本研究對象為國內上市櫃公司之董事及監察人之專業度之資訊流量體重要程度分析。將董事及監察人之專業度分為董事及監察人席次、董事席次、監事席次、董事及監察人持股、董事持股、監事持股、審計委員會持股、獨立董事平均兼任家數、董事及監察人平均進修時數、董事會實際出席率、董事長實際出席率、監事實際出席率、董事及監察人具財務資歷比率、董事及監察人具會計資歷比率、董事及監察人具法務資歷比率、董事及監察人具公家機關背景比率、董事及監察人具律師資格比率、董事及監察人具會計師資格比率、董事及監察人具教師資格比率及董事及監察人具博士學位比率等20項準則。再使用熵值法分析各公司於各準則間之差異；研究結果顯示：上市櫃董事及監察人專業度中以董事及監察人差異最大依序為是否具律師資格，設置審計委員會、是否具公家機關背景，獨立董事兼任家數、具法務背景、具會計師資格比率，具教師資格，具博士學歷於各公司間之差異較大，故為較重要之資料，因此未來學者依董事及監察人專業度來分析各公司各項資訊時得以依序採用相關所需資料來劃分。最後本研究也提出研究建議供後續學者參考。

The object of this study is the analysis of the importance of the professional information flow of directors and supervisors of domestic listed cabinet companies. The professionalism of directors and supervisors is divided into director and supervisor seats, director seats, supervisor seats, director and supervisor shares, director shares, supervisor shares, audit committee shares, average concurrent directors, director And supervisors 'average training hours, actual board attendance rate, chairman's actual attendance rate, supervisors' actual attendance rate, directors 'and supervisors' financial qualification ratio, directors 'and supervisors' accounting qualification ratio, directors 'and supervisors' legal qualification ratio 20 criteria for directors and supervisors with public agency background ratio, directors and supervisors with lawyer qualification ratio, directors and supervisor with accountant qualification ratio, directors and supervisor with teacher qualification ratio, and directors and supervisor with doctorate ratio . The entropy method is used to analyze the differences between the various standards. The research results show that the largest difference in the professionalism of directors and supervisors of listed cabinets is whether they have the qualifications of a lawyer, an audit committee, and a public company. Institutional background, the number of independent directors concurrently, legal background, accountant qualification ratio, teacher qualifications, and doctoral qualifications vary widely between companies, so it is more important information. Therefore, future scholars should specialize in directors and supervisors. In order to analyze the various information of each company, it can be divided by the relevant required data in order. Finally, this study also puts forward research recommendations for follow-up scholars'   reference.

目錄
第一章  緒論	1
第一節	研究背景與目的	1
第二節	研究流程與架構	5
第二章  文獻探討	7
第一節	董事及監察人結構	7
第二節	董事及監察人專業度	9
第三章  研究方法	12
第一節	研究方法之採用	12
第二節	資料來源與樣本選取	12
第三節	熵值法	16
第四章  實證結果與分析	19
第一節   敘述性統計	19
第二節   資訊量體分析	25
第五章  結論與建議	29
第一節	研究結論	29
第二節	研究限制與未來建議	30
參考文獻	31
圖目錄
圖 1.1 研究流程圖	6
圖 4.1資訊量體分析彙總圖	26


表目錄
表 1.1台積電董事及獨立董事之專業背景	3
表 3.1董事及監察人專業度資料欄位說明一覽表	12
表 4.1 敘述統計表-1	20
表 4.2 敘述統計表-2	22
表 4.3 敘述統計表-3	23
表 4.4 敘述統計表-4	24
表 4.5 資訊量體分析表-1	27
表 4.6 資訊量體分析表-2	27
表 4.7 資訊量體分析表-3	28
表 4.8資訊量體分析表-4	28

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