近年來，航空貨運市場因應全球運籌發展趨勢而快速成長，許多航空公司亦趨往重視貨運航線；在競爭日趨白熱化的航空貨運市場，貨運聯盟亦成為航空公司貨運航線策略選項之一。過去相關航空公司策略聯盟文獻，多以航空公司客運航線聯盟為研究對象，航空公司貨運聯盟研究仍屬少數，且尚無研究針對航空貨運聯盟方式組合決策及因應聯盟之貨運航線網路規劃問題進行探討。
　　本研究探討航空貨運聯盟決策分析與聯盟航線網路規劃問題，針對一航空公司貨運考慮加入航空貨運聯盟，進行聯盟夥伴、聯盟航線與聯盟方式之組合決策，並在聯盟條件下進行航空貨運聯盟航線網路規劃。本研究應用模糊合作競局分析航空貨運聯盟決策問題，透過模糊合作競局之求解，選擇最佳的聯盟組合決策方案。進一步，針對航空貨運聯盟決策結果，因應聯盟航線與聯盟方式，建構對應之航空貨運聯盟航線班次規劃模式，進行建模發展與求解，分析貨運聯盟之航線班次變化，以期提供航空公司選擇貨運聯盟及其航線規劃之參考與決策支援基礎。
　　本研究以中華航空公司為對象進行數值範例分析，驗證模式可行性。經由模糊合作競局之選擇後得出兩種結果：航線台北(TPE)-廣州(CAN)、台北(TPE)-上海浦東(PVG)、安格拉治(ANC)-紐約(JFK)分別與兩個夥伴共用班號，及多選取一條航線採聯運協定方式進行聯盟。而在貨運聯盟航線規劃結果顯示，在最適聯盟決策與協商互動下，平行式共用班號使聯盟兩造之總利潤皆增加、總營運成本皆有效降低、航線市場佔有率亦提升，而互補式共用班號則使航空貨運增加市場營運範圍並提升營收。研究結果發現，在決策不確定性較高時，航空公司可能採取聯運協定方式將運量委外給夥伴航空公司運送，但可能相對造成自身的利潤較為降低。綜上，本研究成果不僅在學術上做為航空貨運聯盟網路規劃問題之建模基礎，在實務上亦可提供貨運聯盟策略與決策參考。

One current trend of air transportation is that while international alliances among major airlines continue, some airline cargo alliances have formed. However, few researches have examined airline cargo alliance practices, and no research has been paid to the alliance decision analysis and airline cargo flight frequency planning issues for the airline cargo alliances.
　　This study develops a series of models to analyze the airline cargo alliance decision-makings and determine allied flight frequencies under air cargo alliances. This study develops a fuzzy cooperative game for assessing the combination of airline cargo alliance alternatives. Under the determined airline cargo alliance condition, the integrated allied cargo flight network programming model is developed, while considering overall profitability, traffic gains, and cost reduction for the allied network in which they cooperate with their partners. 
　　A numerical case study demonstrated the synergy benefits of airline cargo alliances and the feasibility of applying the proposed models. Moreover, a group of optimal solutions for airline flight frequencies was determined. The results showed that the parallel code-shared alliance makes both sides of cargo members increased profits, reduced operating costs and also increased market shares. On the other hand, the complementary code-shared alliance makes them extending the network scope. The results of this study explored the effects of airline cargo alliances on allied routes and flight frequencies, and the allied network structure. In addition, it is envisaged that the results of this study may shed light on air cargo alliance strategies.

目錄
第一章　緒論	1
1.1研究背景與動機	1
1.2研究目的	4
1.3研究範圍	5
1.4研究流程	6
第二章　文獻回顧	8
2.1航空公司策略聯盟相關文獻	8
2.2航空貨運聯盟相關文獻	12
2.3競局理論相關文獻	15
2.4航空貨運規劃相關文獻	19
2.5文獻小結	22
第三章　模式建構	23
3.1基本假設與模式型式	23
3.2模糊合作競局之航空貨運聯盟決策模式	23
3.3航空貨運聯盟航線網路規劃模式	26
3.4貨運聯盟互動求解	31
第四章　數值範例	33
4.1範例數值設定	33
4.2模糊合作競局之航空貨運聯盟決策	38
4.3航空貨運聯盟網路規劃分析	48
4.3.1聯盟網路規劃-P1	52
4.3.2聯盟網路規劃-P2	55
第五章 結論與建議	59
5.1結論	59
5.2建議	62
參考文獻	64
附錄	70

表目錄
表2.1航空聯盟相關文獻彙整表	11
表2.2航空聯盟規劃相關文獻彙整表	12
表2.3航空貨運聯盟相關文獻彙整表	15
表2.4競局理論相關文獻彙整表	16
表2.5模糊競局理論相關文獻彙整表	18
表2.6航空貨運規劃相關文獻彙整表	21
表4.1聯盟組合決策單元(合作賽局中參賽者I)	35
表4.2起迄對城市對照表	36
表4.3航空公司I航線市場總運量與航線設定	36
表4.4聯盟可行方案組合	40
表4.5不同信賴水平上夏普利值區間	44
表4.6最佳聯盟決策結果模糊區間值	47
表4.7航線網路聯盟決策結果	47
表4.8航空貨運公司航線網路集合定義(P1)	49
表4.9航空貨運公司航線網路集合定義(P2)	50
表4.10航空貨運公司之初始值設定	51
表4.11 聯盟前個別航空公司航線班次規劃結果	54
表4.12航空貨運聯盟航線班次規劃結果(P1)	54
表4.13聯盟後航空公司航線班次規劃(P2)	56
表4.14航空貨運聯盟整體班次、市佔率及費率	57
表4.15聯盟前後總利潤比較	57
附錄一、糢糊報償函數區間值	70

圖目錄
圖1.1研究架構流程圖	7
圖3.1聯盟航線規劃求解架構	32
圖4.1目標航空貨運公司(I)貨運網路	37
圖4.2聯盟可行方案組合貨運航線	37
圖4.3航線{1-2}模糊夏普利值隸屬函數	45
圖4.4航線{1-3}模糊夏普利值隸屬函數	45
圖4.5航線{7-5}模糊夏普利值隸屬函數	46
圖4.6 航空貨運航線聯盟網路(P1)	49
圖4.7 航空貨運航線聯盟網路(P2)	50
圖4.8聯盟前後三家個別利潤比較	58

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