，民國八十一年。

申旭。老撾史。昆明市：雲南大學出版社，西元一九九O年。

貳、	英文部分

I.	Official Documents

National Intelligence Council. Estimative Products on Vietnam 1948-1975. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005.

United States Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Vol. 12. East Asia and the Pacific. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1984. (Foreign Relations of the United States will be hereafter abbreviated as FRUS.)

------ FRUS, 1952-1954. Vol. 13. Indochina. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1982.

------ FRUS, 1955-1957. Vol. 1. Vietnam. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1985.

------ FRUS, 1958-1960. Vol. 1. Vietnam. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1988.

------ FRUS, 1961-1963. Vol. 1. Vietnam, 1961. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1988.

------ FRUS, 1961-1963. Vol. 2. Vietnam, 1962. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1990.

------ FRUS, 1961-1963. Vol. 3. Vietnam, January- August 1963. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1991.

------ FRUS, 1961-1963. Vol. 4. Vietnam, August-December 1963. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1991.

II.	Books

Adams, Nina S. ed. Laos: War and Revolution. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.
Ambrose, Stephen E. Eisenhower, Vol. 2. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983-1984.

Anderson, David L. Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.

Cameron, Allen W., ed. Vietnam Crisis: A Documentary History, Vol. 1. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972

Collins, J. Lawton. Lighting Joe: An Autobiography. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1979.

Cooper, Chester L. The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1970.

Dommen, Arthur J. Laos: Keystone of Indochina. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985.

Duiker, William J. The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981.

------ Scared War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam. New York: McGraw Hill, 1995.

Duncanson, Dennis J. Government and Revolution in Vietnam. New York: Oxford University, 1968.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. Waging Peace, 1956-61. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965.
FitzGerald, Frances. Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972.

Gelb, Leslie H. The Irony of Vietnam: the System Worked. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1979.

Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996.

Hess, Gary R. Vietnam and the United States: Origin and Legacy of War. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1988.

Hilsman, Roger. To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1967. 

Kaiser, David. American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000.

Kinnard, Douglas. The Certain Trumpet: Maxwell Taylor & The American Experience in Vietnam. Washington: Brassey’s, 1991.

McNamara, Robert S. In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1995.

Newman, John M. JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power. New York, N.Y.: Warner Books, 1992. 
Nolting, Frederick. From Trust to Tragedy: The Political Memoirs of Frederick Nolting, Kennedy’s Ambassador to Diem’s Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1988.

Rostow, W. W. The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History. New York: MacMillan, 1972.

Rust, William J. Kennedy in Vietnam.New York: Scribner, 1985.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967.

------ Robert Kennedy and His Times. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978.

Schulzinger, Robert D. A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Scigliano, Robert. South Vietnam: Nation under Stress. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963.

Shaplen, Robert. The Lost Revolution. New York: Harper & Row, 1965.

Smith, R. B. An International History of the Vietnam War, Vol. 1: Revolution versus Containment, 1955-61. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983.

Spector, Ronald H. The United States Army in Vietnam: Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983.
Stuart-Fox, Martin. A History of Laos. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Williams, William A., ed. American in Vietnam: A Documentary History. New York: Norton, 1985.

III.	Periodicals

Cuddy, Edward. “Vietnam: Mr. Johnson’s War---Or Mr. Eisenhower’s?” Review of Politics, Vol.65, Issue 4, Fall 2003, pp. 351-374.

Gavin, Francis J. “Choosing Tragedy in Vietnam.” Orbis, Vol. 45, Issue 1, Winter 2001, pp. 135-142.

Herring, George C. “American and Vietnam: The Debate Continues.” American Historical Review, Vol. 92, Issue 2, April 1987, pp. 350-363.

Kentleton, John. “War and the President.” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 40, Issue 4, October 2005, pp.773-781.

Varsori, Antonio. “Britain and US Involvement in the Vietnam War during the Kennedy Administration, 1961-1963.” Cold War History, Vol. 3, Issue 2, January 2003, pp. 83-112.

Rusk, Dean. “The Stake in Viet-Nam.” Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 29, Issue 16, June 1963, pp. 493-497.

IV.	Internet Resources

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/index.htm