在現今知識經濟時代，研發創新儼然成為企業提升自我價值與市場競爭力的最佳途徑，而研發費用的支出取決於公司管理者之決策，故本文以國內上市櫃公司研發支出水準為研究主軸，探討公司總經理持股比率與公司現有條件：企業價值與成長機會、組織寬裕資源與負債比率共四項變數對公司研發支出決策之影響關係，旨在探討總經理在自利動機與公司績效考量下，對研發投資水準之決策考量，並進一步探討在不同的公司型態與條件下，是否具有差異性。
    本研究資料取自台灣經濟新報社(TEJ)資料庫並輔以公開資訊觀測站資料，採用多元迴歸分析對樣本進行檢定。實證結果顯示，總經理持股比率、公司負債比率與研發支出呈顯著負相關；企業價值與成長機會、組織寬裕資源與研發支出呈顯著正相關。此外，在整體樣本和不同的上市櫃標準下，以總經理持股率與組織寬裕資源之交互效果對企業研發支出決策具有顯著的正向影響力。唯當公司總經理非由董事長兼任時，僅有企業成長機會、公司負債比率以及兩變數與總經理持股之交互效果對企業研發投資決策具有顯著之影響。

In a knowledge economy, the research and development (R&D) has become the best way for an enterprise to prosper and gain market power. Executives are the ones who decide the amount of capital a firm puts into R&D activities. This study takes the   agency perspective to investigate the relationship between CEO stock ownership and a firm's R&D expenditures. This study investigate the impact of the CEO stock ownership, firm growth opportunity, slack resources, and debt ratio on R&D expenditures. The purpose is to determine whether CEO stock ownership would affect CEO’s decision on R&D expenditures. We further investigate the effects of a firm’s listing statue, industry type, and CEO dual role statue on R&D expenditure.
   The data comes from TEJ database and the market observation post system, and multiple regression analysis is used to carry on the investigation. As a whole, this study shows that CEO stock ownership and debt ratio are negatively associated with a firm’s R&D expenditures, and firm growth opportunity and slack resources are positively associated with a firm’s R&D expenditures. The increasing in shareholding of CEO will increase CEO’s fear of downside risk. As a result, CEO may reduce the long term risky investment in R&D to avoid the lose. When a firm’s CEO isn’t also the firm’s chairman of the board, only firm growth opportunity and debt ratio have the significant effect on a firm’s R&D expenditures.

謝辭 ................................................. I
中文摘要...............................................II
英文摘要...............................................III
第一章緒論 ............................................1
第一節 研究動機與背景..................................1
第二節 研究問題與目的..................................3
第三節 預期研究貢獻....................................4
第四節 論文架構與研究流程..............................5
第二章文獻探討 ........................................7
第一節 研發活動之定義與會計處理........................7
一、 研究發展活動之定義................................7
二、 研究發展活動之會計處理............................8
第二節 研發支出之相關文獻探討..........................9
一、 研發支出與公司績效之探討..........................9
二、 影響研發支出之相關因素............................13
第三節 管理者自利行為之相關文獻
一、 代理理論之管理者持股探討..........................17
二、 管理者自利行為之盈餘操縱..........................20
三、 董事長兼任總經理之自利行為........................22
第四節 研發支出與管理者獎酬之相關探討..................24
第三章研究設計與方法 ..................................28
第一節 研究變數架構與研究假說..........................28
二、 研究假說設立......................................29
第二節 實證模型與變數定義..............................33
一、 實證..............................................33
二、 自變數之定義......................................35
三、 應變數之定義......................................37
四、 控制變數之定義....................................37
第三節 研究期間、樣本選取與資料蒐集....................42
一、 研究期間選取......................................42
二、 樣本選取標準......................................43
三、 資料..............................................45
第四節 研究............................................46
一、 敘述性統計分析( Descriptive statistics)...........46
二、 變數間相關性分析(Correlation analysis） ..........46
三、 t 檢定(t-test)....................................47
四、 多元迴歸分析(Multiple regression analysis ).......47
第四章實證結果與分析 ..................................49
第一節 敘述性統計分析..................................49
第二節 變數相關性分析..................................59
第三節 多元迴歸模型之實證分析結果......................61
一、 整體樣本之迴歸模型分析............................61
二、 董事長兼任與總經理獨任之迴歸模型分析..............66
三、 高科技產業與傳統產業之迴歸模型分析................70
四、 上市與上櫃公司之迴歸模型分析......................74
第五章.................................................79
第一節 研究結論........................................79
第二節 研究限制........................................82
第三節 研究建議........................................83
參考文獻...............................................85


表次
表 3-1 變數定義衡量表..................................41
表3-2 樣本篩選過程表...................................43
表3-3 產業別樣本統計表.................................44
表4-1 整體樣本之變數基本統計量表.......................52
表4-2 兼任別之變數基本統計量表.........................54
表4-3 產業別之變數基本統計量表.........................56
表4-4 上市櫃別之變數基本統計量表.......................58
表4-5 PEARSON 相關係數及變異數膨脹因子(VIF)分析表......60
表4-6 整體樣本之迴歸分析表.............................65
表4-7 兼任別之迴歸分析表...............................69
表4-8 產業別之迴歸分析表...............................73
表4-9 上市櫃別之迴歸分析表.............................77

圖 次
圖 1-1 論文架構與流程圖.................................6
圖3-1 研究變數架構圖...................................28

一、中文文獻
1.	行政院國家科學委員會(2008)，「中華民國科學技術統計要覽」，2008年版
2.	杜玉振、黃荃、林容竹(2002)，「董事會特性對經營績效、財務決策之影響研究－以台灣上市公司為例」，管理與系統，第九卷第三期，頁345-368
3.	林美倫(2008)，「總經理決策行為影響其薪酬之研究」，台南科大學報，第27期第二冊人文管理類 ，頁235-250
4.	徐君毅（2001），「研發與廣告支出與企業價值變動之因果關係研究」，東海大學企業管理研究所碩士論文
5.	梁玲菁(1988)，「我國資訊電子業研究與發展決定因素之研究」，國立中興大學經濟研究所碩士論文
6.	許和鈞、謝國文、楊之宜(2002)，「管理者持股與公司經營績效」，亞太社會科技學報，第二卷第一期，頁103-118
7.	陳威廷（2001），「研究發展支出與市場價值關聯性之實證研究」，中國文化大學會計研究所碩士論文
8.	黃世鈞(2002)，「外部公司治理對新任總經理研發支出影響之實證研究」，國立中正大學會計學系碩士論文
9.	黃志雄(2001)，「企業價值之衍生性探討─以資訊軟體業研究發展活動為例」，東吳大學會計學研究所碩士論文
10.	黃明潔(2002)，「多期損益平穩化行為之決定因素」，政治大學會計研究所碩士論文
11.	楊美津(1996)，「以實證探討研究發展費用化在台灣之市場評價」，淡江大學會計學研究所碩士論文
12.	楊朝旭、吳幸蓁(2003)，「總經理薪酬績效敏感性、績效門檻與盈餘管理關聯性之研究」，會計評論，第36 期，頁 55-87
13.	葉銀華、邱顯比 (1996)，「資本結構、股權結構與公司價值關聯性之實證研究：代理成本理論」，台大管理論叢，第七卷第二期，民國八十五年八月，頁57-90
14.	廖秀梅(2004)，「董監事結構特性與公司績效關係之研究－探討台灣家族控制企業因素的影響」，台北大學會計研究所博士論文
15.	熊英秀(2001)，「我國高科技產業與傳統產業董事會結構之探討」，台灣大學會計研究所碩士論文
16.	劉正田(1997)，「研究發展支出之效益及其資本化會計資訊對股票評價攸關性之研究」，國立政治大學會計研究所碩士論文
17.	歐進士(1998)，「我國企業研究發展與經營績效關聯之實證研究」，中山管理評論，第六卷第二期，頁357-386
18.	謝劍平(1994)，「資本支出宣告與對股東財富之影響─Jensen閒餘現金流量與Tobin’s Q兩假說之驗證」，中國財務學刊，第一卷第二期，頁37-52

二、英文文獻
1.	Aboody, D. and B. Lev (2000). “Information asymmetry, R&D, insider gains,” Journal of Finance, 55, 2747-2766.
2.	Agrawal, A.(1990). “Large shareholders and the monitoring of managers: the case of antitakeover charter amendments,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 25, 143-161.
3.	Amihud, Y. and B. Lev (1981). “Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate merger,” Bell Journal of Economics, 12, 605-617.
4.	Bannister, J. W. and H. A. Newman (1992). “Management forecasts as targets for earnings management,” Working Paper, University of Illinois at Chicago.
5.	Beatty, R. P. and E. J. Zajac (1987). “CEO change and firm performance in large corporation: succession effects and manager effects,” Strategic Management Journal, 8, 305-317.
6.	Ben-Zion, U.(1984). “The R&D and investment decision and its relationship to the firm's market value: some preliminary result,” R&D, Patent, and Productivity, 299-314.
7.	Bizjak, J., J. Brickley and J. Coles (1993). “Stock-based incentive compensation and investment behavior,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16, 349-372.

8.	Brainard, W. and J. Tobin (1968). “Pitfalls in financial model building,” American Economic Review, 58, 99-122.
9.	Bromiley, P.(1991). “Testing a causal model of corporate risk taking and performance,” Academy of Management Journal, 34, 37-59.
10.	Bronwyn, H., M. Jacques, B. Lee and C. Bruno (1998). “Does cash flow investment and R&D? An exploration using panel data for French, Japanese, and United States scientific firms,” Working paper, University of California.
11.	Bushee, B.(1998). “The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior,” Accounting Review, 73, 305-33.
12.	Chung, K. H. and S. W. Pruitt (1994). “A simple approximation of Tobin’s Q,” Financial Management, 23, 70-74.
13.	Clinch, G.(1991). “Employee compensation and firms’ research and development activity,” Journal of Accounting Research, 29, 59–78.
14.	Dalton, D. and I. Kesner (1985). “Organizational performance as antecedent of Inside/outside chief executive succession: An empirical assessment,” Academy of Management Journal, 28, 749-762.
15.	Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan and A. P. Sweeney (1996). “Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: an analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC,” Contemporary Accounting Research, 13, 1-36.
16.	Demsetz, H.(1983). “The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm,” Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 375-390.
17.	Demsetz, H. and K. Lehn (1985). “The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences,” Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155-1177.
18.	Dobrzynski, J.(1993). “Relationship investing,” Business Week, 3309, 68-75.
19.	Donaldson, L. and J. H. Davis (1991). “Stewardship theory of agency theory: CEO governance and shareholder returns,” Australian Journal of Management, 16, 49-64.
20.	Eaton, J. and H. Rosen (1983). “Agency, delayed compensation and the structure of executive remuneration,” Journal of Finance, 38, 1489-1505.
21.	Eng, L. and M. Shackell (2001). “The implications of long-term performance plans and institutional ownership for firms’ research and development investments,” Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 16, 117-139.
22.	Fama, E. F.(1980). “Agency problems and the theory of the firm,” Journal of Political Economy, 88, 21, 288-307.
23.	Friend, I. and L. Lang (1988). “An empirical test of the impact of managerial self-interest on corporate capital structure,” Journal of Finance, 43, 271-281.
24.	Graves, S. B.(1988). “Institutional ownership and corporate R&D in the computer  industry,” Academy of Management Journal, 31, 417-427.
25.	Greve, H. R.(2003). “A behavioral theory of R&D expenditures and innovations: evidence from shipbuilding,” Academy of Management Journal, 46, 685–702.
26.	Griliches, Z.(1995). “R&D and Productivity: econometric results and measurement issues,” Handboook of the Economics of Innovation and Technological Change, Oxford: Blackwell.
27.	Hand, J.(2001). “The economic versus accounting impacts of R&D on U.S. Market-to-book ratios,” Working paper, University of North Carolina.
28.	Harrison, J. S. and J. O. Fiet (1999). “New CEOs pursue their own
self-interests by sacrificing stakeholder value,” Journal of Business Ethics, 19, 301-308.
29.	Healy, P. M.(1985). “The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7, 85-107.
30.	Hirschey, M. and J. J. Weygandt (1985). “Amortization policy for advertising and research and development expenditures,” Journal of Accounting Research, 23, 326-335.
31.	Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling (1976). “Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.

32.	Jensen, M. C. and R. S. Ruback (1983). “The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence,” Journal of Financial Economics, 11, 5-50.
33.	Kasznik, R.(1999). “On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management,” Journal of Accounting Research, 37, 57-81.
34.	Kole, S.(1997). “The complexity of compensation contracts,” Journal of Financial Economics, 43, 79-104.
35.	Lev, B. and T. Sougiannis (1996). “The capitalization, amortization, and value-relevance of R&D,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 21, 107-138.
36.	McConnell, J. J. and H. Servaes (1990). “Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value,” Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 595-612.
37.	Monks, R. and N. Minow (1995). Corporate governance, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Blackwell.
38.	Morbey, G.. K. and R. M. Reithner (1990). “How R&D affects sales growth, productivity and profitability,” Research Technology Management, 33, 11.
39.	Morck, R., A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1988). “Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 293-315.
40.	Murphy, K.(1985). “Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: A empirical analysis,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7, 11-42.

41.	Myers, S.C.(1977). “Determinants of corporate borrowing,” Journal of Financial Economics, 5, 147-175.
42.	Patton, A. and J. C. Baker (1987). “Why do not directors rock the boat？” Harvard Business Review, 65, 10-12、16、18.
43.	Penrose, E.(1959). The theory of the growth of the firm, New York, Wiley.
44.	Puffer, S. and J. Weintrop (1991). “Corporate performance and CEO turnover: The role of performance expectations,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 36, 1-19.
45.	Schumpeter, J. A.(1950). ”Capitalism, socialism and democracy, Third edition, London: Allen & Unwin. 
46.	Schuster, J. R. and J. D. Sutcliffe (1973). “Cash incentives vs. stock options,” Financial Executive, 41, 92.
47.	Sougiannis, T.(1994). “The accounting based valuation of corporate R&D,” The Accounting Review, 69, 44-68.
48.	Stulz, R.(1988). “Managerial control of voting rights, financing policies and the market for corporate control,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 25-54.
49.	Wu, J. and R. Tu (2007). ”CEO stock option pay and R&D spending: a behavioral agency explanation,” Journal of Business Research, 60, 482–492.
50.	Yermack, D.(1996). “Higher valuation of companies with a small board of directors,” Journal of Financial Economics, 40, 185–212.
51.	Zietz, J. and B. Fayissa (1994). “The impact of exchange rate changes on investment in research and development,” The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 34, 195-211.