本研究之目的係探討核心代理問題對薪酬績效敏感性之影響，並進一步檢測兩者間的關係是否會受到薪酬委員會的調節。本研究以2012年至2016年為研究期間，研究對象為我國上市電子業公司。實證結果指出核心代理問題(股份控制權與盈餘分配權的偏離)愈高會使薪酬績效敏感性下降。另外，本研究五項薪酬委員會品質特性(薪酬委員會委員之董事年資、薪酬委員會規模、每年開會次數、委員出席率與獨立董事比例）愈高，無法使薪酬績效敏感性增強。最後，本研究亦發現，當薪酬委員會品質愈高，有助於降低核心代理問題對薪酬績效敏感性之影響。

The objective of this study is to discuss relationship between core agency problem and pay-performance sensitivities, and further examine whether the relationship is mediated by compensation committee. In this study we used public listed electronics industry in Taiwan as our study sample and our sample period is from 2012 to 2016. The results found that core agency problem more higher (the controlling shareholder with excess control rights) will reduce pay-performance sensitivities. In addition, The study of the five quality of compensation committee characteristics (directors’ seniority, size of compensation committee, frequency of meetings, members attendance rate and proportion of independent directors) with a high quality will not be stronger to pay-performance sensitivities. At last, the higher the quality of the compensation committee will reduce the impact of core agency problem on pay-performance sensitivities.

目錄
第壹章　緒論 1
第一節　研究背景與動機 1
第二節　研究目的 5
第三節　研究流程 6
第四節　研究架構 7
第貳章　文獻探討與假說發展 8
第一節　核心代理問題 8
第二節　薪酬績效敏感性 11
第三節　薪酬委員會 14
第四節　假說發展 17
第參章　研究方法 21
第一節　觀念性架構 21
第二節　研究期間、樣本選取與資料收集 22
第三節　變數定義與衡量 24
第四節　實證模型 30
第肆章　實證結果與分析 32
第一節　敘述性統計 32
第二節　皮爾森相關分析 35
第三節　迴歸分析 37
第伍章　研究結論與建議 41
第一節　研究結論 41
第二節　研究建議與限制 42
第三節　研究貢獻 43
參考文獻 44

圖目錄
圖1-1研究流程圖 6
圖3-1觀念性架構 21

表目錄
表3-1樣本篩選過程 22
表3-2樣本分布 23
表3-3變數定義與衡量彙總表 29
表4-1薪酬委員會品質主成分分析結果 32
表4-2薪酬委員會品質五項變數(N=1,805) 33
表4-3各變數之敘述性統計(N=1,805) 34
表4-4Pearson相關係數表 36
表4-5公司績效分析結果 37
表4-6核心代理問題對薪酬績效敏感性之分析結果 38
表4-7薪酬委員會對薪酬績效敏感性之分析結果 39
表4-8薪酬委員會調節核心代理問題對薪酬績效敏感性之分析結果 40

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