由1980年代起，股權結構與公司績效的相關議題便逐漸被廣泛討論。許多文獻探討在股權結構與公司績效兩者中，內生性問題到底扮演何種角色。本文主旨是使用Helwege, Pirinsky and Stulz(2007)所建立之動態方程式，允許利用跨年度的模式消除內生性及其他對績效面無法觀測因子。並且運用有別於以往只考慮經理人持有股份便以此觀測所有權變動高低對績效的影響之方式，將持股拆解為經理人、董監事及流通在外股權這兩部分，進一步了解兩者究竟是經理人、董監事抑或是流通在外股權的變動對公司績效有明顯之影響效果。
  
  估計結果發現以台灣為體的產業而言，企業風險、公司規模與產業類別對公司績效的影響上是重要的考量因素，而且在估計年度間，公司績效則隨產業、時間的不同而產生不同的變化。針對公司績效衝擊的次要部分主要則坐落於研發費用。再者，本文在經理人、董監事及流通在外股權中得知，若在大幅增加經理人、董監事股權持有，對公司市場價值是驟減的；在若大幅減少流通在外股權持有時，對公司績效而言則呈現下滑趨勢。

The theme of managerial ownership structure and firm performance has been generally discussed since the 1980s’. Many documents debated on what role endogeneity plays between ownership structure and firm value. In this study, we used the dynamics of linear equation from Helwege, Pirinsky and Stulz(2007) that could eliminate endogeneity and other unobservable factors from ownership structure. This method is different from the ratio of the number of shares held by managers divided by the total number of shares outstanding. We decomposed the change in managerial ownership to clarify which—shares held by managers or shares outstanding—contribute the major effect on firm performance.

  Our main findings were as following: First of all, we identified some important factors in firm performance, such as the risk for enterprises, the scope of firm and the types of industries. Also, we observed that during the estimating years, firm performance could fluctuate according to time period and industries. The R&D expenditure stands the next in importance to firm value. Second, we discovered that when shares held by managers increase, firm value will drop. Moreover, when shares outstanding decreases, firm performance will fall.

目錄
第一章　緒論	                        1
第一節　研究動機與目的	               1
第二節　本文結構	                        2
第二章　文獻回顧	                        4
第一節　經理人所有權決定因素	      4
第二節　股權結構與公司績效之關係	      5
第三節　股權結構與公司績效內生性問題	      7
第三章　實證模型與變數定義	               9
第一節　實證模型設定	               9
第二節　變數定義及說明	              17
第三節　資料來源	                       21
第四章　實證結果	                       22
第一節　基本敘述統計量分析	              22
第二節　實證結果分析	              25
第五章　研究結論	                       38
參考文獻	                                40
 
 
表目錄
《表4- 1》公司績效迴歸式各變數之基本統計量	24
《表4- 2》公司績效迴歸式之實證結果	         31
《表4- 3》公司績效迴歸式之實證結果	         32
《表4- 4》公司績效迴歸式之實證結果	         36
《表4- 5》公司績效迴歸式之實證結果	         37

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