本研究以1996年至2016年間23家美國上市壽險公司為樣本，探討公司治理及功能性委員會對公司經營績效的影響。功能性委員會包含審計委員會、薪酬委員會、提名委員會、執行委員會、財務委員會及風險管理委員會。實證結果顯示，壽險業設置執行委員會對公司經營績效為顯著正相關，但提名委員會規模與公司經營績效為顯著負相關。公司治理的部分，財務專家佔審計委員會之比例與公司經營績效為顯著正相關；機構投資人持股比例對公司經營績效影響之結果不一致，在考量設置功能性委員會時為顯著負相關，然考量功能性委員會規模時則為顯著正相關。業務集中度與公司經營績效為顯著負相關。
本研究進一步分析歷經沙賓法案通過及金融海嘯發生後功能性委員會設置、結構之變化對公司經營績效之影響。結果發現企業設置功能性委員會在沙賓法案通過後均對公司經營績效沒有顯著影響。在歷經金融海嘯後相較於金融海嘯前財務委員會規模對公司經營績效為顯著負相關，風險管理委員會規模對公司經營績效為顯著正相關。

This paper examines the impact of a functional committee on firm performance. The research contains 23 U.S. publicly traded life insurance companies from 1996 to 2016. Functional committees include audit committee, compensation committee, nomination committee, executive committee, finance committee, and risk committee. The results indicate that establishing an executive committee has a significantly and positively related to firm performance. However, the scale of the nomination committee has a significantly and negatively related to firm performance. The proportion of financial expert on the audit committee is a significantly and positively related to firm performance. The influence of proportion of institutional investors’ ownership with firm performance is inconsistent. It appears to be a significantly and negatively related to firm performance when establishing functional committees. Nevertheless, it is a significantly and positively related to firm performance when considering the scale of the functional committee. Finally, Herfindahl has a significantly and negatively related to firm performance. 
The researcher further examines the impact of establishments and scale of the functional committee on firm performance before and after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and financial crisis. Results show that establishing functional committee after Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not have a significant influence on firm performance. The scale of a financial committee is a significantly and negatively related to firm performance before financial crisis rather than after. The scale of risk committee has a significantly and positively related to firm performance.

目錄
第一章 緒論1
第一節 研究背景與動機1
第二節 研究目的4
第三節 研究架構5
第二章 文獻回顧7
第一節 公司治理與公司經營績效7
第二節 機構投資人與公司經營績效12
第三節 功能性委員會與公司經營績效14
第三章 研究方法18
第一節 研究樣本與資料來源18
第二節 研究方法與研究模型19
第三節 變數定義23
第四章 實證結果與分析30
第一節 敘述性統計分析30
第二節 相關係數分析33
第三節 平均數差異檢定36
第四節 實證結果41
第五章 結論與建議56
第一節 結論56
第二節 建議60
參考文獻61
附錄68


圖目錄
圖1-1研究流程圖6


表目錄
表3-1變數定義29
表4-1樣本敘述性統計分析32
表4-2相關係數分析35
表4-3沙賓法案前後之平均數差異檢定38
表4-4金融海嘯前後之平均數差異檢定40
表4-5公司治理與設置功能性委員會對公司經營績效之實證結果45
表4-6公司治理與功能性委員會規模對公司經營績效之實證結果49
表4-7沙賓法案對公司治理與設置功能性委員會之交乘迴歸結果52
表4-8金融海嘯對公司治理與設置功能性委員會之交乘迴歸結果55
表5-1公司治理與功能性委員會對公司經營績效影響之迴歸結果表59


附錄表
附錄表1公司治理與功能性委員會規模對公司經營績效之實證結果68
附錄表2沙賓法案對公司治理與功能性委員會規模之交乘迴歸結果(一)69
附錄表3沙賓法案對公司治理與功能性委員會規模之交乘迴歸結果(二)70
附錄表4金融海嘯對公司治理與功能性委員會規模之交乘迴歸結果(一)71
附錄表5金融海嘯對公司治理與功能性委員會規模之交乘迴歸結果(二)72

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