由於各國的國際金融的自由化、國際化、資訊科技日益改善與日趨進步，再加上日趨複雜性的金融商品創新之下，國際資金得以在國際市場之間快速的流竄，同時也使得各國的匯率以及不確定性的波動也是與日倍增。

中央銀行在進行外匯市場干預，主要也是為了影響本國貨幣匯率，並防止匯率在短期內的過度波動而導致在中長期的失調而影響國內經濟，特別是因為特殊狀況的發生將引發市場恐慌。伴隨著總體經濟規則的潛在規則之下，倘若市場恐慌訊息的釋出參雜著各參與者的猜疑與不確定，高逐利性的國際投機性資本也可能因為市場恐慌訊息而迅速抽離市場並造成外匯動盪。

本文採用競合策略PARTS分析，在總體經濟環境規則的限制之下，定位出各個市場參與者以及其附加價值。並以各個市場參與者的角度各別分析，在面對外匯市場動盪之下利用其各自的戰術得以因應時勢而能夠創造對己有利的優勢策略。

透由本文研究結果可以發現，附加價值的絕對優勢，決定了整個賽局關鍵。例如市場參與者中，中央銀行握有直接介入外匯市場的權利、金融機構利用資訊不對稱的優勢等等，將決定其在賽局當中的關鍵影響力。此外，各市場參與者在做戰略考量的同時，又必須跟隨著總體經濟環境的規則而應變，其所決定的策略必須相當謹慎，因為這不單單只牽動國內市場參與者，更有可能影響到其他國家市場參與者的利害關係。

最後，根據本文研究結論得知原先競合策略的價值網隨著市場與賽局規模的逐漸擴增，由單純的價值網，延伸成為多連結性的價值網。為此由原先價值網而提出修正成「連續型價值網」以更符合實際的市場狀況。

Under the liberalization and internationalization of international finance, improvement of information technology, and the innovation of complicated commercial products, the international capital can be fled hither and thither among international financial market, which might increase the possibility of foreign exchange fluctuations. 

When processing the intervention of foreign exchange market, the main goal of central bank is trying to affect the domestic currency which would prevent the short term over-fluctuation of the foreign exchange from affecting to the long term domestic economy, especially to the released market panic messages which might cause to the suspect and terrified to market participants. Moreover, the international speculative capital within highly profit chasing features would withdraw in quick from the market and cause foreign exchange fluctuations.

Under the limitation of macro economy environment, this research adopts the co-opetition PARTS analysis for positioning each market participant and its added value; also, the research has the individual analysis to each market participant by using their outstanding tactics to react and create their own advantages under to the turbulence condition of foreign exchange market.

According to the conclusion of the research, the absolute advantages of added value define the key point of the whole game, such as central bank has the right and power to intervene the foreign exchange market, financial institute uses the advantages of asymmetric information to earn the giant fund and so on. Moreover, when market participants were doing the consideration of tactics, they have to follow up the macro economy environment and rules. The chosen tactics they decided should be much more careful which might not only influence the benefits among domestic market participants, but also involve in other market participants in foreign countries as well.

目錄
謝誌	I
摘要	II
ABSTRACT	III
目錄	V
圖目錄	VII
表目錄	VII

第一章 緒論	1
第一節 研究背景	1
第二節 研究動機與目的	2
第三節 資料與研究方法	3
第四節 本文架構	4
第二章 中央銀行與外匯市場研究文獻回顧	6
第一節 中央銀行研究	6
第二節 中央銀行干預外匯市場之研究	15
第三節 小結	26
第三章 市場參與者與投機行為及投機資本研究文獻回顧	27
第一節 投機行為與投機資本之研究	27
第二節 私人資本探討	39
第三節 小結	45
第四章 賽局理論與競合策略研究文獻回顧	46
第一節 賽局理論之研究	46
第二節 競合策略PARTS分析之研究	50
第三節 小結	56
第五章 競合策略分析	58
第一節 PARTS分析 – 參賽者	58
第二節 PARTS分析 – 附加價值	65
第三節 PARTS分析 – 規則	69
第四節 PARTS分析 – 戰術	71
第五節 PARTS分析 – 範圍	82
第六章 研究結論與建議	85
第一節 研究結論	85
第二節 研究建議	89
參考文獻	91
一、 中文部分	91
一、 英文部分	92


圖目錄
圖4-1  價值網	50
圖5-1  價值網	58
圖5-2  企業價值網	59
圖5-3  國家央行價值網	60
圖5-4  金融機構價值網	61
圖5-5  他國價值網	         62
圖5-6  投資大眾價值網	63
圖5-7  各市場參與者價值網	63
圖5-8  投資大眾附加價值圖	68
圖5-9  國家政府價值交換圖示	72
圖5-10 企業價值交換圖示	75
圖5-11 金融機構權益交換圖示	78
圖5-12 銀行與房貸戶關係圖	83
圖5-13 銀行衝擊關係圖	83
圖6-1  市場價值網	         85
圖6-2  連續型價值網	89


表目錄
表1-1 各國經濟成長率(%)	2
表4-1 囚犯困境報酬表	48
表4-2 賽局的四種架構	49

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