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系統識別號 U0002-1007200610564600
中文論文名稱 公司治理與資訊揭露透明度之關聯性探討-以台灣上市電子業為例
英文論文名稱 An empirical study of the relationship between corporate governance and information disclosure transparency--Evidence from listed electronic industry in Taiwan.
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 國際貿易學系國際企業學碩士班
系所名稱(英) Department of International Trade
學年度 94
學期 2
出版年 95
研究生中文姓名 林岳賢
研究生英文姓名 Yueh-Hsien Lin
學號 693480278
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2006-06-02
論文頁數 119頁
口試委員 指導教授-潘玉葉
委員-黃振豊
委員-陳義勝
中文關鍵字 資訊揭露  透明度  公司治理 
英文關鍵字 information disclosure  transparency  corporate governance 
學科別分類 學科別社會科學商學
中文摘要 自1997年亞洲金融風暴發生以來,許多東亞國家一直積極檢討和改善他們的管理制度,尤其是公司治理及資訊揭露。因為公司治理被認為是加強資訊揭露透明度的有效機制。而國內也於民國九十二年起實施上市櫃公司資訊揭露評鑑系統,此評鑑系統考慮了台灣獨特的企業環境且提供給企業一個絕佳資訊揭露的摘要,作為管理和分析的參考。近年來,新的財會公報準則亦陸續推動,對於資訊揭露的透明化實有深入探究之必要。
本研究係以國內上市電子業公司,並以取得該公司完整資訊者為主要研究對象,共取得270家上市公司,深入了解目前國內企業資訊揭露的概況。並採用變異數分析、t 檢定、卡方檢定、F 檢定、主成份分析及複迴歸分析等統計方法,探討資訊揭露透明度與公司治理之間的關係。
研究結果顯示,企業研發費用率愈高、專利權數愈多、獨立董事之比例愈高、專業人才培育愈多、管理人持股比率愈高、政府及金融機構持股比率愈高、本國法人持股比率愈高及外資法人持股比率愈高,資訊揭露透明度愈高;而大股東持股比率與資訊揭露透明度呈顯著的負相關,顯示隨著大股東持股比率的增加,資訊揭露透明度愈低。
英文摘要 Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, most East Asian countries have been actively reviewing and improving their regulatory frameworks, in particular, corporate governance and information disclosure. Because corporate governance has been described as the efficient structure used to enhance transparency of information disclosure. The Securities and Futures Institute entrusted by the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and the Gre Tai Securities Market, launches “Information Transparency and Disclosure Ranking System” to evaluate the level of transparency for all listed companies in Taiwan in 2003, the System takes into consideration Taiwan’s unique business environment and provides companies with a summary of best practice as regards their benchmark for management and analysis. Recent year, the new financial accounting guidelines also have been drived continually, the transparency of information disclosure will be an important topic to study.
By using a sample of 270 electronic public listed companies with full-detail data in Taiwan stock market to know how they disclose information, and to understand the relationship between information disclosure transparency and corporate governance choosing by variance analysis, t-test, chi-square-test, F-test, principle component analysis and multiple regression.
The empirical result shows that companies with higher R&D rate, more patent numbers, higher proportion of independent directors, to breed more professionals, higher ownership ratio of managers, higher ownership ratio of government and financial institute, higher ownership ratio of domestic institute, higher ownership ratio of Foreign institute are more likely to have a higher transparency of information disclosure. Besides, transparency of information disclosure is significantly negatively related to the ownership ratio of block shareholders, shows companies with higher ownership ratio of block shareholders are more likely to have a lower transparency of information disclosure.
論文目次 目錄
第一章 緒論
1.1研究問題說明…………………………………………………………………….1
1.2研究流程………………………………………………………………………….4
第二章 文獻探討
2.1公司治理………………………………………………………………………....6
2.1.1公司治理簡介……………………………………………………………....6
2.1.2公司展望與公司治理……………………………………………….……...7
2.1.3董事會特性與公司治理…………………………………………………...10
2.1.4所有權結構與公司治理…………………………………………………...14
2.1.5公司治理相關議題……………………………………………………..….18
2.2資訊揭露透明度……………………………………………………………..….21
2.2.1資訊揭露透明度簡介…………………………………………………..….21
2.2.2資訊揭露的動機…………………………………………………………...23
2.2.3資訊揭露透明度相關議題……………………………………………..….25
2.3國內相關實證………………………………………………………………..….28
2.4國外相關實證………………………………………………………………..….38
第三章 研究設計
3.1研究架構………………………………………………...………………………44
3.2研究假說………………………………………………………………………...46
3.3研究變數之衡量……………………………………………………………..….54
3.4樣本選取與資料來源…………………………………………………………...59
3.5研究限制……………………………………………………………………...…60
3.6研究方法……………………………………………………………………..….61
第四章 實證結果分析
4.1資訊揭露評鑑指標分析……………………………………………………..….66
4.1.1樣本產業分佈…………………………………………………………..….66
4.1.2公司資訊透明度總分評析…………………………………………..…….68
4.1.3公司資訊揭露評鑑指標逐項剖析………………………………………...74
4.1.4資訊揭露評鑑指標之效力性評比………………………………………...81
4.2 資訊揭露透明度影響因素分析…………………………………………….….82
4.2.1自變數與控制變數之敘述統計…………………………………………...82
4.2.2公司特質之分群檢定…………………..………………………..…..…….91
4.2.3資訊揭露透明公司與不透明公司之分群檢定………………………..….92
4.3公司治理對資訊揭露透明度影響之分析………………………………..….....95
4.3.1公司治理三構面指標對資訊揭露透明度之影響………………..……….95
4.3.2公司治理變數對資訊揭露透明度之影響…………………………..…….98
第五章 結論與建議
5.1研究結論………………………………………………………………….……106
5.2發現與建議………………………………………………………………….…107
5.2.1研究發現……………………………………………………………...…..107
5.2.2研究建議………………………………………………………...………..108
參考文獻……………………………………………………………………..….111











圖表目錄
圖1.2 研究流程………………………………………………………………...5
表2.3-1 公司治理對資訊揭露透明度之影響-國內研究彙整表…………….34
表2.4-1 公司治理對資訊揭露透明度之影響-國外研究彙整表………….…42
圖3.1 研究架構……………………………………………………...………..45
表3.4-1 樣本篩選表………………………………………………………….…59
表4.1.1-1 資訊電子產業分佈表……………………………………………….…66
圖4.1.1 公司資訊揭露評鑑總分次數分配圖……………………………….…67
表4.1.1-2 公司資訊揭露評鑑總分次數分配表………………………………….67
表4.1.1-3 公司資訊揭露評鑑總分變異數分析………………………………….67
表4.1.2-1 公司資訊揭露透明度之比較表…………………………………….…70
表4.1.2-2 產業別與資訊揭露種類透明度之變異數分析……………………….70
表4.1.2-3 產業別資訊揭露種類透明度評比………………………………….…71
表4.1.2-3 產業別資訊揭露種類透明度評比(續)…………………………….…72
表4.1.2-4 產業別之整體資訊揭露透明度排行榜…………………………….…73
表4.1.3-1 資訊揭露評鑑指標總表…………………………………………….…75
表4.2.1-1 連續性變數之敘述統計…………………………………………….…84
表4.2.1-2 虛擬變數之敘述統計……………………………………………….…85
表4.2.1-3 產業別與連續性變數間之表現情況……………………………….…87
表4.2.1-3 產業別與連續性變數間之表現情況(續)………………………….…88
表4.2.1-4 產業別與虛擬變數間之表現情況………………………………….…89
表4.2.1-5 產業別與自變數之變異數分析…………………………………….…90
表4.2.2-1 公司特質之分群檢定……………………………………………….…92
表4.2.3-1 資訊揭露透明公司與不透明公司之分群檢定…………………….…94
表4.3.1-1 特徵值及解釋比例-公司展望指標………………………..…..….…95
表4.3.1-2 特徵值及解釋比例-董事會特性指標………………………….....…95
表4.3.1-3 特徵值及解釋比例-所有權結構指標…………………………….…96
表4.3.1-4 模型I之Pearson相關分析………………………………...……..…97
表4.3.1-5 模型I之複迴歸分析……………………...……………………...........97
表4.3.2-1 模型II之Pearson相關分析……………………………….….……104
表4.3.2-2 模型II之複迴歸分析………………………………………..…...….105
附錄一 資訊電子業之高透明度公司…………………………………....……110
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