本研究以美國前三千大企業為研究對象，探討企業面對正盈餘、去年同期盈餘、分析師盈餘預測等三類盈餘門檻下，經理人是否有操控盈餘的行為。結果顯示當管理前盈餘高（低）於門檻時，經理人確有使用裁決性應計項目降低（增加）盈餘的行為，且隨管理前盈餘與門檻間差距程度之增加，使用程度也愈加提升。業外損益方面，僅發現當管理前盈餘低於門檻時，企業有認列處分利得以增加盈餘數字的情形，且使用程度亦隨距離門檻之差距增加而擴大。最後，本研究亦對裁決性應計項目與業外損益間的內生關係進行驗證，結果部份支持了管理前盈餘與門檻間差距大（小）時，兩盈餘管理工具間的使用為互補（替代）關係。

In a sample of firms listed in Russell 3000, we investigate the behavior of earnings management by discretionary accruals (DA) and non-operating assets (NOA) around earnings thresholds, including positive earnings, earnings of the same quarter in last year, and analysts’earnings forecast. Results indicate that managers tend to use DA to decrease (increase) earnings when pre-managed earnings are above (below) earnings thresholds. The bigger the difference between pre-managed earnings and threshold, the stronger the use of DA is. Results also reveal that managers realize gains by disposing NOA to increase earnings when pre-managed earnings are lower than thresholds. Again, the positive association between threshold difference and use of NOA holds in this case. Testing the endogenous relation between DA and NOA, we find, at least in part, a complementary (substitute) relationship between these two instruments when thresholds difference is big (small).

目錄
第一章 緒論	1
第一節  研究背景與動機	1
第二節  研究目的	4
第三節  研究流程	5
第四節  論文架構	6
第二章 文獻探討	7
第一節  盈餘管理工具	7
第二節  盈餘管理與門檻	10
第三章 研究方法	13
第一節  觀念性架構	13
第二節  假說建立	14
第三節  研究設計	17
第四節  變數衡量與模型	21
第五節  樣本選取、資料來源與研究期間	27
第四章 實證結果	28
第一節  敘述統計量與相關分析	28
第二節  各門檻下之盈餘管理行為	30
第三節  盈餘管理工具之內生關係	36
第五章 敏感性分析	41
第六章 結論與建議	51
第一節  結論	51
第二節  研究限制	52
第三節  對後續研究之建議	53
參考文獻	54

表目錄
表3-1  聯立方程式之變數彙總表	26
表3-2  樣本產業分布表	27
表4-1  各變數之敘述性統計值	29
表4-2  聯立方程式變數之PEARSON相關係數AB	29
表4-3  正盈餘門檻之盈餘管理	31
表4-4  正盈餘門檻各子樣本間盈餘管理之差異	31
表4-5  去年同期盈餘門檻之盈餘管理	33
表4-6  去年同期盈餘門檻各子樣本間盈餘管理之差異	33
表4-7  分析師預期盈餘門檻之盈餘管理	35
表4-8  分析師預期盈餘門檻各子樣本間盈餘管理之差異	35
表4-9  聯立方程式實證結果	39
表4-9 （續）	40
表5-1  正盈餘門檻之盈餘管理	42
表5-2  正盈餘門檻各子樣本間盈餘管理之差異	42
表5-3  去年同期盈餘門檻之盈餘管理	42
表5-4  去年同期盈餘門檻各子樣本間盈餘管理之差異	43
表5-5  分析師預期盈餘門檻之盈餘管理	43
表5-6  分析師預期盈餘門檻各子樣本間盈餘管理之差異	43
表5-7  聯立方程式實證結果	44
表5-7 （續）	45
表5-8  聯立方程式實證結果（去年同期盈餘門檻）	46
表5-9  正盈餘門檻之盈餘管理（排除AS為零）	47
表5-10  正盈餘門檻各子樣本間盈餘管理之差異（排除AS為零）	47
表5-11  去年同期盈餘門檻之盈餘管理（排除AS為零）	48
表5-12  去年同期盈餘門檻各子樣本間盈餘管理之差異（排除AS為零）	48
表5-13  分析師預期盈餘門檻之盈餘管理（排除AS為零）	48
表5-14  分析師預期盈餘門檻各子樣本間盈餘管理之差異（排除AS為零）	49
表5-15  聯立方程式實證結果（排除AS為零）	49
表5-15 （續）	50
 
圖目錄
圖1-1 研究流程	5
圖3-1 觀念性架構	13

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