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系統識別號 U0002-1507200615090200
中文論文名稱 公司治理機制與退休金提撥之關聯性
英文論文名稱 A study on the association between corporate governance and pension fund appropriation
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accounting
學年度 94
學期 2
出版年 95
研究生中文姓名 劉師誠
研究生英文姓名 Shih-Cheng Liu
學號 691470164
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2006-06-14
論文頁數 76頁
口試委員 指導教授-江淑玲
指導教授-周濟群
委員-蕭幸金
委員-張石柱
委員-洪玉舜
委員-周濟群
委員-江淑玲
中文關鍵字 公司治理  退休金提撥 
英文關鍵字 corporate governance  pension fund appropriation 
學科別分類 學科別社會科學商學
中文摘要 本研究旨在探討公司治理機制與退休金提撥之關聯性,經濟合作暨發展組織(OECD)公佈之公司治理原則明白指出公司治理應重視所有利害關係人之權益;其中亦包括員工權益之維護。而退休金提撥為員工重要福利,企業對退休金若提撥不足,不但將傷害員工應得權益,亦會導致退休金負債上升,使公司面臨財務結構惡化之後果,因此,擁有完善的公司治理機制應有助於促使公司保障員工之退休金權益。另一方面,退休金提撥為企業之裁量性現金支出,雖其提撥金額受到政府法令所規範,而有一最低限額,但若企業實行完善的公司治理機制,而對員工提撥足額之退休金時,即代表了企業願積極地配合政府的相關法令規範。
本研究以民國八十九年至民國九十三年上市櫃公司為樣本,公司治理變數從董事會組成及股權結構兩方面予以討論,經由選取樣本內相關公司治理機制變數及財務資料建立本研究之迴歸模型,研究結論說明如下:
一、董事會規模對退休金提撥率具顯著之正向影響,因此,當董事會規模大時,可透過注重員工退休金之提撥,以期達到增加員工對公司之向心力,使其努力為公司付出,以增加企業經營績效。
二、在內部人持股方面,全體上市櫃公司及非電子業公司之經理人、大股東持股對退休金提撥率具顯著負向影響,推測原因為基於自利動機與短視近利之行為,而未顧及員工之退休金權益。另外,非電子業公司之董監事持股對退休金提撥率亦為顯著負向影響,即董監事會專注於自身的利益而忽略了公司員工的權益;相對地,電子業公司之董監事持股對退休金提撥率則具有顯著之正向影響,故其會重視若員工退休金提撥不足所產生財務結構惡化之後果,而要求經理人應提足退休金數額。
三、在機構投資人持股方面,全體上市櫃公司之本國政府機構持股對退休金提撥率具顯著正向影響,符合Pound(1988)提出之效率監控假說。於區分產業別之影響後,在非電子業公司中,本國政府機構持股以及外國法人持股與退休金提撥率均存在關聯性,且為顯著之正向影響,本研究之實證結果亦支持Pound提出之效率監控假說。另外,對於電子業公司之影響,外國法人持股與退休金提撥率存在關連性,但為顯著之負向影響,故其支持Pound另外所提出之利益衝突假說。
英文摘要 This paper concentrates on the relation between pension fund appropriation and corporate governance. The principle of corporate governance issued by OECD clearly points out that the corporate governance should take all of the related rights and responsibility in the enterprise into account. In the same time, the request of pension fund is an important right of the employees. The deficiency of fund appropriation will not only hurt the employees but raise the accrual pension liabilities appeared in the financial statement to worsen the capital structure of the firm. Thus in this paper we focus our topic on the association between the pension fund appropriation and corporate governance. On the other hand, the pension fund is the discretionary cash outflow of the firm. Since it is regulated by government to have a minimum level required, the positive response to the regulation represents well-structured corporate governance from the aspect of the pension fund appropriation.
We sample the financial data of all listed firms in TAIEX and OTC in Taiwan from 2000 to 2004 and further divide our data into electronic sector and non-electronic one to construct the multiple regression model, our findings are as follows:
1. We find a positive pattern between the size of BOD and the appropriation; it shows that the large size of BOD will put the appropriation high to cheer the employees for the operations of the enterprise.
2. There is a negative relation between the appropriation and the scale of share holdings of CEO, BOD and large share holders in non-electronics sector because of myopia. On the other hand, it tells a positive relation between the appropriation and the size of share holdings of BOD in the electronic sector thus this shows that the BOD in the electronic industry would pay attention to this issue for fear that the deterioration of capital structure.
3. There exists positive relations between the pension fund appropriation and the rate of share holdings of domestic government and foreign institutional investors in the non-electronic division thus our findings tend to support Pound’s Efficient Monitor Hypothesis. We find a negative relation between the appropriation and the rate of share holdings of foreign institutional investors in the electronic sector and thus tend to support Pound’s Conflict of Interest Hypothesis
論文目次 目 錄

第一章 緒論………………………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究背景與動機........................................................................................1
第二節 研究目的…………………………………………………………………5
第三節 研究範圍與研究方法……………………………………………………5
第四節 研究流程與論文架構……………………………………………………6
第二章 文獻探討…………………………………………………………………9
第一節 公司治理及相關文獻……………………………………………………9
第二節 企業提撥退休金之相關文獻…………………………………………..24
第三章 研究方法………………………………………………………………..33
第一節 觀念性架構……………………………………………………………..33
第二節 研究假說………………………………………………………………..36
第三節 變數衡量及研究設計…………………………………………………..40
第四節 資料來源、研究期間及樣本選取………………………………………46
第四章 實證結果與分析………………………………………………………..47
第一節 各變數之敘述統計量…………………………………………………..47
第二節 Pearson相關係數分析………………………………………………….50
第三節 複迴歸分析……………………………………………………………..58
第五章 結論與建議……………………………………………………………..67
第一節 研究結論………………………………………………………………..67
第二節 研究限制………………………………………………………………..71
第三節 研究建議………………………………………………………………..72
參考文獻……………………………………………………………………………..73

圖目錄

圖1-1 研究流程圖……………………………………………………………………7
圖2-1 世界銀行提出的公司治理之架構圖………………………………………...11
圖3-1 觀念性架構…………………………………………………………………..35

表目錄

表1-1 民國84年至92年上市公司一般產業退休金提率…………….……………4
表4-1 樣本之基本敘述統計值-全體公司………………………………………… 49
表4-2 樣本之基本敘述統計值-電子業…………………………………………….49
表4-3 樣本之基本敘述統計值-非電子業………………………………………….50
表4-4 Pearson 相關係數及P值-全體公司………………………………….……52
表4-5 Pearson 相關係數及P值-電子業………………………………….………54
表4-6 Pearson 相關係數及P值-非電子業………………………………….……56
表4-7 退休金提撥率與公司治理變數之複迴歸分析結果-全體公司…………….64
表4-8 退休金提撥率與公司治理變數之複迴歸分析結果-電子業……....…….…65
表4-9 退休金提撥率與公司治理變數之複迴歸分析結果-非電子業.……………66
表5-1 實證結果彙總表……………………………………………………………..70


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