近年來經營不善或財務周轉失靈而導致失敗的公司分布於台灣各產業中，對廣大的投資人與債權人造成傷害，對社會將會造成嚴重的衝擊，公司員工也會因失業而使生計陷入困境。在整體投資環境與公司治理經營中，風險控管一直是監督機制非常重要的一環。從公司角度來看，公司的經營績效及風險控管，皆能反映出公司風險的高低。
    本文選定於2000年到2007年之台灣上市公司作為研究樣本，探究其公司股權結構與內外部監督機制，是否對公司違約風險有顯著影響。其中，資料型態以縱橫資料特性(panel data)進行估計，對於違約風險的推估，則採用KMV模型進行估計。實證結果顯示，台灣上市公司內部監督比外部監督機制，對於違約風險的降低有較高的顯著效果。並且在獨立董監事的制度建立下，更能發揮內部監督機制的實行，不僅在公司經營績效上有良好的提升，最重要的是能夠有效降低公司的違約風險。

In recent years, the firm bankruptcy referred to poor management or the financial turnover malfunction in Taiwan, caused the damage to the general investors and the creditors, will have the serious impact on the society. The company staffs will fall into the difficult position because of being unemployed. In the whole investment environment and the corporate governance, the risk control has been an important link in the corporation supervisory. From company standpoint, firm performance and the risk control can reflect the height of default risk. The study investigated whether shareholder structure and supervisory are affected firm’s default risk by KMV model in the securities market of Taiwan during 2000 to 2007 years. Empirical results show that the inside monitoring mechanism has more significant effect on decreasing default risk than the outside. Moreover, the effect of the independent directors and supervisors can display the internal supervising mechanism implementation. Most importantly, the role of the independent directors and supervisors is effective not only in improving firm performance but also in decreasing default risk.

目 錄
第壹章 緒論
第一節 研究動機………………………………………………………………1
第二節 研究目的………………………………………………………………3
第三節 研究架構………………………………………………………………5
第貳章 文獻探討
第一節 風險的定義與衡量……………………………………………………7
第二節 公司特性與違約風險…………………………………………………16
第三節 股權結構與經營績效…………………………………………………20
第四節 董監事特性與違約風險………………………………………………24
第三章 研究方法
第一節	縱橫資料迴歸模型……………………………………………………27
第二節	縱橫迴歸模型檢定……………………………………………………31
第三節	模型變數定義…………………………………………………………32
第四節	實證迴歸模型…………………………………………………………40
第四章 實證結果與分析
第一節 資料處理………………………………………………………………43
    第二節 相關係數檢定…………………………………………………………48
    第三節 實證結果分析…………………………………………………………50
第五章 結論與建議
第一節	結論……………………………………………………………………56
第二節	研究限制與未來研究建議……………………………………………57
參考文獻………………………………………………………………………59

表目錄
【表1】各變數之基本統計量…………………………………………………44
【表2】各變數之相關係數……………………………………………………49
【表3】全樣本縱橫資料迴歸模型估計結果:應變數EDF……………………55

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