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系統識別號 U0002-1507201321550200
中文論文名稱 現金增資用途、股權結構與公司長期經營績效關係之研究-以台灣上市上櫃公司為例
英文論文名稱 A Study of the Relationships among the Use of Seasoned Equity Offering, Ownership Structure and Long-term Operating Performance: The Cases of Listed Companies on SEC and OTC in Taiwan
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 管理科學學系企業經營碩士在職專班
系所名稱(英) Executive Master’s Program of Business Administration(EMBA) in Management Sciences
學年度 101
學期 2
出版年 102
研究生中文姓名 鄭秀玲
研究生英文姓名 Hsiu-Ling Cheng
學號 700620254
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2013-07-04
論文頁數 43頁
口試委員 指導教授-莊忠柱
委員-蔡蒔銓
委員-婁國仁
中文關鍵字 現金增資用途  股權結構  長期經營績效  董監事持股比率  經理人持股比率  十大股東持股比率  法人機構持股比率 
英文關鍵字 Use of SEO  Shareholding structure  Long-term operating performance  Director and supervisor shareholding ratio  Manager shareholding ratio  Block shareholding ratio  Institution shareholding ratio 
學科別分類
中文摘要   公司資本投資且現金增資對於公司長期經營績效的提昇,一直是公司利害相關人士關注的焦點。本研究以1997年1月至2008年12月在台灣股票上市上櫃現金增資公司為研究對象,樣本公司共有203家,其中上市有150家,上櫃有53家,利用複迴歸分析方法,探討現金增資用途、股權結構與公司長期經營績效的關係。
  本研究實證發現: 現金增資用途對會計基礎長期經營績效、股票市場基礎長期經營績效無顯著影響。此外,董監事持股比率、經理人持股比率、十大股東持股比率或是法人機構持股比率分別不干擾現金增資用途對公司會計基礎長期經營績效、股票市場基礎長期經營績效的影響,顯見公司股權結構並未發揮公司治理功能,監督公司管理當局的經營。本研究的研究結果可提供公司利害相關人士的參考。
英文摘要 The improvement of long-term operating performance caused by capital investment and seasoned equity offerings(SEO) is always focused by stakeholders. This study uses multiple regression analysis to analyze the relationship among the use of SEO, shareholding structure and long-term operating performance. The listed SEO firms spaned during the period from January 1997 to December 2008 in Taiwan stock market are taken as research objects, and there are 203 firms in total, in which 150 out of 203 firms are listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation(TSEC) and the others are listed in over-the-counter(OTC). The result of this study shows that the use of SEO does not significantly affect the accounting-based long-term operating performance and the market price-based long-term operating performance. Besides, the shareholding ratio of the directors of boarding and supervisors, managers, block holders and investments institutions do not moderate the effect of SEO on the accounting-based long-term operating performance and the market price-based long-term operating performance. It shows that the ownership structure does not promote corporation governance and supervise the management of the firms. The results can provide a reference to the stakeholders.
論文目次 目錄
目錄------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------I
圖目錄-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------III
表目錄-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------IV
1.緒論--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1
1.1 研究背景與動機------------------------------------------------------------------1
1.2 研究目的---------------------------------------------------------------------------6
1.3 研究對象與範圍------------------------------------------------------------------7
1.4 研究架構---------------------------------------------------------------------------7
2.研究方法--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------9
2.1 觀念性架構------------------------------------------------------------------------9
2.2 研究變數操作性定義-----------------------------------------------------------10
2.3 研究樣本與資料來源-----------------------------------------------------------15
2.4 實證模型--------------------------------------------------------------------------16
3.實證結果與分析----------------------------------------------------------------------------17
3.1 基本敘述統計分析-------------------------------------------------------------17
3.2 相關分析-------------------------------------------------------------------------18
3.3 現金增資用途、股權結構與公司長期經營績效關係實證分析----------21
4.結論與建議----------------------------------------------------------------------------------30
4.1 結論與管理意涵-----------------------------------------------------------------30
4.2 建議--------------------------------------------------------------------------------31
參考文獻
(1).中文部份---------------------------------------------------------------------------34
(2).英文部份---------------------------------------------------------------------------36
圖目錄
圖1-1 研究流程圖-----------------------------------------------------------------------8
圖2-1 觀念性架構圖------------------------------------------------------------------10
表目錄
表3-1 變數基本敘述統計------------------------------------------------------------18
表3-2 變數相關分析------------------------------------------------------------------20
表3-3 現金增資用途、股權結構對會計基礎長期經營績效的複迴歸
係數估 計與檢定估計與檢定----------------------------------------------24
表3-4 現金增資用途、股權結構與股票市場基礎長期經營績效變化
的複迴歸係數估計與檢定---------------------------------------------------28
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