行為經濟學探討「利他」的文獻雖多，但多以實驗觀察或個人決策的分析模型為主。近年來日益受到重視的「企業社會責任」(CSR)的概念，可以視為廣義的廠商「利他」行為；但相關的探討也極少以正式的經濟模型進行理論分析。本文利用「公益財」與「消費者剩餘」這兩個概念，來界定並區分廠商的利他類型(手段利他或目的利他)，並以靜態及動態的雙佔市場競爭，來分析各種廠商類型搭配下的均衡結果。本研究所獲致基本結論是: (1) 「利他」，原則上有助於提高廠商的均衡市佔率。(2) 從市場競爭的角度看，「利他」也不必然是市場競爭的毒藥；在相關條件(參數值)的配合下，「利他型」廠商的均衡利潤高過傳統「自利型」廠商的均衡利潤。

In behavioral economics, altruism is usually investigated by experiments or individual choice models. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) referring to firm’s altruistic behavior receives high attention recently; nevertheless, it is seldom studied by formal economic models. In this paper, we use goods of public welfare and consumer’s surplus to differentiate firm’s altruism in itself from firm’s altruism as a means. Under a duopoly model of static game and dynamic game, combining different types of firms, our equilibrium analyses show: (1) altruism is generally good for raising firm’s market share. (2) Form the perspective of market competition, altruism is not necessarily a bad. Some numerical examples in our study illustrate that profits of firms with altruism are higher than profits of firms of self-interested.

目錄
第一章  緒論1
1.1  研究動機與目的1
1.2  章節概要4
第二章  文獻回顧5
2.1  「利他」的定義與類型5
2.2  「利他」的相關實驗6
2.3  利他與市場競爭的結合7
第三章  基本模型設定9
3.1  消費者效用函數及相關假設9
3.2  不同廠商競爭組合的需求反函數11
3.3  商品的成本、廠商的類型與消費者剩餘14
第四章  靜態產量競爭的均衡分析17
4.1  Cournot競爭的均衡分析	17
4.2  均衡解之比較與數值分析範例29
第五章  動態產量競爭的均衡分析36
5.1  廠商的最適阻入及最適非阻入策略的均衡分析36
5.2  廠商的最適策略與均衡解的數值分析範例54
第六章  結論58
參考文獻60	

表目錄
表(一) Cournot競爭下的均衡產量27
表(二) 競爭組合之均衡利潤28
表(三) Cournot均衡之均衡產量實例32
表(四) Cournot均衡之均衡利潤實例(不包含FC)33

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