本研究旨在探討會計師輪調制度與審計品質之關聯性。隨著國內企業越來越趨於集團化，相較於非集團企業，集團企業對經濟環境的影響力日益上升，同時，集團企業內部組織與股權結構皆較為複雜，使得集團企業更容易從事盈餘管理之行為，故本研究將從集團企業的角度切入去探討輪調制度實行的必要性。本文以台灣上市櫃公司為研究對象，將研究樣本區分為集團與非集團兩部分，探討輪調對集團與非集團的審計品質關係為何。實證發現，不論更換一位或二位會計師皆未能看出輪調後所帶來的效益。本研究推論其因為會計師於輪調後初期對受查客戶的不熟悉，而導致輪調制度的效益受到限制。此外，加入產業專家變數，對集團企業輪調產業專家會計師時將與負的裁決性應計數(Da-)呈現顯著負相關；而在非集團企業方面，若更換產業專家會計師則對裁決性應計數絕對值(AbsDa)、正的裁決性應計數(Da+)呈現顯著負相關，結果顯示對非集團企業更換產業專家會計師能有效抑制管理當局從事盈餘管理的程度及向上操弄。

The objective of this study was to investigate the relationship between auditor rotation systems and audit quality. With their increasing number in Taiwan, group enterprises are wielding greater influence on the economic environment than non-group enterprises. At the same time, their internal organizations and ownership structures are becoming increasingly complex, thereby giving them more opportunities to engage in earnings management. This study therefore examined the necessity of implementing an auditor rotation system from the perspective of group enterprises. This study examined listed companies in Taiwan, dividing them into group and non-group enterprises and investigating the influence of auditor rotation on the audit quality in these two groups. The empirical results revealed that rotating one or two auditors showed no obvious influence on audit quality. We infer that the initial unfamiliarity of new auditors with the enterprises being audited limits the effectiveness of the rotation system. Furthermore, once an industry expert variable was included, rotating the industry expert auditors of group enterprises presented a negative correlation with negative correlation discretionary accruals (Da-), whereas rotating the industry expert auditors of non-group enterprises presented a negative correlation with the absolute value of discretionary accruals (AbsDa) and positive discretionary accruals (Da+). The results therefore indicate that rotating industry expert auditors can effectively inhibit the practice of earnings management in non-group enterprises.

第壹章	、緒論………………………………………………………….…….…..1
第一節	研究背景與機……………………………………………………......…...1
第二節	研究目的………………………………………………………..………...3
第三節	研究架構與流程……………………………………………………….....4
第貳章	、文獻探討與假說發展…………………………………………………6
第一節	集團定義與經濟重要性………………………………………………...…6
第二節	集團特性與客戶重要性………………………………………………..…12
第三節	會計師任期與輪調制度……………………………………….………….14
第四節	審計產業專家……………………………………………………………..17
第參章	、研究方法……………………………………………………….….….19
第一節	樣本選取與資料來源………………………………………………….….19
第二節	變數定義與實證模型……………………………………………………..24
第肆章、實證結果與分析……………………………………………………....29
第一節	敘述性統計………………………………………………………...…...…29
第二節	相關係數分析……………………………………………………….….…33
第三節	迴歸結果分析……………………………………….………….……...….40
第伍章、結論與建議……………………………………………………………48
第一節	研究結論………………………………………………………….…….…48
第二節	研究限制………………………………………………………….…….…49
參考文獻……………………………………………………………………..……….…50
表2-1 集團分子公司的平均成長家數……………………………….…….………..….9
表2-2 集團企業雇用的員工數與台灣就業人口比……………………….….….....…..9
表2-3 集團總營收與國民生產毛額(GNP)比……………………………..……….......10
表3-1  Panel A集團企業應輪調且更換一位會計師(主簽)之樣本分配表……....….20
表3-1  Panel B集團企業應輪調且更換一位會計師(副簽)之樣本分配表……….…21
表3-1  Panel C 集團企業應輪調且更換二位會計師之樣本分配表.…......................21
表3-1  Panel D 非集團企業應輪調且更換一位會計師(主簽)之樣本分配表……....22
表3-1  Panel E 非集團企業應輪調且更換一位會計師(副簽)之樣本分配表……....22
表3-1  Panel F 非集團企業應輪調且更換二位會計師之樣本分配表………....…...23
表4-1  Panel A 集團企業應輪調且更換一位會計師(主簽)之敘述性統計表…....…30
表4-1  Panel B 集團企業應輪調且更換一位會計師(副簽)之敘述性統計表….…...31
表4-1  Panel C 集團企業應輪調且更換二位會計師之敘述性統計表……….…….31
表4-1  Panel D 非集團企業應輪調且更換一位會計師(主簽)之敘述性統計表…....31
表4-1  Panel E 非集團企業應輪調且更換一位會計師(副簽)之敘述性統計表.…....32
表4-1  Panel F 非集團企業應輪調且更換二位會計師之敘述性統計表…............…32
表4-2  Panel A 集團企業應輪調且更換一位會計師(主簽)之相關係數表...…..…...34
表4-2  Panel B 集團企業應輪調且更換一位會計師(副簽)之相關係數表…….…...35
表4-2  Panel C 集團企業應輪調且更換二位會計師之相關係數表……………..….36
表4-2  Panel D 非集團企業應輪調且更換一位會計師(主簽)之相關係數表……....37
表4-2  Panel E 非集團企業應輪調且更換一位會計師(副簽)之相關係數表……....38
表4-2  Panel F 非集團企業應輪調且更換二位會計師之相關係數表……………...39
表4-3  Panel A 集團企業應輪調且更換一位會計師(主簽)之迴歸結果………....…42
表4-3  Panel B 集團企業應輪調且更換一位會計師(副簽)之迴歸結果…….……..43
表4-3  Panel C 集團企業應輪調且更換二位會計師之迴歸結果……………….….44
表4-3  Panel D 非集團企業應輪調且更換一位會計師(主簽)之迴歸結果….…..…45
表4-3  Panel E 非集團企業應輪調且更換一位會計師(副簽)之迴歸結果…….…..46
表4-3  Panel F 非集團企業應輪調且更換二位會計師之迴歸結果……………......47
圖1-1 研究流程圖……………………………………………………………………5

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