本論文延伸Spencer與Brander(1983)的模型架構，考慮在有外溢效果下，政策確定與不確定，以及有市場需求不確定性發生時，對廠商的行為有何影響，和政府的R&D政策為何。我們發現在考慮外溢效果下，且政府的R&D補貼政策為確定時，當外溢效果不夠大時，政府的最適R&D政策為補貼；當外溢效果夠大時，最適政策要看不同效果的相對重要程度而定。當政府的R&D政策有不確定性，且廠商的R&D支出水準為策略互補下，此政策不確定性增加時，會減少兩家廠商的R&D支出水準。當市場需求有不確定性，且廠商的R&D支出水準為策略互補下，此需求不確定性增加時，會增加兩家廠商的R&D支出水準，且當外溢效果不夠大時，政府會採取何種政策則無法得知；當外溢效果夠大時，最適政府政策要看不同效果的相對重要程度而定。

This paper extends the Brander-Spencer (1983) model by certainty considering R&D spillovers. We examine the impacts of R&D spillover on firms’ choices of strategic variables under R&D policy with and/or without un/certainty is well as market demand uncertainty. We show that both R&D spillovers and the type of uncertainties are important in affecting the direction of optimal R&D policy when firms engage in international R&D competition. When the type of uncertainty is policy uncertainty, increasing uncertainty will reduce firms’ R&D level in the case of strategic complements. With demand uncertainty, however, firms’ R&D levels in the case of strategic complements are increasing as long as the uncertainty is increasing. When R&D spillover is significant and the strategic effect of subsidy overweight the shift effect of subsidy, then the policy maker will tax the firm 1. When the shift effect of subsidy exceeds the strategic effect of subsidy, the optimal policy is a R&D subsidy.

目  錄
頁次
第一章 緒論	1
第一節 研究動機、目的以及主要發現	1
第二章 文獻回顧	5
第三章 在政策確定下考慮外溢效果與最適R&D政策	8
第一節 廠商的最適產出數量	9
第二節 最適數量的比較靜態分析	12
第三節 廠商的最適R&D支出水準	15
第四節 R&D支出水準的比較靜態分析	18
第五節 政府政策的分析	22
第四章 政策不確定性與最適R&D水準	26
第一節 廠商的最適產量	27
第二節 最適數量的比較靜態分析	29
第三節 廠商的最適R&D程度	33
第四節 政策不確定性對產出及R&D的效果	35
第五章 市場需求不確定性與最適政府政策	38
第一節 廠商的最適產量	39
第二節 最適數量的比較靜態分析	41
第三節 廠商的最適R&D程度	45
第四節 市場需求不確定性對產出及R&D的效果	47
第五節 政府政策的分析	48
第六章 總結	52
參考文獻	55
中文部分：	55
數學附錄頁	58
圖表附錄頁	70
圖1-1電子細項產業附加價值率	70
圖1-2產業附加價值之變動(表格形式)	71
圖1-3產業附加價值之變動(圖形形式)	72

參考文獻
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