§ 瀏覽學位論文書目資料
  
系統識別號 U0002-0807201321293900
DOI 10.6846/TKU.2013.00234
論文名稱(中文) 財報資訊訊息與公司治理對內線交易的影響
論文名稱(英文) The Effect of Financial Information and Corporate Governance on Insider Trading
第三語言論文名稱
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中文) 管理科學學系企業經營碩士在職專班
系所名稱(英文) Executive Master's Program of Business Administration (EMBA) in Management Sciences
外國學位學校名稱
外國學位學院名稱
外國學位研究所名稱
學年度 101
學期 2
出版年 102
研究生(中文) 林寶堂
研究生(英文) Pau-Tan Lin
學號 700620163
學位類別 碩士
語言別 繁體中文
第二語言別
口試日期 2013-06-24
論文頁數 39頁
口試委員 指導教授 - 倪衍森
委員 - 曹銳勤
委員 - 蕭文姃
關鍵字(中) 公司治理
內線交易
財務資訊訊息
關鍵字(英) Corporate Governance
Insider Trading
Financial Information
第三語言關鍵字
學科別分類
中文摘要
由於資本市場的蓬勃發展,證券市場規模不斷擴大,很多公司以此為籌資的主要管道,而投資者亦以此為主要的理財方式,兩者可謂戶互蒙其利,各取所需。然而在這資本市場的遊戲當中,時而會有內線交易發生,常使一般投資大眾遭受損失,顯然證券市場是存有弊端的,而本文是以公司治理變數的角度來詮釋內線交易行為,探討公司治理機制與非法內線交易行為之關聯性,另一方面觀察財報變數與內線交易的關聯性,希望在這資訊不對稱的市場中,有助於投資大眾分析及慎選投資適當的投資標的。本文以股票上市公司為研究標的,經實證結果顯示,外資持股傾向於經營穩健、獲利良好之公司,然而外資會將持股高的標的做為操做股市與期貨的工具。本研究發現信用評等越好、董監事酬勞越低的企業比較不可能有內線交易的發生。 此外,股本小的公司因具有董監事持股率高、經理人持股高,資產週轉率高的特質,發生內線交易的機率會亦較高。再者,外資對股本小的投資標並不青睞,是否表示這些標的比較容易存有內線交易因素,此為投資人亦需深思之。
英文摘要
Stock markets are growing fast resulting in share markets expended quickly. In fact,enterprises could raise money by listing in stock exchanges and investors could manage their money by investing stocks in share markets. In other words, stock markets are main channels for fund raising provided by investors for enterprises,which might benefit for both enterprises and investors. However, the drawbacks resulting from insider trading seem existed in stock markets, which often cause the loss even huge losses while market participants invest shares in stock markets. This study investigates whether the insider trading would be affected by the corporate governance and financial statements for the share listing in the Taiwan stock exchanges. We wish that investors would be beneficial for screening stocks by taking the results revealed into accounts. The results show that foreign institutions are inclined to invest heavy-weighted stocks accompanied with profitability, since the
stocks with higher foreign holding ratios are often employed for manipulating index futures though trading these heavy-weighted stocks by these institutions. In this study,we disclose that the insider trading is seldom occurred for the firms with higher credit rating and lower directors’ remuneration. In addition, insides trading seem to be often happened for the small-scale stocks. We argue that these firms with higher directors’ ratios, managers holding ratios, higher turnover ratios would be suspect to
manipulate prices due to their higher shareholding ratios. Furthermore, we disclose that foreign institutions seem not to prefer holding small-scale stocks. Investors might ponder whether insider trading is easily existed for these shares.
第三語言摘要
論文目次
目  錄
中文摘要	i
英文摘要	ii
目  錄	iii
圖目錄	iv
表目錄	v
 第一章 緒論	1
第一節 研究背景與動機	1
第二節 研究目的	3
第三節 研究流程	5
第四節 研究架構	6
第二章 文獻探討	7
第一節 公司治理	7
第二節 內線交易	9
第三節 公司治理與內線交易	11
 第三章 研究假說與模型	13
第一節 研究資料與變數	13
第二節 研究假說模型	19
第三節 研究方法	22
第四章 實證結果與分析	24
第一節 敘述統計量	24
第二節 實證結果與分析	27
第五章 研究結論與建議	33
第一節 研究結論	33
第二節 投資與管理意涵	34
第三節 研究限制與建議	35
參考文獻	36
 
圖目錄
圖1 1  研究流程圖	5

表目錄
表4 1  敘述統計量	24
表4 2  VIF值統計表	26
表4 3  應變數為內線交易代理變數(市值)的迴歸分析	27
表4 4  應變數為內線交易的代理變數(市值)的panel data models	28
表4 5  應變數為內線交易的代理變數(DM_1)的羅吉斯迴歸分析	29
表4 6  應變數為內線交易代理變數(外資持股比率變動率)panel data model 	30
表4 7  應變數為內線交易的代理變數(DM_2)的羅吉斯迴歸分析	31
表4 8  應變數為內線交易代理變數(外資持股比率變動百分比) panel data model	32
參考文獻
參考文獻
Acharya, Viral V., Sergei A. Davydenko and Ilya A. Strebulaev,2011.Cash holdings and credit risk, NBER Working Paper No. 16995.

Avramov, D., Chordia, T., Jostova, G., & Philipov, A. (2009). Credit ratings and the cross-section of stock returns. Journal of Financial Markets, 12(3), 469-499.

Banz, R. W. (1981). The relationships between return and market value of common stocks. Journal of Financial Economics, 9(1), 3-18.

Barbabella, M., Cohen, D., Kardon, A., & Molk, P. (2009). Insider trading in congress: The need for regulation. Journal of Business & Securities Law 9: 199-236.

Barclay, Michael J.and Clifford W., and Smith JR., 2012. The maturity structure of corporate debt, Journal of Finance 50: 609–631.

Beams, J. D., Brown, R. M., and Killough, L. N. (2003). An experiment testing the determinants of non-compliance with insider trading laws. Journal of Business Ethics 45(4), 309-323.

Bhagat, Sanjai, Bolton, Brian J. and Subramanian, Ajay (2008), CEO education, CEO turnover, and firm performance. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1670219.

Cai, Jie, Qian, Yiming and Liu, Yixin (2009) Information asymmetry and corporate governance. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1082589.

Cheng, L. T., Davidson III, W. N., & Leung, T. Y. (2011) Insider trading returns and dividend signals, International Review of Economics & Finance 20(3): 421-429.

Chung, Kee H. and Hao Zhang (2010) Corporate governance and institutional ownership, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 64(1): 247-273.

Collins, Daniel W, Hollis Ashbaugh-Skaife and Ryan LaFond , 2006 .The effects of corporate governance on firms’ credit ratings, Journal of Accounting and Economics 42 : 203–243.

Darren, Joseph (2005) Do insider trades reflect both contrarian beliefs and superior knowledge about future cash flow realizations, Journal of Accounting and Economics 39: 55–81.

Denis, David J. and Xu, Jin (2013) Insider trading restrictions and top executive compensation, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1909065.  

Duan, D.J. 1987, “Directors are not doing their jobs”, Fortune, pp.117-119.

Firth, A. Michael, T.Y. Leungb, and Oliver M. Ruic(2010) Double signals or single signal? An investigation of insider trading around share repurchases, International Financial  Markets, Institution, and Money 20: 376–388.

Frankel, Richard and Xu Li (2004) Characteristics of a firm’s information, environment and the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, Journal of Accounting and Economics 37:229–259.

Gao, Feng, Lisic, Ling Lei, and Zhang, Ivy (2012) Corporate social responsibility and insider trading: The role of reputational costs, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2140193.

Glosten, Lawrence R. and Paul R. Milgrom (1985)Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders, Journal of Financial Economics 14 (1): 71–100.

Harforda, Jarrad, Sattar A. Mansib, andWilliam F. Maxwellc (2008) Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US, Journal of Financial Economics 87:  535–555.

Hausmann, Ricardo and Eduardo Fernandez-Arias,2000. Foreign direct investment: Good cholesterol? IDB Working Paper No.348.

Henderson, Todd (2010) Insider trading and CEO pay, Available at: http://works.bepress.com/todd_henderson/6.

Huang, H., Wang, W., & Zhou, J. (2010) The effect of shareholder rights and insider ownership on earnings management, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=928611.

Huang, Rong, Carol A. Marquardt and Bo Zhang (2011) Why do managers avoid EPS dilution? AAA 2010 Financial Accounting and Reporting Section (FARS) Paper.

Hughes, L. E. (2009) Impact of insider trading regulations on stock market efficiency: A critique of the law and economics debate and a cross-country Comparison, The. Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 23: 479-503. 

Khang, K. and King, T. H. D. (2006). Does dividend policy relate to cross‐sectional variation in information asymmetry? Evidence from returns to insider trades. Financial Management 35(4): 71-94.

Kim, Wi Saeng, Jae Won Lee, and Jack Clark (1988) Investment performance of common stocks in relation to insider ownership, Financial Review 23 (1): 53–64.

Linck, James, S. (2008) The determinants of board structure, Journal of Financial Economics 87(2): 308–323.

Loke, Alexander E. H. (2005) Sending the right signals on corporate liability for employee insider trading, Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 5: 137-158.

Ma, Y. and Sun, H. L. (1998) Where should the line be drawn on insider trading ethics? Journal of business Ethics 17(1): 67-75. 

McConnell, John J., Henri Servaes, and Karl V. Lins (2008) Changes in insider ownership and changes in the market value of the firm, Journal of Corporate Finance 14: 92–106.

McGee, Robert W. (2008) Applying ethics to insider trading, Journal of Business Ethics 77:205–217.

Meulbroek, Lisa K. (1992) An empirical analysis of illegal insider trading, Journal of Finance 47(5): 1661–1699.

Millestein, I.M., and Macavoy, P.W. (1998) The active board of directors and performance of the large publicly traded corporation, Columbia Law Journal 98, pp.1283-1321.

Roulstone, Darren T. (2003) The relation between insider-trading restrictions and executive compensation, Journal of Accounting Research 41(3): 525–551.

Rubin, Amir (2007) Ownership level, ownership concentration and liquidity, Journal of Financial Markets 10: 219–248.

Salmon et al. (2000) Harvard Business Review on corporate governance, Boston: Harvard Business Press. 

Stolper, Anno, 2009. Regulation of credit rating agencies, Journal of Banking and 
Finance 33:1266–1273.

Zhang, W., Cahan, S. F., and Allen, A. C. (2005) Insider trading and pay‐performance sensitivity: An empirical analysis. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 32(9‐10), 1887-1919.
論文全文使用權限
校內
紙本論文於授權書繳交後5年公開
同意電子論文全文授權校園內公開
校內電子論文於授權書繳交後5年公開
校外
同意授權
校外電子論文於授權書繳交後5年公開

如有問題,歡迎洽詢!
圖書館數位資訊組 (02)2621-5656 轉 2487 或 來信