由於賽局理論的目的即在運用數學模式，簡化現實中複雜的互動關係，以提供參與者選擇最佳策略之準則，然而賽局理論中的囚犯兩難賽局之怪異性，在於參與者為了極大化自身利益而採行優勢策略，也就是達到均衡，導致雙方所獲得的報酬比採行劣勢策略較差。
本研究利用實驗法進行教室實驗，以檢視囚犯兩難賽局在理論和現實之差異：觀察參與者的決策選擇並進一步探討參與者背景，包含性別、所屬學院和曾修習之課程對於決策差異之影響。
實驗結果發現，雖然全部參與者選擇背叛策略的比例高於合作策略，但為機率式選擇和囚犯兩難賽局之均衡不同，參與者非一定選擇優勢策略。全部參與者性別和所屬學院對其選擇策略並不產生影響，然而是否修習過數學二則對選擇策略產生影響。此外分析參與者背景因素之交互作用，實驗結果發現參與者的性別與學院的交互作用對於選擇策略則有顯著差異。本研究發現，曾修習過數學一、數學二和經濟學之參與者選擇背叛的比例較未修習過課程之參與者低，此結果無法和Frank、Gilovich與Regan（1993）認為主修經濟學的學生者比較考慮自身利益，在囚犯兩難的實驗中採行背叛的比例較高以及學習經濟學抑制合作行為之研究結果一致。

Since the purpose of game theory in the use of mathematical models that simplify the complex interaction in reality, it provides participants criteria to choose the best strategy. However, the eccentric nature of prisoner’s dilemma in game theory is that due to pursuing the advantages of the player’s own self-interest, each player adopts a dominant strategy as equilibrium and it leads both players getting fewer payoffs compared to choose a dominated strategy. 
We conducted a classroom experiment by using experiment method to examine the theory and reality application of prisoner’s dilemma. The purpose of this paper is not only to observe how people choose the strategy in the game, but also to analyze the background of participants, including gender, school and studied courses, to further explore the factors effecting on strategy difference. 
The results showed that the probability of chooing to betray was higher than it of choosing to cooperate, but the strategy was made by probabilistic mechanism, not in line with the equilibrium of prisoner’s dilemma, and participants don’t choose dominant strategy. School and gender in all participants do not affect their choice of strategy, but Mathematics II studying in all participants has impact on betrayal behavior. Moreover, to analyze the interaction of participants’ background, it was found that participants in the interaction of gender and school have significant differences on betrayal behavior. Surprisingly, we found the proportion of participants choosing betrayal who had studied Math Ι, Math II and economics is lower than that of participants who never had studied the courses, and the result does not coincide with the previous finding (Frank, Gilovich & Regan, 1993) that students majoring in economics consider their own interests and adopt a higher proportion of betrayal and studying economics inhibits the cooperative behavior.

謝    辭	I
中文摘要	II
英文摘要	III
目    錄	V
表目錄	VI
圖目錄	VII
第一章 緒論	1
第一節	研究動機與目的	1
第二節	研究流程	3
第三節	研究內容	3
第四節	研究限制	4
第二章 文獻回顧	6
第一節	賽局理論	6
第二節	實驗設計研究	31
第三章 實驗研究設計與實驗進行	39
第一節	實驗設計	39
第二節	實驗進行的方法	40
第四章 實驗結果分析說明	45
第一節	分析方法	45
第二節	實驗結果	46
第五章 結論與建議	71
第一節	研究結論	71
第二節	研究建議	73
附件︰結果登記單	74
參考文獻	75

表目錄
表2-1︰賽局型態 ....................................................................................................... 13
表2-2︰賽局的種類與其對應之均衡概念 ............................................................... 17
表2-3︰囚犯賽局報酬結構標準型態 ....................................................................... 20
表2-4：賽局應用相關文獻 ....................................................................................... 30
表2-5：國外賽局實驗相關文獻 ............................................................................... 37
表2-6：國內賽局實驗相關文獻 ............................................................................... 38
表3-1︰參與者所屬學院系所分佈 ........................................................................... 40
表3-2︰遊戲報酬結構表 ........................................................................................... 44
表4-1︰第1 回合和第12 回合賄賂決策之單因子變異數分析 ............................. 47
表4-2︰每回合賄賂決策之單因子變異數分析 ....................................................... 48
表4-3︰每回合賄賂決策之T 檢定 ........................................................................... 49
表4-4︰每回合決策之比例 ....................................................................................... 51
表4-5︰性別和賄賂決策之單因子變異數分析 ....................................................... 53
表4-6︰所屬學院和賄賂決策之單因子變異數分析 ............................................... 54
表4-7︰各學院男性、各學院女性和賄賂決策之單因子變異數分析 ................... 55
表4-8︰是否修習數學一和採取賄賂之單因子變異數分析 ................................... 57
表4-9︰是否修習數學二和採取賄賂之單因子變異數分析 ................................... 57
表4-10︰是否修習經濟學和採取賄賂之單因子變異數分析 ................................. 58
表4-11︰是否修習數學一之男性、女性和賄賂之單因子變異數分析 ................. 59
表4-12︰未修習、曾修習數學二之男性女性和賄賂決策之單因子變異數分析 . 60
表4-13︰男性未修習、男性曾修習數學二和賄賂決策之單因子變異數分析 ..... 61
表4-14︰女性未修習、男性曾修習數學二和賄賂決策之單因子變異數分析 ..... 61
表4-15︰男女性曾修習和未修習經濟學和賄賂決策之單因子變異數分析 ......... 62
表4-16︰所屬學院和性別對於賄賂決策之雙因子變異數分析 ............................. 63
表4-17︰是否修習過數學一和性別對於賄賂之雙因子變異數分析 ..................... 64
表4-18︰是否修習過數學二和性別對於賄賂決策之雙因子變異數分析 ............. 65
表4-19︰是否修習過經濟學和性別對於賄賂之雙因子變異數分析 ..................... 65
表4-20︰是否修習過經濟學和數學一對於賄賂之雙因子變異數分析 ................. 66
表4-21︰是否修習過經濟學和數學二對於賄賂之雙因子變異數分析 ................. 67
表4-22︰所屬學院和是否修習數學一對於賄賂決策之雙因子變異數分析 ......... 68
表4-23︰所屬學院和是否修習數學二對於賄賂決策之雙因子變異數分析 ......... 69
表4-24︰所屬學院和是否修習經濟學對於賄賂決策之雙因子變異數分析 ......... 69

圖目錄
圖4-1︰每回合賄賂決策比例曲線圖 ....................................................................... 52

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