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系統識別號 U0002-1007201300282000
中文論文名稱 盈餘管理、公司治理機制與高階主管薪酬關係之研究 -以台灣上市上櫃公司為例
英文論文名稱 A Study of the Relationships among Earnings Management, Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation: The Cases of Listed Companies on SES and OTC in Taiwan
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 管理科學學系企業經營碩士在職專班
系所名稱(英) Executive Master’s Program of Business Administration(EMBA) in Management Sciences
學年度 101
學期 2
出版年 102
研究生中文姓名 謝尚諺
研究生英文姓名 Shang-Yen Hsieh
學號 700620593
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2013-07-04
論文頁數 36頁
口試委員 指導教授-莊忠柱
委員-婁國仁
委員-林忠機
中文關鍵字 盈餘管理  公司治理機制  高階主管薪酬  裁決性應計項目 
英文關鍵字 Earnings Management  Corporate Governance Mechanism  Executive Compensation  Discretionary Accruals 
學科別分類
中文摘要 近年來,一連串假帳醜聞風波,但高階主管薪酬卻與公司盈餘不成正比,使得肥貓議題備受全球重視。本研究以2005年至2011年在台灣股票上市上櫃公司為研究對象,樣本公司共有1,351家,其中上市有772家,上櫃有579家,利用Pearson積差相關分析、複迴歸分析方法,以盈餘管理為自變數,公司治理機制為干擾變數(含董監事規模、董事長兼任總經理、大股東持股比率、董監事持股比率、經理人持股比率、法人機構持股比率及四大會計事務所簽證),高階主管薪酬為應變數,探討盈餘管理、公司治理機制與高階主管薪酬的關係。
本研究發現盈餘管理對公司高階主管薪酬有顯著負向影響。董監事規模、董監事持股比率及四大會計事務所簽證顯著正向干擾盈餘管理對高階主管薪酬的影響。董事長兼任總經理、大股東持股比率、經理人持股比率與法人持股比率顯著負向干擾盈餘管理對高階主管薪酬的影響。公司治理機制的發揮是有效監督高階主管自利行為的關鍵所在,因而如何使高階主管利益與股東的利益趨於一致,減少高階主管藉著盈餘的操弄而增加高階主管薪酬,則是台灣主管當局健全資本市場努力的方向。本研究的研究結果可作為利害相關人士的參考。
英文摘要 There are some financial scandals over the recent years. As the executive compensation is not proportional to the corporation earning, the public’s focus on the issues of Fat Cat. This research is targeted on the companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC) or Over the Counter (OTC) from 2005 to 2011, there are 1,351 sample companies in total, in which 772 companies are listed in TSEC and 579 companies are listed in OTC. Based on Pearson correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis, this study investigates the relationship among earnings management, corporate governance and management compensation. Management compensation is as the dependent variable, the independent variable is the earning management, and moderating variable is the corporate governance which includes board size, chairman also serving as CEO, block shareholding ratio, director shareholding ratio, manager shareholding ratio, investment institution shareholding ratio, and certification of top-four accounting agency.
The findings of this study show the earnings management has negative effect on the management compensation significantly. The board size, investment institution shareholding ratio and the certification of top-four accounting agency significantly increase the effect the earnings management on the management compensation. Contrarily chairman also serving as CEO, block shareholding ratio, manager shareholding ratio and investment institution shareholding ratio significantly decrease the effect of earnings management on the management compensation.
What the key point of effective monitoring executive self-interested behavior, depends on the corporate governance mechanism. Therefore, how to match the interests between the executives and stockholders, and how to avoid the executives’ earnings manipulation for increasing executive compensation are the striving directions of Taiwan authorities for healthy capital market. The result of this study provides the references for the stakeholders of the companies.
論文目次 目錄 頁次
目錄----------------------------------------------------- I
圖目錄------------------------------------------------- III
表目錄-------------------------------------------------- IV
1. 緒論-------------------------------------------------- 1
1.1 研究背景與研究動機----------------------------------- 1
1.2 研究目的--------------------------------------------- 5
1.3 研究對象與範圍--------------------------------------- 6
1.4 研究架構--------------------------------------------- 6
2. 研究方法---------------------------------------------- 8
2.1 觀念性研究架構--------------------------------------- 8
2.2 研究變數操作性定義----------------------------------- 9
2.3 研究樣本與資料來源---------------------------------- 16
2.4 實證模型-------------------------------------------- 17
3. 實證結果分析----------------------------------------- 18
3.1 基本敘述統計分析------------------------------------ 18
3.2 相關分析-------------------------------------------- 20
3.3 盈餘管理、公司治理機制與高階主管薪酬的變化實證分析-- 22
4. 結論與建議------------------------------------------- 28
4.1 結論------------------------------------------------ 28
4.2 建議------------------------------------------------ 29
參考文獻------------------------------------------------ 31
(1). 中文部份------------------------------------------- 31
(2). 英文部份------------------------------------------- 32

圖目錄 頁次
圖1-1 研究流程圖----------------------------------------- 7
圖2-1 觀念性研究架構圖----------------------------------- 9

表目錄頁次
表2-1 研究資料期間樣本上市櫃公司分佈-------------------- 16
表3-1 變數基本敘述統計---------------------------------- 19
表3-2 變數相關分析-------------------------------------- 21
表3-3 盈餘管理、公司治理機制與高階主管薪酬的複迴歸係數估計與檢定---------------------------------------------------- 25
參考文獻 中文部份
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2.李建然與陳政芳,2004,審計客戶重要性與盈餘管理:以五大事務所組別為觀察標的,會計評論,第38期,頁59-80。
3.洪堂城,2011,企業該導入高階經理人薪酬獎勵制度嗎?,經濟日報,2011年6月19日,A13版。
4.陳維鈞,2010,寰宇法務「經理人薪酬 回歸公司治理」,經濟日報,2010年8月11日,A11版。
5.葉崇琦,2011,從「薪酬委員會」看薪酬工具的選用及評價,勤業眾信通訊,11月號,頁42-48。
6.葉銀華,2002,從台灣上市公司網站資訊揭露看透明度,會計研究月刊,第200期,頁70-77。
7.葉銀華、李存修與柯承恩,2002,公司治理與評分系統,台北:商智文化事業股份有限公司。
8.葉銀華,2006,如何健全獨立董事會制度,會計研究月刊,第253期,頁63-68。
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英文部份
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