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系統識別號 U0002-1607200713023600
中文論文名稱 公司治理機制與違約風險之探討-以台灣金融機構為例
英文論文名稱 The Relationship between Corporate Governance and Default Risk in Taiwan’s Financial Institution
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 財務金融學系碩士在職專班
系所名稱(英) Department of Banking and Finance
學年度 95
學期 2
出版年 96
研究生中文姓名 簡郁蓉
研究生英文姓名 Yu-Jung Chien
學號 794490325
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2007-06-30
論文頁數 64頁
口試委員 指導教授-邱建良
指導教授-鄭婉秀
委員-李命志
委員-林卓民
委員-邱哲修
委員-鄭婉秀
中文關鍵字 公司治理  違約風險  KMV模型  監督機制 
英文關鍵字 corporate governance  default risk  KMV model  monitoring mechanism 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本研究目的在於探討國內金融機構之公司治理變數與違約風險的關聯,相關產業涵蓋銀行業、壽險業、證券業和產險業,研究期間為2002年至2005年,違約風險的衡量採用KMV模型進行估計,樣本資料採用結合橫斷面及時間序列資料特性的縱橫資料(panel data)來進行迴歸分析。另外,考量國內銀行業近年弊案不斷,針對銀行業進行子樣本實證分析,模型分別引入內外部監督機制變數予以探討。
在全樣本實證結果方面,獲利指標、流動性和大股東持股比率皆與違約風險呈現負向顯著關係,而經理人持股對違約風險呈現不顯著結果。在銀行業方面,獲利指標、大股東持股、員工紅利對銀行違約風險呈現不顯著結果,流動性、經理人持股、機構法人持股、資本適足率對銀行違約風險呈負向顯著關係,監察人持股對銀行違約風險為正向顯著關係。
英文摘要 The purpose of this paper is examined relationship between the variables of corporate governance and default risk. These industries include banking, insurance, securities, and life insurance. Firm’s default risk is estimated by KMV model. The regression models have been to analysis using a sample data of cross-section and time series. Specially, we add monitoring mechanism to analysis bank’s default risk because they happen more fraud behavior or default event in recent years.
Our results show that performance indicate, liquidity, and largest stockholder express negative significantly relationship with firm’s default risk, but manager’s ownership hasn’t significant. In banking, performance indicate, largest stockholder and bonus haven’t significant. Liquidity, manager’s ownership, institutions ownership and capital adequacy ratio are negative significantly relationship with default risk, but supervisor ownership is positive significantly relationship with default risk.
論文目次 目錄

誌謝.................................Ⅰ
中文摘要.............................Ⅱ
英文摘要.............................Ⅲ
目錄.................................Ⅳ
圖表.................................Ⅴ

第一章 緒論
第一節 研究動機......................1
第二節 研究目的......................2
第三節 研究架構......................3
第二章 相關理論與文獻回顧
第一節 相關理論......................5
第二節 文獻回顧......................9
第三章 研究方法
第一節 資料使用模型.................20
第二節 實證模型.....................26
第三節 變數選取與估計...............28
第四章 實證結果與分析
第一節 資料來源與處理...............35
第二節 實證結果與分析...............40
第五章 結論與建議
第一節 結論.........................49
第二節 後續研究建議.................50
附錄
附錄一 備註.........................51
附錄二 金融機構樣本資料.............58
參考文獻.............................59

圖表
【圖1-1】研究架構流程圖...............4
【表4-1】全樣本各變數之基本統計量....36
【表4-2】銀行業各變數之基本統計量....37
【表4-3】全樣本各變數之相關係數......39
【表4-4】各銀行變數之相關係數........39
【表4-5】全樣本迴歸之實證結果........40
【表4-6】銀行業迴歸之實證結果........44
參考文獻 國內文獻

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