本研究主要是以臺灣上市櫃企業為研究對象探討董事會結構與企業資金成本之關聯性，且以2009至2018年臺灣上市櫃企業為研究樣本，針對董事會結構在代理理論及資源依賴理論所需具備的條件之特性，以董事會規模、董事長兼任總經理、董監事持股比率、獨立董事比率等四項特性，作為董事會結構的變數，探討其與企業資金成本之間的影響，其中企業資金成本又分別為負債資金成本、權益資金成本及加權平均資金成本等三項探討之。除此之外，另再加入公司規模、資產報酬率、負債比率及董監事股權質押比率等控制變數，進一步分析與資金成本相互結合，對企業資金成本是否有正向影響還是負向影響。
實證結果顯示，以負債資金成本來說，董事會結構與負債資金成本之關聯性不大，並無影響，沒有統計證據支持，由於董事會規模愈大、董事長不兼任總經理者及獨立董事比率愈高皆無法降低負債資金成本，但是董監事持股比率愈高，愈能降低負債資金成本。而其權益資金成本則是與董事會結構之關聯性很大，並有正向影響，且有統計證據支持，表示董事會結構愈良好，愈能降低權益資金成本。最後，加權平均資金成本與負債資金成本之實證研究結果相似。

This study mainly discusses the relationship between the board structure and capital cost in Taiwan listed enterprises from 2009 to 2018. Applying agency theory and resource dependence theory, it is explored in understanding the characteristics of the board structure, i.e., the board size, CEO duality, the directors' shareholding ratio, and its independence, and to examine the impact of board structure on the firm’s capital cost which consists of debt capital cost, equity capital cost, and weighted average capital cost. In addition, control variables such as company size, ROA, debt ratio, and equity pledge ratio are considered into analysis to understand whether those variables positively or negatively affect the capital cost.  
The empirical results show that the relationship between the shareholding ratio and the debt capital cost is statistically significant, whereas the size of the board, CEO duality, and independence have no significant impact on the debt capital cost. In additional, the board structure is positively associated with equity capital cost. indicating that the better the board structure, the lower the cost of equity funds. Finally, the study produced similar results under the  aspect of the dependent variable for weighted average capital cost.

目錄
第一章、緒論 1
第一節、研究背景與動機 1
第二節、研究目的 3
第三節、研究流程與架構 3
第二章、文獻探討 5
第一節、董事會結構 5
第二節、資金成本 15
第三節、研究假說發展 19
第三章、研究方法 25
第一節、資料來源與樣本選取 25
第二節、變數定義 29
第三節、實證模型與統計方法 35
第四章、實證結果與分析 37
第一節、敘述性分析 37
第二節、相關係數分析 39
第三節、多元迴歸分析 41
第五章、結論與建議 48
第一節、研究結論 48
第二節、研究意涵 50
第三節、管理意涵 51
第四節、研究限制與未來建議 52
參考文獻 53

圖表目錄
圖1-1、研究流程圖 4
表3-1、樣本篩選過程 25
表3-2、2009-2018年各產業上市櫃公司樣本分佈表(原始) 27
表3-3、2009-2018年各產業上市櫃公司樣本分佈表(調整後) 28
表3-4、變數之英文縮寫及其定義表 34
表3-5、假說彙整表 36
表4-1、敘述性統計 38
表4-2、相關係數 40
表4-3、董事會結構與負債資金成本之迴歸結果 41
表4-4、董事會結構與權益資金成本之迴歸結果 42
表4-5、董事會結構與加權平均資金成本之迴歸結果 42
表4-6、研究假說與實證結果彙整 47

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