淡江大學覺生紀念圖書館 (TKU Library)
進階搜尋


  查詢圖書館館藏目錄
系統識別號 U0002-1707201119203800
中文論文名稱 政治關係對會計師事務所選擇之影響:中國上市公司之實證
英文論文名稱 Political Connection and Auditor Choice: Evidence from China
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accounting
學年度 99
學期 2
出版年 100
研究生中文姓名 林之嵐
研究生英文姓名 Chih-Lan Lin
學號 698600342
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2011-06-17
論文頁數 78頁
口試委員 指導教授-孔繁華
指導教授-徐志順
委員-丁誌魰
委員-賴丞坡
委員-曹修源
中文關鍵字 會計師事務所選擇  政治關係  國有企業  政商關聯  股權分置改革  中國 
英文關鍵字 Auditor choice  Political connection  State-owned enterprises  Politically-connected CEOs  Split-share structure reform  China 
學科別分類 學科別社會科學商學
中文摘要 由於社會經濟及股權分置等制度環境影響,中國上市公司多屬國有企業的性質,因此這些公司的營運決策容易受政治因素所影響,亦造成公司和政府之間存在著密切的政治關聯性。而中國早期為確保會計師事務所的品質,要求事務所必須掛靠在地方政府或是學術單位之下,造成其業務活動和市場佔有率亦與政治關係密不可分。這樣的中國審計市場特色,提供一個檢視企業政治關係與會計師事務所選擇的機會。本研究以中國2003至2009年在上海及深圳證券交易所上市的A股公司為樣本進行分析。資料來源為國泰安 (CSMAR)、台灣經濟新報 (TEJ)資料庫及中國註冊會計師協會,採用邏輯斯迴歸模型,測試樣本期間內中國上市公司政治關係對會計師事務所選擇之影響,並利用政商關聯、國有企業及國有股持股比率做為政治關係的替代變數,預期政治關聯度高的公司,可利用其政治關係優先取得投資與融資機會,所以企業對於雇用高品質的會計師事務所來顯示其高資訊品質的訊號需求就會降低。實證結果發現國有股及法人股持股比率愈高及股權制衡程度愈大的公司,愈會選擇前十大會計師事務所。然而具有政商關聯的公司,對外部人已傳遞一種無形保證,因此降低選擇十大會計師事務所的誘因。此外,由於中央國有企業的最終控股人係透過層層的控制鏈控制公司,為降低代理成本,較會選擇前十大會計師事務所。地方國有企業較仰賴地方會計師事務所與地方政府的密切關係與專業的地方知識,較不會選擇前十大會計師事務所。額外測試以修正式審計意見為審計品質之代理變數,實證結果顯示中國十大會計師事務所較會出具修正式審計意見,審計品質較高。
英文摘要 This study investigates the incremental effects of corporate political connections on auditor choice, examining data of Chinese listed companies which are listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2003 to 2009. For reasons of socioeconomic conditions and separation of ownership, a majority of the publicly traded Chinese companies are state-owned and their business operations are subject to political elements. The special characteristics of audit market in China provide an opportunity to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the auditor choice. State-owned enterprises and companies run by politically-connected CEOs are expected more likely to hire small auditors. This auditor choice pattern is likely to be explained by a lesser need to respond to market pressures, lack of demand for large auditors and collusion incentives. The empirical results show that since the reform in China, companies with more non-tradable shares and decreased state ownership are more likely to choose Big 10. Besides, central state-owned enterprises are more likely to hire Big 10. However, companies with politically-connected CEOs are less likely to hire Big 10.
論文目次 目錄
第壹章 緒論- 1 -
第一節 研究背景與動機- 1 -
第二節 研究目的- 4 -
第三節 研究架構- 4 -
第四節 研究流程- 6 -
第貳章 文獻探討- 7 -
第一節 中國審計市場制度背景- 7 -
第二節 中國資本市場制度背景- 9 -
第三節 會計師事務所選擇- 13 -
第四節 政治關係(Political Connection)- 20 -
第五節 政治關係與會計師事務所選擇- 25 -
第参章 研究方法- 33 -
第一節 資料來源與樣本選取- 33 -
第二節 變數衡量- 34 -
第三節 實證模型- 37 -
第肆章 實證結果- 40 -
第一節 敘述性統計與相關係數分析- 40 -
第二節 迴歸分析結果 - 47 -
第伍章 研究結論、限制與建議- 64 -
第一節 研究結論- 64 -
第二節 管理意涵- 67 -
第三節 研究限制與建議- 67 -
參考文獻- 69 -
【中文文獻】- 69 -
【英文文獻】- 71 -
圖目錄
圖1-1 研究流程圖- 6 -
圖4-1 按年度區分會計師事務所選擇及平均國有股持股比率- 42 -
圖4-2 中國各產業選擇十大會計師事務所情況- 43 -
表目錄
表3-1 會計師事務所綜合評價資訊- 35 -
表4-1 敘述性統計表- 41 -
表4-2 相關係數分析 46 -
表4-3 選擇中國前十大會計師事務所邏輯斯迴歸分析 - 個別變數- 52 -
表4-4 選擇中國前十大會計師事務所邏輯斯迴歸分析 - 政商關聯交乘項- 54 -
表4-5 額外測試邏輯斯迴歸分析- BIG 4- 58 -
表4-6 額外測試邏輯斯迴歸分析- Modified Audit Opinions (MAO)- 62 -
表4-7 額外測試順序邏輯斯迴歸分析- Modified Audit Opinions (MAO)- 63 -
參考文獻 【中文文獻】
王艷艷,2007。政府管制、所有權安排與會計師事務所選擇。廈門大學會計學博士學位論文。
王耀堂、趙子夜,2003。審計獨立風險的動因、環境及其治理。當代財經,第9期:109-112。
田利輝,2005。國有產權、預算軟約束和中國上市公司槓桿治理。管理世界,第7期:123-147。
伍利娜、朱春艷,2010。股權分置改革的審計治理效應。審計研究,第5期:73-81。
李文德,2009。股權分置改革對獨立審計的影響。當代經濟,第11 期:130-131。
吳曉求,2006。股權分置改革後的中國資本市場。北京:中國人民大學出版社。
吳文峰、吳沖鋒、劉曉薇,2008。中國民營上市公司高管的政府背景與公司價值。
經濟研究,第7期:130-141。
吳文峰、吳沖鋒、芮萌,2008。中國上市公司高管的政府背景與稅收優惠。第五屆中國金融學年會。
杜興強、郭劍花、雷宇,2009。政治聯繫方式與民營上市公司業績:“政府干預”抑或“關係”?金融研究,第11期:158-173。
林嬋娟、林孝倫,2009。會計師事務所規模、品牌與競爭程度對審計公費之影響:中國之實證。會計評論,第 49期:35-72。
林俊頡、羅靖霖,2010。陸股全流通後的市場反應觀察。貨幣觀測與信用評等,第81期:37-49。
周娟,2009。淺談股權分置改革及股權集中度對審計意見的影響。現代審計與經濟,第1期:28-29。
孫錚、于旭輝,2007。分權與會計師事務所選擇─來自我國國有上市公司的經驗證據。審計研究,第6期:52-58。
唐清泉、羅黨論、王莉,2005。大股東的隧道挖掘與制衡力量─來自中國市場的經驗證據。中國會計評論,第6期:63-85。
陳毓圭,2008。我國註冊會計師行業發展的四個階段─行業發展研究資料。北京:中國註冊會計師協會,http://www.cicpa.org.cn/Column/Research_data/200810/t20081020_14431.htm。
陳璇、淳偉德,2010。股權分置改革對企業的影響:來自我國上市公司的經驗。
四川師範大學學報(社會科學版),第37期(1):26-31。
淳偉德、胡培,2008。股權集中度對上市公司市場價值的影響─股權分置改革後非金融行業的實證研究。社會科學研究:56-61。
張奇峰、胡穎琳,2008。後股改時代大股東控制下的隧道行為研究。會計之友,第10期:34-36。
張奇峰、張鳴、王俊秋、戴佳君,2010。股權流通性改善對審計市場的影響。財經研究,第8期:133-143。
張維迎,2001。企業尋求政府支持的收益、成本分析。新西部,第8期:55-56。
張濤、王麗萍,2008。股權結構、激勵機制與治理效率研究。北京:中國財政經濟出版社。
劉啓亮、周連輝、付杰、肖建,2010。政治聯繫、私人關係、事務所選擇與審計合謀。審計研究,第4期:66-77。
薛玉蓮,2008。經營困境、政治關係與銀行貸款差異。經濟經線,第4期:79-82。
龍建輝,2010。企業政治關聯前沿研究述評。江西社會科學:70-75。
【英文文獻】
Alchian, A. and H. Demsetz. 1972. Production, information costs, and economics organization. American Economic Review 62 (5): 777-795.
Aharony, J., C. W. Lee, and T. J. Wong. 2000. Financial packaging of IPO firms in China. Journal of Accounting Research 38 (Spring): 103-126.
Bachar, J.. 1989. Optimal underwriting contracts and underpricing of new issues. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 4: 432-459.
Blair, M. M..1995. Ownership and control: Rethinking corporate governance for the twenty-first century. Journal of Economic Literature 34 (4): 1971-1972.
Biais, B. and E. Preotti. 2002. Machiavellian privatization. American Economic Review 92 (1): 240-258.
Burton, J. C., and W. Roberts. 1967. A study of auditor changes. Journal of Accountancy 123 (April): 31-36.
Balvers, R. J., B. McDonald, and R. E. Miller. 1988. Underpricing of new issues and the choice of auditor as a signal of investment banker reputation. The Accounting Review 63 (4): 605-622.
Boubakri, N., J. C. Cosset, and W. Saffar. 2008. Political connections of newly privatized firms. Journal of Corporate Finance 14 (5): 654-673.
Bushman, R., Q. Chen, E. Engle, and A. Smith. 2004. Financial accounting information, organizational complexity and corporate governance systems. Journal of Accounting and Economics 37 (2): 167-201.
Chen, J. P., X. Su, and X. Wu. 2007. Market competitiveness and Big 5 pricing: Evidence from China’s binary market. The International Journal of Accounting 42 (1): 1-24.
Chen, J. P., X. Su, and X. Wu. 2010. Auditor changes following a Big 4 merger with a local Chinese firm: A case study. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 29 (1): 41-72.
Chen, J. P., Z. Li, X. Su, and Z. Sun. 2011. Rent-seeking incentives, corporate political connections, and the control structure of private firms: Chinese evidence. Journal of Corporate Finance 17 (2): 229-243.
Chen, S., Y. J. Sun, and D. Wu. 2010. Clint importance, institutional improvements, and audit quality in China: An office and individual auditor level analysis. The Accounting Review 85 (1): 127-158.
Chen, C., X. Su, and R. Zhao. 2000. An emerging market’s reaction to initial modified audit opinions: Evidence from the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Contemporary Accounting Research 17(3): 429-455.
Chow, C. W.. 1982. The demand for external auditing: Size, debt and ownership influences. The Accounting Review 57 (2): 272-291.
Chow, C. W., and S. J. Rice. 1982. Qualified auditor opinions and auditor switching. The Accounting Review 57 (2): 326-335.
Carpenter, C. G. and R. H. Strawser. 1971. Displacement of auditors when clients go public. Journal of Accountancy 131 (June): 55-58.
Chaney, P. K., M. Faccio, and D. C. Parsley. 2011. The quality of accounting information in politically connected firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics 51 (1): 58-76.
Choi, J. H., and T. J. Wong. 2007. Auditors’governance functions and legal environments: An international investigation. Contemporary Accounting Research 24 (1): 13-46.
Charumilind, C., R. Kali, and Y. Wiwattanakantang. 2006. Conntected lending: Thailand before the financial crisis. Journal of Business 79 (1): 181-218.
Claessens, S., E. Feijen, and L. Laeven. 2008. Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions. Journal of Financial Economics 88 (3): 554-580.
Cochran, P. L., and S. L. Wartick. 1988. Corporate governance: a review of the literature. Morristown, NJ: Financial Executives Research Foundation.
Dye, R., 1993. Auditing standard, legal liability, and auditor wealth. Journal of Political Economics 101 (5): 887-914.
Datar, S. M., G. A. Feltham, and J. S. Hughes. 1991. The role of audits and audit quality in valuing new issues. Journal of Financial Economics 14 (1): 3-49.
DeAngelo, L.. 1981. Auditor size and audit quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics 3 (12): 181-199.
DeFond, M. L.. 1992. The association between changes in client firm agency costs and auditor switching. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and theory 11 (1): 16-31.
DeFond, M. L. and J. Jiambalvo. 1994. Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17 (1): 145-176.
DeFond, M. L., T. J. Wong, and S. Li. 2000. The impact of improvec auditor independence on audit market concentration in China. Journal of Accounting and Economics 28 (3): 269–305.
Demsetz, H.. 1983. The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm. Journal of Law and Economics 26 (2): 375-390.
Dhaliwal, D., G. Salamon, and E. Smith. 1982. The effect of owner versus management control on the choice of accounting methods. Journal of Accounting and Economics 4 (1): 41-53.
Dinc, I. S.. 2005. Politicians and banks: political influences on government-owned banks in emerging countries. Journal of Financial Economics 77 (2): 453-479.
Eichenseher, J. W. and D. Shields. 1983. The correlates of CPA-firm change for publicly-held corporations. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and theory 2 (2): 23-37.
Eichenseher, J. W. and D. Shields. 1986. Corporate capital structure and auditor ‘fit.’ Working paper: University of Wisconsin.
Faccio, M.. 2006. Political connected firm: Can they squeeze the state? American Economic Review 96 (1): 369-386.
Faccio, M. and D. C. Parsley. 2009. Sudden deaths: taking stock of geographic ties. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44 (3): 683-718.
Fama, E. F.. 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy 88 (2): 288-307.
Fama, E. F., and M. C. Jensen. 1983a. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26 (2): 301-326.
Fama, E. F., and M. C. Jensen. 1983b. Agency problems and residual claims. Journal of Law and Economics 26 (2): 327-349.
Fan, J., T. J. Wong, and T. Zhang. 2007. Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and post-IPO performance of China’s newly partially privatized firms. Journal of Financial Economics 84 (2): 265-590.
Fan, J., O. Rui, and M. Zhao. 2009. Public governance and corporate finance: evidence from corruption cases. Journal of Comparative Economics 36 (3): 343-364.
Fisman, R.. 2001. Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review 91 (4): 1095-1102.
Francis, J. R., and E. R.Wilson. 1988. Auditor changes: A joint test of theories relating to agency costs and auditor differentiation. The Accounting Review 63 (4): 663-682.
Guedhami, O. and J. A. Pittman. 2006. Ownership concentration in privatized firms: The role of disclosure standards, auditor choice, and auditing infrastructure. Journal of Accounting Research 44 (5): 889-929.
Hart, O.. 1995. Corporate governance: Some theory and implications. The Economic Journal 105 (430): 678-689.
Hao, Z. P.. 1999. Regulation and organization of accountants in China. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 12: 286-302.
Healy, P. and T. Lys. 1986. Auditor changes following Big Eight takeovers of Non-Big Eight audit firms. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy: 251-265.
Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4): 305-360.
Johnson, W. B. and T. Lys. 1990. The market for audit services: Evidence from voluntary auditor changes. Journal of Accounting and Economics 12 (1): 281-308.
Keloharju, M., S. Knüpfer, and S. Torstila. 2008. Do retail incentives work in privatizations?. Review of Financial Studies 21 (5): 2061-2095.
Khwaja, A. I, and A. Mian. 2008. Tracing the impact of bank liquidity shocks: Evidence from and emerging market. American Economic Review 98 (4): 1413-1442.
Li, H., L. Meng, Q. Wang, and L. Zhou. 2008. Political connections, financing and firm performance: Evidence from Chinese private firms. Journal of Development Economics 87 (2): 283–299.
Lin, Z. J. 2004. Auditor’s responsibility and independence: Evidence from China. Research in Accounting Regulation 17: 167-190.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and G. Zamarripa. 2002. Related lending. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118: 231-268.
Leuz, C., and G. F. Oberholzer. 2005. Political relationships, global financing, and corporate transparency: Evidence from Indonesia. Journal of Financial Economics 81 (2): 411-439.
Lindbeck, A.. 1976. Stabilization policies in open economies with endogenous politicians. American Economic Review 66 (2): 1-19.
Megginson, W. L., and J. N. Netter. 2001. From state to market: A survey of empirical studies on privatization. Journal of Economic Literature 39 (2): 321-389.
Myers, S. C.. 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics 5 (2): 147-175.
Olson, M.. 1993. Dictatorship, democracy, and development. American Economic Review 87 (3): 567-576.
Palmrose, Z.. 1984. The demand for quality-differentiated audit services in an agency-cost setting: An empirical investigation. Auditing Research Symposium: 229-252.
Pagano, M. and A. Röell. 1998. The choice of stock ownership structure: agency costs, monitoring, and the decision to go public. Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (1): 187-225.
Perotti, E.. 1995. Credible privatization. American Economic Review 85 (4): 847-859.
Qian, Y.. 1996. Enterprise reform in China: agency problems and political control. Econ Transition 4 (2): 427–448.
Roberts, R. W., G. W. Glezen and T. W. Jones. 1990. Determinants of auditor change in public sector. Journal of Accounting Research 28 (1): 220-228.
Roberts, B. E.. 1990. A dead senator tells no lies: Seniority and the distribution of federal benefits. American Journal of Political Science 34 (1): 31-58.
Rodgers, C.. 1965. The corporate trust indenture project. Business Lawyer: 551-571.
Sun, Q., and W. H. S. Tong. 2003. China share issue privatization: the extent of its successes. Journal of Financial Economics 70 (2): 183-222.
Sapienza P. 2004. The effects of government ownership and bank lending. Journal of Financial Economics 72 (2): 357-384.
Schwartz, K. B., and K. Menon. 1985. Auditor switches by failing firms. The Accounting Review 60 (2): 248-261.
Schwartz, K. B.. 1982. Accounting changes by corporations facing possible insolvency. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 6 (1): 32-43.
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52 (2): 737–783.
Smith, C. W., Jr., and J. B. Warner. 1979. On financial contracting: An analysis of bond covenants. Journal of Financial Economics 7 (2): 117-161.
Titman, S., and B. Trueman.1986. Information quality and the value of new issue. Journal of Accounting and Economics 8 (2): 159-172.
Watts, R. L.. 1977. Corporate financial statements, a product of market and political processes. Australian Journal of Management 2 (1): 53-75.
Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman. 1983. Agency problems, auditing, and the theory of the firm: Some evidence. Journal of Law and Economics 26 (3): 613-633.
Wallace, W.. 1987. The economic role of the audit in free and regulated market: A review. Research in Accounting Regulation 1: 7-34.
Wang, Q., T. J. Wong, and L. J. Xia. 2008. State ownership, the institutional environment, and auditor choice: Evidence from China. Journal of Accounting and Economics 46 (1): 112-134.
Wang, K., S. O, and Z. Iqbal. 2009. Auditing pricing and auditor industry specialization in an emerging market: Evidence from China. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation 18 (1): 60-72.
Xin, K. R., and J. L. Pearce. 1996. Guanxi: connections as substitutes for formal institutional support. The Academy of Management Journal 39 (6): 1641-1658.
論文使用權限
  • 同意紙本無償授權給館內讀者為學術之目的重製使用,於2016-07-18公開。
  • 不同意授權瀏覽/列印電子全文服務。


  • 若您有任何疑問,請與我們聯絡!
    圖書館: 請來電 (02)2621-5656 轉 2281 或 來信