淡江大學覺生紀念圖書館 (TKU Library)
進階搜尋


下載電子全文限經由淡江IP使用) 
系統識別號 U0002-0901201210182900
中文論文名稱 授權與區位選擇:垂直相關市場、史坦貝克領導與彈性生產
英文論文名稱 Essays on Licensing and Location Choice: Vertically Related Markets, Stackelberg Leader and Flexible Manufacturing
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 產業經濟學系博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Industrial Economics
學年度 100
學期 1
出版年 101
研究生中文姓名 丁虹仁
研究生英文姓名 Hong-Ren Ding
學號 895540077
學位類別 博士
語文別 英文
口試日期 2012-01-07
論文頁數 57頁
口試委員 指導教授-梁文榮
共同指導教授-林俊宏
委員-梁文榮
委員-賴孚權
委員-王光正
委員-林燕淑
委員-楊秉訓
委員-陳和全
委員-郭平欣
中文關鍵字 二維空間模型  區位選擇  空間聚集  彈性生產  固定權利金  單位權利金  垂直相關市場  史坦貝克領導 
英文關鍵字 Spatial Agglomeration  Flexible Manufacturing Techniques  Spatially Discriminatory Pricing  Vertically Related Markets  Fixed-Fee Licensing  Royalty Licensing 
學科別分類 學科別社會科學經濟學
中文摘要 此博士論文由三篇獨立論文組合而成,每篇論文所討論的議題為區域經濟或產業經濟。第一篇論文為「 Spatial Competition and Flexible Manufacturing」,採用一個二維(two-dimensional)空間模型,假設廠商從事Bertrand價格競爭,探討廠商擁有彈性生產下,廠商最適區位的選擇。此篇文章發現,給定服務全市場的條件成立下,若運輸費率相對於調整費率低時,兩廠商會聚集在市場中點;反之,當運輸費率相對於大時,兩廠商會選擇分離區位。不管運輸費率大小,基礎產品的位置會在1/4與3/4來區位。此外,若運輸費率(調整費率)越大,則兩廠商分離越遠(越相互靠近)。
第二篇論文為「Patent Licensing and Double Marginalization in Vertically Related Markets」,給定垂直相關市場,上下游廠商經由「談判」決定中間財價格,主要探討產業外專利權擁有者的最適授權方式與社會福利的影響。此篇文章發現若上游廠商談判力越強,則專利權擁有者的最適授權方式為固定權利金授權(fixed-fee licensing);反之,上游廠商談判力越弱,則單位權利金授權(royalty licensing)為最適授權方式。此外,傳統文獻指出,若消除完全雙重邊際化會增進社會福利。本篇文章卻發現,當上游廠商談判力越強,最適授權方式由單位權利金授權改變為固定權利金授權,進而使社會福利上升。此一結果與傳統文獻有明顯的不同。
第三篇論文為「Patent Licensing in a Leadership Structure: Comment」,探討Kabiraj (2004)的結果不同於Kamien and Tauman (1986)的結論。此篇文章依循Kabiraj (2004)的模型架構,但採用Kamien and Tauman (1986)固定權利金的定義。此篇文章發現,當創新程度相對小時,且專利權擁有者採用固定權利金授權,其最適授權家數為兩家廠商。此外,當專利擁有者的授權策略為固定權利金、單位權利金與拍賣時,單位權利金決對不會被選擇。
英文摘要 This dissertation consists of three independent papers. Each of them explores issues involved in either regional or industrial economics. The first paper is entitled “Spatial Competition and Flexible Manufacturing”. This paper constructs a two-dimensional framework to explore firms’ equilibrium locations by taking into account flexible manufacturing. It shows that the two firms will agglomerate at the center of the location line and the optimal attributes of the two basic products are located at the first and third quartiles of the attribute line, as the transport rate relative to the marginal modification rate is lower, while will get apart on the location line and the optimal attributes of the two basic products are located at the first and third quartiles of the attribute line, as the transport rate is relatively higher. Secondly, the two firms would locate at first and third quartiles of the location line and the attribute addresses of the basic products would agglomerate at the center of the attribute line as the relative transport rate is further higher so that market-serving condition is violated. Lastly, two firms would locate at the opposite endpoints of the line segment and the optimal attributes of the two basic products would be located at the first and third quartiles of the attribute line under mill pricing with quadratic transportation costs.
The title of the second paper is “Patent Licensing and Double Marginalization in Vertically Related Markets”. The conventional wisdom indicates that the elimination of the double marginalization unambiguously increases social welfare. This paper develops a three-stage model, in which the input price is determined by a bargaining process between the upstream and the downstream firms in vertically related markets. It shows that the outsider patentee prefers royalty (fixed-fee) licensing to fixed-fee (royalty) licensing, as the bargaining power of the upstream firm is small (large) irrespective of the innovation size. Moreover, it also proves that the social welfare may get improved by switching from a royalty licensing to a fixed-fee licensing selected by the outsider patentee, as the bargaining power of the upstream firm is large enough.
The third paper is “Patent Licensing in a Leadership Structure: Comment” and it has been accepted by the Manchester School. This paper explains why Kabiraj (2004) has obtained so different results compared with those of Kamien and Tauman (1986) and utilizes a different definition from that in Kamien and Tauman (1986) and Kamien et al. (1992). It shows that a transfer to both firms under fee licensing is optimal when the innovation size is small. It also proves that a royalty contract will never be an optimal contract when fee, royalty and auction contracts are available.
論文目次 Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivations 1
1.2 Contents 2
Chapter 2 Spatial Competition and Flexible Manufacturing 4
2.1 Introduction 4
2.2 The Two-dimensional Model 7
2.2.1 Optimal Attributes of the Basic Products 11
2.2.2 Firms’ Equilibrium Locations 14
2.3 The Model Where Market-serving Condition Is Relaxed 20
2.4 Extension 24
2.5 Concluding Remarks 26
Chapter 3 Patent Licensing and Double Marginalization in Vertically Related Markets 28
3.1 Introduction 28
3.2 Model Setup 30
3.2.1 The General Model 31
3.2.2 Fixed-Fee Licensing 33
3.2.3 Royalty Licensing 34
3.3 The Optimal Licensing Contract 35
3.4 Social Welfare and Double Marginalization 37
3.5 Concluding Remarks 41
Chapter 4 Patent Licensing in a Leadership Structure: Comment 43
4.1 Introduction 43
4.2 The Derivation of the Fixed Fee for Licensing Both Firms 45
4.3 Fee Licensing 46
4.4 Optimal Licensing Contracts 48
4.5 Concluding Remarks 51
Chapter 5 Conclusions 53
References 55

List of Figures
Figure 2.1 The two-dimensional spatial framework 8
Figure 2.2 The marginal consumer z(x) 10
Figure 2.3 The relationship between the firms’ location equilibrium and the transport rate 19
Figure 2.4 The marginal consumer z(x) can lie beyond the two basic products 21
Figure 3.1 The welfare locus in various licensing contracts for the case of large innovation size 39
參考文獻 Anderson S., and D. Neven, 1991, “Cournot Competition Yields Spatial Agglomeration,” International Economic Review 32, 793-808.
Arya, A., and B. Mittendorf, 2006, “Enhancing Vertical Efficiency through Horizontal Licensing,” Journal of Regulatory Economics 29, 333-342.
Belleflamme, P. and Peitz, M, 2010, “Industrial Organization: Market and Strategy,” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Brekke, K.R., and O.R. Straume, 2004, “Bilateral Monopolies and Locational Choice,” Regional Science and Urban Economics 34, 275-88.
D’Aspremont, C., J. Gabzewicz, and J.-F. Thisse, 1979, “On Hotelling’s Stability in Competition,” Econometrica 47, 1145-1150.
De Palma, V. Ginsburgh, Y.Y. Papageorgiou, and J.-F. Thisse, 1985, “The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Holds under Sufficient Heterogeneity,” Econometrica 53, 767-781.
Eaton, B. C., and N. Schmitt, 1994, “Flexible Manufacturing and Market Structure,” American Economic Review 84, 875-888.
Faulí-Oller, R., and J. Sandonís, 2002, “Welfare Reducing Licensing,” Games and Economic Behavior 41, 192-205.
Fauli-Oller, R., and J. Sandonis, 2003, “To Merger or to License: Implications for Competition Policy,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 21, 655–72.
Friedman, J.M., and J.-F. Thisse, 1993, “Partial Collusion Fosters Minimum Product Differentiation,” the RAND Journal of Economics 24, 631-645.
Hamilton, J. H., J.-F Thisse, and A. Weskamp, 1989, “Spatial Discrimination: Bertrand vs. Cournot in a Model of Location Choice,” Regional Science and Urban Economics 19, 87-102.
Hotelling, H., 1929, “Stability in Competition,” Economic Journal 39, 41-57.
Irmen, A. and J.-F. Thisse, 1998, “Competition in multi-characteristics spaces: Hotelling was almost right,” Journal of Economic Theory, 78, 76-102.
Jehiel, P., 1992, “Product Differentiation and Price Collusion,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 10, 633-643.
Kabiraj, T., 2004, “Patent Licensing in a Leadership Structure,” The Manchester School 72, 188-205.
Kabiraj, T., and S. Marjit, 2003, “Protecting Consumers through Protection: The Role of Tariff-induced Technology Transfer,” European Economic Review 47, 113-124.
Kamien, M.I. and Y. Tauman, 1986, “Fees versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent ,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 101, 471-491.
Kamien, M.I., S.S. Oren, and Y. Tauman, 1992, “Optimal Licensing of Cost-reducing Innovation,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 21, 483-508.
Liang, W.J., and C.C. Mai, 2006, “Validity of the Minimum Differentiation under Vertical Subcontracting,” Regional Science and Urban Economics 36, 373-384.
Mai, C., and S.K. Peng, 1999, “Cooperation vs. Competition in a Spatial Model,” Regional Science and Urban Economics 29, 463-472.
Matsushima, N., and T. Matsumura, 2006, “Mixed Oligopoly, Foreign Firms, and Location Choice,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 36, 753-772.
Mukherjee A., 2010, “Competition and Welfare: The Implications of Licensing,” The Manchester School 78, 20-40.
Mukherjee A., and E. Pennings, 2006, “Tariffs, Licensing and Market Structure,” European Economic Review 50, 1699-1707.
Muto, S., 1993, “On Licensing Policies in Bertrand Competition,” Games and Economic Behavior, 5, 257-267.
Poddar, S., and U.B. Sinha, 2004, “On Patent Licensing in Spatial Competition,” Economic Record, 80, 208-218.
Poddar, S. and U.B. Sinha, 2010, “Patent Licensing from a High-Cost Firm to a Low-Cost Firm,” Economic Record 86, 384-395.
Rhee, B.-D., A. De Palma, C. Fornell, and J.-F. Thisse, 1992, “Restoring the Principle of Minimum Differentiation in Product Positioning,” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 1, 475-5058.
Stahl, K., 1982, “Location and Spatial Pricing Theory with Nonconvex Transportation Cost Schedules,” The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 13, 575-582.
Sydsaeter, K., and P.J. Hammond, 1995, Mathematics for Economic Analysis, Prentice-Hall International, London.
Tabuchi, T., 1994, “Two-stage Two-dimensional Spatial Competition between Two Firms,” Regional Science and Urban Economics 24, 207-227
Thisse, J.-F. and Vives, X., 1988, “On the strategic choice of spatial price policy,” American Economic Review, 78, 122-137.
Tseng, C.C., W.J. Liang, and K.C.A. Wang, 2010, “Spatial Agglomeration with Vertical Differentiation,” Papers in Regional Science 89:4, 841-857.
Veendorp and Majeed, 1995, “Differentiation in a two-dimensional market,” Regional Science and Urban Economics 25, 75-83.
Zhang, Z.J., 1995 “Price-Matching Policy and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation,” Journal of Industrial Economics 43, 287-299.
論文使用權限
  • 同意紙本無償授權給館內讀者為學術之目的重製使用,於2012-01-11公開。
  • 同意授權瀏覽/列印電子全文服務,於2012-01-11起公開。


  • 若您有任何疑問,請與我們聯絡!
    圖書館: 請來電 (02)2621-5656 轉 2281 或 來信