本研究以1998年至2016年在臺灣證券交易所及中華民國櫃檯買賣中心掛牌交易的上市櫃公司為研究樣本，探討企業經營團隊的政治背景或企業政治關聯性是否會顯著地影響該公司的租稅規避行為或租稅規避的積極程度。在控制內生性問題之下，實證結果發現具有政治關聯的企業之長期現金有效稅率相對較低，顯示擁有政治關聯性之企業愈傾向運用本身的政治資源從事租稅規避。其中，相較於擁有政治背景之經理人而言，擁有政治背景之董事會成員對於企業從事租稅規避行為更具有影響力；擁有民選公職政治背景對於企業租稅規避行為的影響力將更甚於擁有官派公職政治背景。因此，本研究將建議對於租稅規避需求較高的企業，應遴選具有政治背景之經理人或董事會成員以達成租稅規避目的。

Using stocks listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and the Taipei Exchange during the period of 1998 through 2016, this study is aimed to investigate whether political connection of a company’s board members and management teams will affect its behavior of tax avoidance. After controlling for endogeneity problem, empirical results show that politically connected firms have significantly lower long-term cash effective tax rate than nonconnected firms, indicating companies with political connections tend to use their political resources to avoid taxes. In particular, corporate insiders with political connections will have more influential on tax avoidance than those with political connections. The impact of political connections on tax avoidance is stronger, if such political connections are built upon government officers, congressperson, or city councilmen, who were elected democratically. Overall, this study suggests that companies with higher demand on tax avoidance should hire managers or board members who own political positions before.

目 錄
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與背景 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 研究架構與流程 3
第二章 文獻回顧與研究假說 5
第一節 企業租稅規避 5
第二節 公司經營團隊之政治關聯性對企業的影響 9
第三節 研究假說：公司經營團隊之政治關聯性對企業避稅的影響	13
第三章 研究方法 16
第一節 研究樣本 16
第二節 變數定義 16
第三節 實證模型建立	 21
第四章 實證結果與分析 23
第一節 敘述性統計與平均數差異分析 23
第二節 迴歸分析 28
第三節 穩健性測試 34
第五章 結論與建議 46
第一節 結論 46
第二節 研究限制與建議 47
參考文獻 48
一、中文文獻 48
二、英文文獻 49
 
表目錄
表 1 樣本敍述統計分析 24
表 2 政治關聯變數逐年平均數分析 25
表 3 現金有效稅率平均數逐年分析 26
表 4 單變數分析－按企業政治關聯變數劃分 27
表 5 企業政治關聯性與租稅規避之迴歸分析 29
表 6 董事政治關聯性與租稅規避之迴歸分析 31
表 7 經理人政治關聯性與租稅規避之迴歸分析 32
表 8 企業政治關聯性與租稅規避之迴歸分析—民選公職或官派公職 33
表 9 兩階段最小平方法：企業政治關聯性與租稅規避之迴歸分析	 36
表10 兩階段最小平方法：董事、經理人政治關聯性與租稅規避之迴歸分析 38
表11 兩階段最小平方法：企業政治關聯性與租稅規避之迴歸分析—民選公職
     或官派公職 40
表12 兩階段最小平方法：企業政治關聯性與租稅規避之迴歸分析—董事曾任
     民選公職或官派公職 42
表13 兩階段最小平方法：政治關聯性與租稅規避之迴歸分析—當期現金有效稅率
     44
 
圖目錄
圖1-1 研究架構流程圖 4

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