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系統識別號 U0002-1306201410323100
中文論文名稱 總經理更迭與公司治理機制對臺灣壽險業經營績效之研究
英文論文名稱 Impact of Chief Executive Officer Turnover and Corporate Governance on the Operation Performance of Taiwan’s Life Insurance Industry
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 保險學系保險經營碩士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Insurance
學年度 102
學期 2
出版年 103
研究生中文姓名 董晨郁
研究生英文姓名 Chen-Yu Dong
學號 601560245
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2014-06-05
論文頁數 62頁
口試委員 指導教授-何佳玲
委員-高棟梁
委員-張吉宏
中文關鍵字 總經理更迭  自願性更迭  強迫性更迭  公司治理  經營績效 
英文關鍵字 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover  routine turnover  non-routine turnover  corporate governance  performance 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本研究探討台灣壽險業總經理(Chief Executive Officer,CEO)更迭,在公司治理機制下對經營績效的影響。本研究樣本為1998至2012年14家台灣公開發行壽險公司,資料來源為台灣證券交易所公佈總經理異動宣告事件及各家公司股東會財務年報,共145筆樣本資料,利用以不平衡追蹤資料(Unbalanced Panel Data)模型進行迴歸實證分析。
總經理更迭實證結果發現,總經理更迭對於經營績效無顯著相關,符合代罪羔羊理論。若細分更迭類型,結果顯示自願性更迭為顯著負向關係,符合惡性循環理論;強迫性更迭為顯著正向關係,符合常識理論。
公司治理部分,結果顯示董事會規模大小、董事長兼任總經理、獨立董事比例與經營績效呈顯著負相關;在股權結構分析中發現,大股東持股與績效呈顯著正相關,符合利益收斂假說。本文進一步探討金融海嘯與法令規範修正對於公司治理機制是否影響經營績效。研究發現,金融海嘯對於公司治理機制無顯著影響;法令規範修正後,董事會規模大小、董事長兼任總經理與經營績效呈顯著負向關係。
本研究亦探討總經理教育學歷背景是否影響公司經營績效,研究發現學歷背景為行銷管理或法律專業相對於財務投資專業領域之總經理,經營績效表現較佳。
英文摘要 This study discusses the impact of the chief executive officer (CEO) turnover under the corporate governance on the operation performance of Taiwan’s life insurance industry. Fourteen Taiwan companies offering life insurance publicly were sampled. Rolling data from CEO turnover announcements published by the Taiwan Stock Exchange and annual financial reports released by the board of each company were also considered. This study collected a total of 145 samples, on which the empirical regression analysis was conducted based on unbalanced panel data.
Empirical regression analysis results show that CEO turnover and operation performance have no significant correlation, a finding that adheres to the ritual-scapegoating theory. Among the subdivided types of turnover, routine CEO turnover shows a significant negative correlation with operation performance, which coincides with the vicious-circle theory. The non-routine CEO turnover shows a significantly positive correlation, which agrees with the common-sense theory.
The board size, CEO duality, and percentage of independent directors on the board show a significantly negative correlation with operation performance. The ownership structure analysis, shows that the proportion of block shareholding has a significantly positive correlation with operation performance, which adds evidence to the convergence of interest hypothesis. This study further explores the impact of financial crises and law amendments on operation performance. The findings show that financial crises have no significant influence on operation performance, whereas law amendments have a significantly negative correlation with the board size, CEO duality and operation performance.
This study also discusses whether the educational background of a CEO influences corporate operation performance, particularly the observation that CEOs who have majored in marketing management and law perform better in finance.
論文目次 目錄
第一章 緒論....................................1
第一節 研究背景................................1
第二節 研究動機與目的..........................3
第三節 研究架構................................5
第二章 文獻回顧與實證假說......................6
第一節 代理理論................................6
第二節 總經理更迭與公司經營績效................7
第三節 公司治理機制與公司經營績效..............11
第四節 學歷背景................................16
第三章 研究方法................................17
第一節 樣本資料來源............................17
第二節 操作變數定義............................18
第三節 實證模型設定............................25
第四章 實證分析與結果..........................27
第一節 敘述統計................................27
第二節 實證結果................................31
第五章 結論與建議..............................51
第一節 結論....................................51
第二節 建議....................................53
第三節 研究限制與建議..........................54
參考文獻.......................................55
附錄...........................................59


圖表目錄

圖1-1 2001~2013年 人身保險保險密度與投保率統計表.....3
圖1-2 研究架構.......................................5
表4-1敘述性統計......................................28
表4-2總經理更迭宣告分類..............................29
表4-3總經理更迭與公司治理相關分析....................33
表4-4總經理學歷背景相關分析..........................34
表4-5全數樣本總經理更迭與公司治理迴歸分析............36
表4-6總經理自願性更迭迴歸分析........................37
表4-7總經理強迫性更迭迴歸分析........................38
表4-8股權結構變數平方項迴歸分析......................41
表4-9金融海嘯前後均數檢定............................42
表4-10修正證券交易法(2006)對獨立董事比例變數交乘項迴歸分析...................................................45
表4-11修正證券交易法(2006)對研究變數交乘項迴歸分析...46
表4-12修正保險業負責人應具備資格條件準則(2010)對董事長兼任總經理變數交乘項迴歸分析...............................47
表4-13修正保險業負責人應具備資格條件準則(2010)對研究變數交乘項迴歸分析...........................................48
表4-14總經理學歷背景(行銷管理、保險精算、法律專業)迴歸分析...................................................50

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財團法人保險事業發展中心:http://www.tii.org.tw/index.asp,最後瀏覽日:2014年5月22日。
臺灣證券交易所,公開資訊觀測站:http://mops.twse.com.tw/mops/web/index,最後瀏覽日:2014年5月22日。
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