事業之聯合行為，乃是一種典型之限制競爭方式，先進工業國家常見事業以聯合行為直接阻礙市場之公平競爭，間接損及消費者權益。公平交易法施行以來，在執法上雖有相當成效，但聯合行為違法案件依然存在，甚至類似案件一再發生，此是否因其不當利益甚大，而罰則不足以嚇阻所致，故本研究採「比較個案研究法」，自88至96年間聯合行為處分案中，選取具代表性之同業公會、氣體燃料供應業、及預拌混擬土業三大類型產業，且以受罰金額較大者五件個案為研究分析對象。首先，探究個案事業聯合行為形成之主因及目的，並指出其違法類型，以及公平交易委員會依「公平會裁處罰鍰額度參考表」作成處分之所考量因素，進而對處分類似或相關案件，甚至與行政法院訴訟作成之不同考量，併作比較分析，藉以檢視公平會執法效果。此外，從會計觀點試擬將公平會裁處罰鍰所考量之若干項目予以量化，以及參酌先進國家體例對罰鍰裁處之依據與標準，提出建議供參。
經本研究結果可歸納出下列主要發現：(一)首先，事業聯合行為發生之主因，包括：(1)產品同質性高；(2)產品多為民生必需品；(3)廠商家數少或同業公會介入；以及(4)除油品供應商係寡占市場業者外，餘多經由聯合行為提高其市場集中度。其中，第(2)項產品多為「民生必需品」，致使消費者處於劣勢無法抵制聯合行為之價格調整，僅能作為價格調整後之接受者，乃本研究之主要發現。(二)聯合行為之其主要目的，則在：(1)確保現有廠商之既有利益，阻隔新競爭者加入；(2)維持現有參與聯合廠商之市占率；(3)藉價格調漲，掠取不當利益。(三)而本研究聯合行為違法類型以「價格之聯合」居多，事業聯合行為的發生，主要是在獲取不當之利益，藉由價格之調整及與同業間的協議而達成此一目的。
再就所選取之桶裝瓦斯分裝廠二個聯合行為違法案例中，經比較研究發現「裁處罰鍰額度參考表」可作為評斷違法行為量化之準據，且較具客觀性。而公平會於95年12月15日廢止該參考表，恐對其後違法案件之裁處，徒增更多爭議與不確定性，實值商榷。又從行政法院對公平會裁處之評斷，在違法行為認定上予以肯定，僅對罰鍰裁處之多寡有不同看法，由此可知，該參考表具評核價值，而應對參考表作進一步強化其供作裁處罰鍰之客觀性，並發揮其實質功效。
又因公平法對首次違法處罰之金額為上限2,500萬元，再次違法之處罰上限為5,000萬元之規定，但似無法達成預期之遏阻效果，而一再違法，尤其對惡質卡特爾，應加重罰則，並作出更有效的裁量對策，以減少違法聯合行為的再次發生，如美國與德國以違法聯合行為所造成損害或獲得利益之3倍為上限，因與違法利益有直接關聯性，而預期可產生較大之遏阻效果。另從會計觀點剖析公平會所訂參考表所列之考量項目，其中違法行為所得利益、交易秩序持續期間與事業之市場地位三項為予以可量化，較不具爭議性，列為核計不當利益之主要衡量因素，而其他項目則作為增減或加倍處罰之參考指標；如為便利行政裁量，可仿效歐盟規定，除參考表內各考量因素外，另以參與聯合行為違法業者之營業額百分比作為上限，以避免過度處罰而影響業者之經營發展。
至於公平會與行政法院對罰鍰裁處之不同見解，此有賴公平會主動、積極與司法機關協商，充分表明裁罰依據之考量內涵與衡量標準，除因特殊情況差異甚大，可參採司法機關裁決之建議而增減罰鍰外，宜請司法機關尊重行政機關制訂與執行處罰之行政裁量權。
最後，本研究中所剖析之處分案例，多為民生必需品，受國內外主客觀因素影響，如何遏阻一再發生違法情事，除裁處罰鍰予以加重外，政府尚須在產業政策面，針對該產業特性與供需關聯作出不同考量，並提出調節物質供需之等因應對策。

The Cartels for enterprise is a typical way of restricting the competition. And this is commonly seen in industrially advanced countries, that the Cartels directly restrict the fair competition in the market and indirectly affecting and rights and privileges of consumers. Since the deployment and implementation of fair trade law, the performance of it evidenced its effectiveness, nevertheless the unlawful Cartels behaviors still exist, even with frequent occurrences. Whether the occurrence is propelled by huge unlawful profits or the sanctions and fines for these behaviors are not effective, hence, this research adopts the “comparative case study” approach, which indicated that between the year of 1999 to 2007 the Cartels sanction cases which had the representative indicators were selected for this study.  These include three types of large scale industry：The Trade association, providers for gaseous fuel suppliers and preprocessed concrete industry. And the five cases selected for study purpose are those imposed with large fines.  

   First of all, this study is to explore the main cause and purpose for the formation of individual case in the Cartels, and point out the laws that govern this specific behavior in addition to the considerations for the decision behind the sanctioning these behaviors, which are based on the “Reference table for the amount of sanction and fine imposed” by Fair Trade Commission. These rules are used to evaluate similar sanction cases or relevant ones, and they may even take a different approach in consideration in regards to those rulings from administrative court. And comparative analysis is taken to evaluate the performance of Fair Trade Commission. Additionally, from the accounting standpoint, this research is to quantify several items which are considered or referenced for sanctions and fines imposed by Fair Trade Commission, in addition to reference those sanction rulings and standards adopted by advanced countries. And the ensued recommendations are to be submitted for future reference.  

   Through the research process, the following findings can be summarized: (A) First of all, the causes of Cartels behavior, these include: (1) Similarity in the product or product line; (2) Majority of the products are daily necessities of the general populace; (3) Fewer manufacturers or business association were involved; (4)Except those in the oil business are the enterprises of monopoly in nature, the rest achieve their market centralization through the Cartels business maneuvering.  In the midst of all, the (2) items are basically “General populace necessities” in nature, therefore the consumers are placed in an inferior status when bargaining and unable to unite to fight back the Cartels pricing practices, and only can be the receivers for the adjusted prices. These are the main findings in this research.  (B) The Cartels behavior’s main purpose lies at： (1) To assure the existing profitability and prevent the newcomers from entering the market; (2) Maintain status quo of market shares for the existing Cartels partners; (3) Through raising the price in order to acquire undue profits. (3) And this research finds that the majority of the Cartels behaviors are similar to those of “Price unification”, and the occurrence of Cartels behavior is primarily to acquire undue profits and through the price gauging and private agreements between business partners, this goal can be achieved as result.

   Additionally, in the selected case study of two Cartels violations, i.e. the barreled gas packaging factories, the comparative study finds that “Reference table for the amount of sanction and fine imposed” can be adopted as the quantified baselines for evaluating the violation of appropriate laws. And this is also objective from perspective of this thesis. Since the Fair Trade Commission abolished this reference table on Dec. 15, 2006, and this act itself is found to increase the uncertainty for dispute resolution from the perspective of arbitration of future law violation cases. And this indeed is worth of further study and investigation. And the Executive Yuan’s appraisals for Fair Trade Commission are positive and encouraging, only withhold different point of view in regards to the amount of sanctions imposed. From these, this Reference table for the amount of sanction and fine imposed possesses the attributes of appraisal. The need to further enhance this table in the area of supporting the objectivity of imposing the sanctions and ensure to exemplify its effectiveness is justified after all.          

   And the upper limit of the fine resulted from violating the sanctions, the first time offender is set at 2.5 Million NTD, repeat offender’s upper limit is set at 5 Million NTD. Nevertheless, this seems to be not working in light of predicted performance in clamping down the offenses. And repeated violations, especially those of aggravated Cartels behaviors, should be imposed with heavy sanctions and fines. In addition, more effective arbitrations should be administered to lessen the repetitive occurrences of Cartels behaviors. For instances, in US and Germany, they implemented sanctions and fines with the upper limits as high as three times the damages or profits acquired from illegal Cartels practices, since these sanctions and fines are directly impacting the unlawful profits garnered, and are predicted with better performance in suppressing the unlawful practices.   Alternatively, from the accounting perspective in analyzing the items and the ramification behind the tables referenced by Fair Trade Commission, in these, the acquired profits through unlawful practices, the period that the trading order is maintained and persisted, in addition to the market share for the enterprise in interest; these three items can be quantified, and less disputes would be incurring.  And these should be taken in as the main evaluating factors for appraising the unlawful profits. And other items can be used as the references for either increasing or decreasing, even imposing treble damages. Such as： To facilitate the administrative arbitration, it can copy and reference the European Alliance’s rules. In addition to reference the ramifications within the table itself, it can also reference the upper limit of the percentages which are the sales volumes for those who participating unlawful Cartels practices. This way should prevent the excessive and unneeded sanctioning and would result with negative impacts to the overall enterprise development.    

   As for the difference of opinion between Fair Trade Commission and Executive Yuan in regards to sanctions and fines, and this is resolved by Fair Trade Commission’s actively and aggressively negotiating with the judicial organizations.  In the process, the contents and ramifications, even the evaluating standards which the sanctions and fines are based upon, are clearly stated as result. For those exceptions that are unique, they adopted the arbitration suggestions from judicial organizations and increase the amount of fines accordingly. And this also invites the courtesies from judicial organizations in honoring the administration’s law prescription rights and ensued execution of the law, centering on the sanctions from the executive discretions. 

   Lastly, the analyzed sanction cases in this study are mostly cases of general populace necessities, affected by subjective factors both domestic and foreign. As for how to effectively stop these unlawful practices, it not only requires increasing the fines from each violation, since the government holds different point of view from the perspective of industry policy, targeting the industry’s characteristics, and demand & supply connections. Therefore, the corresponding policies for adjusting the supply and demand factors should be proposed accordingly in this regard.

目錄


第一章	緒論 .......................................1
第一節	研究背景與動機 ..............................1  
第二節	研究目的 ....................................2
第三節	研究架構與流程 ..............................3 

第二章	文獻探討 ...................................6 
第一節	聯合行為之定義..............................6 
第二節	聯合行為之類型.............................10
第三節  違反聯合行為禁止之法律效果及判定標準.......13
第四節   實證文獻之探討...............................21

第三章	研究設計 ..................................32
第一節	比較個案研究法.............................32
第二節	資料收集及案例選擇標準.....................34 
第三節	資料分析方法...............................41

第四章	聯合行為違法案例之剖析....................43 
第一節	台灣區麥粉工業同業公會聯合行為處分案例.....43
第二節	中油公司及台塑石化公司聯合行為處分案例.....51
第三節	桶裝瓦斯分裝廠聯合行為處分案例.............56
第四節	預拌混凝土業者聯合行為處分案例.............65
第五節	案例之綜合比較分析.........................68
第六節	裁處罰鍰標準之進一步探討...................74

第五章	結論及建議................................78
第一節	結論.......................................79
第二節	研究限制...................................83
第三節	建議.......................................83

參考文獻 ..........................................86
附錄..............................................91 
圖目錄
【圖1- 1】研究流程圖 ------------------------------------------------- 5
【圖4- 1】 麵粉再製食品需求市場結構圖 ------------------------------- 45
【圖4- 2】 近八年國際原油價格變動趨勢圖 ----------------------------- 52
【圖4- 3】石油煉製業之產業關聯圖------------------------------------ 53
【圖4- 4】氣體燃料供應業之產業關聯圖-------------------------------- 59
【圖4- 5】預拌混凝土業上下游關聯圖 --------------------------------- 66
【圖4- 6】我國水泥與預拌混凝土價格走勢圖---------------------------- 67

表目錄
【表2- 1】聯合行為之構成要件---------------------------------------- 10
【表2- 2】「聯合行為」之類型---------------------------------------- 12
【表2- 3】公平法有關處分「聯合行為」之行政罰及刑事罰相關條文-------- 15
【表2- 4】表2-4 歐盟、美、德及日對違法「聯合行為」處罰規定之比較--- 20
【表2- 4】「聯合行為之形成」之相關文獻 ----------------------------- 25
【表2- 5】「聯合行為之合意」之相關文獻 ----------------------------- 29
【表2- 6】「聯合行為相關案例」之相關文獻 --------------------------- 30
【表2- 7】「行政裁罰之決定要件」之相關文獻-------------------------- 31
【表3- 1】81至96年6月公平會對違法聯合行為處分件數統計--------------- 36
【表3- 2】81至96年6月公平會對違法聯合行為處分金額統計--------------- 37
【表3- 3】88至96年6月違法聯合行為處分件數按選樣產業別之結構分析-----39
【表3- 4】88至96年6月違法聯合行為處分金額按選樣產業別之結構分析 ----40
【表4- 1】83年至90年小麥進口及麵粉國內產銷供需量值之變動----------- 44
【表4- 2】公平委員會處分與高等行政法院90訴字第1207號判決之比較–
          台灣區麥粉工業同業公會案 --------------------------------- 49
【表4- 3】89年至94年油品銷售值結構比之比較 -------------------------53
【表4- 4】89年至94年國內原油供給概況 -------------------------------53
【表4- 5】89年至94年臺閩地區機動車輛登記數------------------------- 54
【表4- 6】液化石油氣供需平衡表 -------------------------------------61
【表4- 7】預拌混凝土製造業銷售比重--------------------------------- 67
【表4- 8】選樣違法實證案例之產業特性與供需關係綜合比較------------- 69
【表4- 9】選樣違法實證案例之行為類型及公平會裁處罰鍰
          評量因素綜合比較---------------------------------------- 72
【表4-10】行政法院對公平會原處分實證案例作成判決之考量因素--------- 73
【表4-11】「裁處罰鍰額度參考表」考量事項可否量化之分析-------------75


附錄
【附表一】「麥粉工業同業公會違法聯合行為處分案例」工作底稿---------- 91
【附表二】「中油及台塑石化公司違法聯合行為處分案例」工作底稿--------- 92
【附表三】「北部地區桶裝瓦斯分裝廠違法聯合行為處分案例」工作底稿----- 93
【附表四】「高屏地區桶裝瓦斯分裝廠違法聯合行為處分案例」工作底稿----- 99
【附表五】「嘉義地區預拌混凝土業者違法聯合行為處分案例」工作底稿-----103

參考文獻
一、中文部分（依作者姓名筆劃排序）
王銘勇，2006，聯合行為宽恕減免責任條款之研究，公平交易季刊，第14卷第1期。
王育品，2004，製粉及碾穀業基本資料，台灣經濟研究院產經資料庫。
日本經濟法學會編，2002，經濟法講座２獨禁法理論展開[1]，293-326。
白忠志，2004，論聯合行為之刑事處罰，國立臺北大學法學系碩士班碩士論文。
林易典，1998，中小事業聯合於公平交易法之探討，政大法律研究所碩士論文，。
林泰延，2003，預拌混凝土製造業基本資料，台灣經濟研究院產經資料庫。
何之邁，1999，歐洲共同體競爭法論，三民書局，頁18-27。
吳庚，2003，行政法之理論與實用，三民書局。
馬泰成，2005，「默契性聯合行為與相關案例研析」，公平交易季刊，第13卷第1期，P89-108。
馬泰成、洪德昌，2001，「事業聯合行為被判違法之因子分析」，公平交易季刊，第9卷第2期。
黃茂榮、蕭文生，1998，「聯合行為構成要件之研究-(第一部份)同業公會聯合行為之處分主體」，行政院公平交易委員會八十七年度合作研究計畫六研究報告。
莊春發，2005，「廠商人數、公會與聯合行為—公平會處分案的研究」，公平交易季刊，第13卷第4期，P1-28。
游素素，1993，「聯合行為之認定問題探討」，公平交易委員會發行。
陳坤銘、溫偉任，2005，「寡占市場廠商價格跟隨行為規範之研究」，公平交易季刊，第13 卷第1期，P55-84。
陳欣佩，2004，石油煉製業基本資料，台灣經濟研究院產經資料庫。
曾俊洲，2006，氣體燃料供應業基本資料，台灣經濟研究院產經資料庫。
張紹勳著，2004，研究方法，台中市，滄海書局。
張麗卿，2007，「公平交易委員會裁處罰鍰額度之研究」，公平交易季刊，第15卷第2期，P81-92。
劉佩真，2006，水泥及其製品製造業基本資料，台灣經濟研究院產經資料庫。
熊柏青、張明宗及劉靜怡，2001，「寡占市場一致性行為之認定方法及其濫用市場地位行為規範—由Container Corp. 案探討交換資訊行為」，行政院公平交易委員會第七屆競爭政策與公平法學術研討會論文集。
賴源河編，2005，公平交易法新論，236，月旦出版公司出版。
蕭麗芬，2005，「共同研發與聯合行為之研究-以我國政府推動研發聯盟為中心」，國立交通大學科技法律研究所碩士論文。
廖義男，2004，「九十二年度委託研究報告七-公平交易法之註釋研究系列(一) 」，行政院公平交易委員會。
行政院公平交易委員會網站，網址：http://www.ftc.gov.tw/
司法院法學資料檢索系統網站，網址：http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/
二、英文部份（依字母排序）
Borenstein, S. and A. Shepard. 1996.“Dynamic pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets,”, Rand Journal of Economics, 27, 429-451.
Carlton, D. W. and J. M. Perloff. 2005. Modern Industrial Organization,   4th ed., New York: Addison-Wesley Publising Company.
Clarke, R. 1985. Industrial Economics, London: Basil Blackwell.
Clarkson, K. W. and R. L. Miller. 1983. Industrial Organization: Theory Evidence and Public Policy, New York: McGraw－Hill Book Company.
Douglass, C. North.Institions. 1991. Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press, p.97-98.
Frass A. G. and D. F. Greer. 1977. “Market Structure and Price Collusion: An Empirical Analysis,” The Journal of Industrial Economics, 24, 21-44.
Fberhard, F. & W. Markus. 2003. “Corporate leniency programs in the EU and the USA ,” German Working Papers in Law and Economics Volume, Paper 24, 14 .
Gal-Or, E. 1985. “First and Second Mover Advantage”, International Economic Review,26: 649-653.
Genesove, D. and W. Mullin. 2001. “Rules, Communications, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence form the Sugar Institute Case”, American Economic Reviews, 91(3), 379-98.
Hay, G. A. and D. Kelly. 1974. “An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies,”Journal of Law and Economics, 13-38.
Holt, C. A. and D. T. Scheffman. 1987. “Facilitating Practices: the effects of advance notice and best-price policies”, Rand Journal of Economics, 20(1), 123-37.
Joseph, E. Harrington, Jr. 2005. “Detecting Cartels,” Johns Hopkins University.
Koch, J. V. 1980. Industrial Organization and Prices, New Jersery: Prentice-Hall Inc.
Leonard-Barton,D. 1990.”A dual methodology for case studies：synergistic use of a longitudinal single site with replicated multiple sites”,Organisation Science,Vol. 1 No.1.
Logan, J. W. and R. W. Lutter. 1989. “Guaranteed Lowest Prices: Do They Facilitate Collusion?”, Economics Letters, 31(1), 189-92.
MacLeod, W. 1985. “A Theory of Conscious Parallelism”, European Economic Review,27, 25-44.
Mssimo, M. & P, Michele. 1999. “Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution,” 25,引自：http://www.iue.it/Personal/Motta/forum/CriJIE.pdf.
Novshek, W. and H. Sonnenschein. 1982. “Fulfilled Expectations, Cournot duopoly with information acquisition and release”, Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 214-18.
Phlips, L. 1995. Competition Policies: a Game-Theoretic Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rees, R. 1993.“Tacit Collusion.”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 9 (2), Summer 1993, pp. 27-40.
Salop, S. C. 1986. “Practices That Facilitate Oligopoly Coordination”, in J. Stiglitz and I. Matthewson, ed., New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure, London:Macmillan Press.
See, D. B. 1994. To Indict or Not to Indict: Prosecutorial Discretion in Sherman Act Enforcement, 63 CORN. L. REV. 412 (1978); J. Gallo, Criminal Penalties Under the Sherman Act: A Study in Law and Economics, 16 Res. L. & Econ. 25, 27.
See, S. M. & A. Maitena. 2000. How the European Commission Sets Cartel Fines, 14 ANTITRUST 24, 25-27.
Schramm, W. 1971. notes on case studies of instructional media projects. Working paper, the Academy for Educational Development, Washington,DC.
Shepherd, W. G. 1990. The Economics of Industrial Organization, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Scherer, F. M. and D. Ross. 1990. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Yasuyo Hamaguchi & Toshiji Kawagoe. 2005. “An Experimental Study of Leniency Programs,” 16, RIETI Discussion Paper Series 05-E-003.
Yin, R. K. 1994. Case study research: Design and methods (2nd ed.) Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Yin, R. K. 2003. Case study research: Design and methods.(3rd ed.) Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.