保險市場的行銷通路發展日趨多元，不同的銷售系統其通路特性與行銷模式亦有所不同，因此產生許多不同型態的代理人問題。有關通路的行銷策略與發展趨勢等相關研究不勝枚舉，本研究則以不同角度實證分析在不同的銷售通路下所產生的契約品質與損失情形是否有所差異。 
本文藉由獨立代理人，專屬代理人，分析車險包含（一）車體險（二）任意第三人體傷險（三）任意第三人財損險 等予以分析探討，並以某產險公司之樣本資料，包含投保年齡、性別、保額、廠牌車型、保費、出險頻率等變數，加以分析以進一步了解以下三點:
    1、獨立、或專屬代理人通路，比較傾向能賣出高保障的保單？(分三種保險分別探討)？
    2、獨立、或專屬代理人通路出售的保單，比較會有較高的理賠機率？(分三種保險分別探討)？
    3、獨立、或專屬代理人通路，何者的核保能力(用loss ratio來觀察)較強？(分三種保險分別探討)
    經實證結果顯示: 以Tobit迴歸模型實證下，承保資料觀察期間的理賠頻率高低而言，專屬代理人通路相對於獨立代理人通路的損失頻率具有顯著的負向相關，亦即專屬代理人所招攬的契約理賠頻率較獨立代理人為低。此外，就契約的損失率而言，以OLS迴歸式來實證分析發現，專屬代理人相對於獨立代理人的損失率亦為顯著的負相關，顯示專屬代理人所招攬契約之損失率較佳。另以Probit迴歸模型實證發現，專屬代理人在汽車車體損失險的招攬中，能夠售出較高保障的保險，是具有正向相關的。

As the marketing channel for insurance industry has become increasingly diverse, the characteristics of the channel and the business models vary under different sales systems, which lead to problems with different types of agents. There are numerous researches related to marketing strategies and development trends of channel. This study empirically analyzes the contract quality and loss condition under various sales channels from a different angle.
    This article discusses auto liability insurance coverage including (1) collision (2) bodily injury (3) property damage liability by independent agents and exclusive agents. From further analysis of sample information provided by an insurance company with variables such as insurance age, sex, insurance amount, car brand and model, insurance premium, accident frequency, the following three points are understood:  
    1、Which of the channels, an independent agent or an exclusive agent, tends to sell insurance policy with higher protection? (to be discussed respectively in regard to three insurances)
    2、Which of the channels, an independent agent or an exclusive agent, tends to sell insurance policy with a higher claim compensation ratio? (to be discussed respectively in regard to three insurances)
    3、Which of the channels, an independent agent or an exclusive agent, has higher underwriting capability (through the observation of the loss ratio)? (to be discussed respectively in regard to three insurances)
    The empirical results show that with the verification of Tobit regression model, as far as the claim compensation ratio during the observation period of insurer’s information is concerned, there is an obviously negative relationship between exclusive agent channel and loss ratio in comparison with independent agent channel, which means that the claim compensation ratio of the insurance policy sold by an exclusive agent is lower than that of an independent agent. Moreover, as far as the loss ratio of the contract is concerned, with the empirical analysis of OLS regression model, there is also an obviously negative relationship between exclusive agent channel and loss ratio in comparison with independent agent channel, showing that the insurance policy sold by an exclusive agent has a better loss ratio than that of an independent agent. In addition to that, with the verification of Probit regression model, it is discovered that there is a positive relationship between an exclusive agent and a policy with higher protection when selling the collision insurance.

第壹章  緒論	1
第一節  研究背景與動機	1
第二節　研究目的	4
第三節　研究架構	7
第貳章　文獻回顧	8
第一節　保險代理人之相關文獻	8
第二節　車商保險代理人之相關文獻	11
第三節　銷售通路之相關文獻	17
第參章　研究資料與研究方法	23
第一節　資料來源	23
第二節　資料概述	24
第三節　研究假說	26
第四節　研究方法	28
第肆章　實證結果分析	33
第一節　行銷通路出售保單保障高低之實證結果	33
第二節　行銷通路核保能力之實證結果	35
第伍章　結論	37
參考文獻	39
附 表	41
圖目錄
圖1-1　  微笑曲線	4
圖1-2　  研究架構圖	7
表目錄
表1-2　  汽車保險在產險業中的簽單比率	1
表1-2  　汽車保險在產險業中的理賠比率	1
表1-2  　保險代理人業務統計表	2
表3-1    國內車商保險代理人一覽表	12
附表1　  本研究使用的各項變數及定義	42
附表2　  所有通路全樣本之基本統計量	43
附表3　  影響消費者透過專屬代理人通路購買保單的因素	45
附表4　  影響消費者透過專屬代理人通路購買保單的因素	47
附表5　  影響消費者透過專屬代理人通路購買保單的因素	49
附表6    影響消費者透過專屬代理人通路保單出險的因素	51
附表7    影響消費者透過專屬代理人通路保單出險的因素	53
附表8    影響消費者透過專屬代理人通路保單出險的因素	55
附表9    影響消費者透過專屬代理人通路保單損失率的因素	57
附表10   影響消費者透過專屬代理人通路保單損失頻率的因素	58

中文文獻：
江朝峰（1994）。我國汽車保險行銷體系之探討，保險專刊 第37輯。
江朝峰、汪芳國（2000）。人身保險與財產保險行銷管理，台北：平安出版有限公司。
邵淑君（2008）。銷售通路與資訊不對稱：個人健康險損失率之實證研究。逢甲大學風險管理與保險學系碩士在職專班碩士論文。
黃文娟（2003）。我國財產保險行銷通路之研究。逢甲大學保險學系碩士班碩士論文。
陳彩稚、連雪玲（1995）。汽車商介入車險市場之影響，保險專刊，第四十輯，p73。
張立義（2006）。台灣與日本產險業代理人通路發展之差異研究。逢甲大學經營管理碩士在職專班碩士論文。
郭泰宏（2008）。汽車車體損失險續保動機之研究-以A公司為例。逢甲大學保險研究所碩士論文。
詹美枝 （2004）。我國汽車車損險經營之研究－從行銷、核保、理賠三方面探討，淡江大學保險學系保險經營碩士論文。
鄭鎮樑等四人（2003）。台灣產物保險市場行銷通路趨勢之探討，核保學報，第11卷
賴炳全（2005）。產品創新與消費者行為意向之研究-以產物保險個人性商品為例。銘傳大學國際企業學系碩士在職專班碩士論文。
 
英文文獻：
Berger, Allen N., J. David Cummins and Mary A. Weiss, 1997, The Coexistence of Multiple Distributions Systems for Financial Services： The Case of Property-Liability Insurance, Journal of Business, 70（4）, 515-546.
Chiappori, P. and B. Salanie, 2002a, Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets, Journal of Political Economy, 108, 56-78.
Cohen, Alma, 2005, Asymmetric Information and Learning：Evidence From the Automobile Insurance Market, The Review Economics and Statistics, 87（2）,197-207.
Dionne, G., C. Gourieroux, and C. Vanasse, 2001, Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market： A Comment, Journal of Political Economy, 109, 444-453.
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Sass, Tim R. and M. Gisser ,1989, Agency Cost, Firm Size, and Exclusive Dealing,Journal of law and Economics, 32（2）, 381-400.