中國和撒哈拉沙漠以南非洲各國 (Sub-Saharan Africa, SSA) 的經濟關係這幾年來急速成長。 中國在此區域的投資遍及44個國家，已成為SSA區域中的主要直接外資。 中國對此區域深感興趣，有幾項眾所皆知的原因。 身為全球第二富裕的國家，中國想要立足世界舞台的中心點。 對非洲各國來說，中國是理想的商業夥伴，從不預設政治立場；中國以美元外交政策為主軸，隨時提供外交上的支援。
美元外交政策的定義是：以一國之財政能力去拓展國際影響力；也是一種外交政策，以利用提供擔保貸款的經濟實力，去進一步實現外交目標。 美元外交政策其實是整合外交影響力、經濟實力和軍事力量，其目的是要確保海外的經濟和商業利益。 以下將詳細檢視中國參與的非洲經濟事務，並評估此政策是否持續進行中。
中國從2000到2019當中，是非洲最大的貿易夥伴，本論文將針對此期間加以評估。 中國對非洲的借貸迅速成長，約一百萬名的中國勞工也移居非洲。 有些人認為中國參與非洲經濟，加速非洲的成長並降低貧窮。 也有人認為中國達到目的後，終究會遺棄非洲。 此項論點是真或假，有待商榷；也有可能是出於忌妒中國在非洲迅速的滲透力。
過去十年中，SSA區域的成長令人印象深刻，GDP成長一度逼近7%。但2010以後成長趨緩，尤其是2015和2016，中國經濟開始緩降。
雖說中國和非洲的經濟成長有密切關係，但是它的參與卻引起爭議。 不少文章的標題都在警告中國對非洲可能的剝削和利用。
此論文的目的在於分析 SSA區域中，影響直接外資的因素，尤其是來自中國的外資以及美元外交政策的影響。中國已找到新方法對 SSA區域各國的市場進行滲透。 另一方面也要呈現各項證據，證明中國在此區域中，對經貿造成的衝擊。 中國參與非洲經濟事務非常複雜且多樣化。 要在非洲低收入國家收集相關資料非常困難，作者將努力收集更多資料以分析解釋相關問題的答案。
本論文使用各項相關圖表以佐證分析各項議題。
依據中非合作論壇之結論，中國參與非洲事務是雙贏局面。本文將於結論中針對經貿和移民事務，提供建議給非洲各國及中國參考。
概括而論，本文主要是評估中國對 SSA區域的投資效應；涵蓋不同的投資項目和規模，並論及非洲國家包括南非、肯亞、奈及利亞和衣索匹亞。 投資的特點也將一併檢視。
雖說中國和非洲的經濟成長有密切關係，但是它的參與卻引起爭議。 不少文章的 標題都在警告中國對非洲可能的殖民剝削和利用。 本文將具體呈現中國在非洲投資經貿的證據。
中國參與非洲經濟事務非常複雜且多樣化。 要在非洲低收入國家收集相關資料非常困難，尤其是中國政府施政以及國營企業運作的非透明度，讓收集資料更加困難。
非洲有一半人口的年齡在20歲以下，也就是說在下個二十年當中，勞動人口的數目會增加，直到本世紀中期。 粗略估算，非洲需要每年增加 2,500萬個工作，以滿足勞動人口的成長。 從現在開始算起30年內，每年要增加3,000萬個工作機會。非洲的人口統計呈現出挑戰與機會。 要期待中國和非洲的經濟關係出現迅速轉變，是不切實際的。但是，即使是製造業的小小改變，對非洲也會造成很大的影響。 以自然資源為起點的經濟關係應該逐漸轉移到以人力資源為基礎。
本研究提供一些結論、發現和建議。 由於某些資料不足和薄弱，研究結果只是假設性質；不過，結論和建議仍具建設性和參考價值。 在分析過程中，作者詳細檢視並呈現相關資料；由於資訊取得不易，難免有異常。 某部份投資計畫資料和訊息是以相關公司公佈的財務報告以及網站資訊為主。 中國政府施政以及國營企業運作的非透明度，讓收集資料更加困難。如本文第一章所述，中國參與非洲事務是雙贏局面，但中國可提供的資訊實屬有限。
第一個結論是跟中國在非洲活動的規模有關。 依據分析和數據顯示，中國從2000到2018在全球的投資有停滯現象，這和來自國內外的壓力有關，主要是因為：
•	2008年，中國投資興盛但是全世界卻遭受嚴重經濟打擊。
•	2018年，中國在世界各國的投資快速下降，尤其是後半年國營企業對電力事業的投資。
•	東非少數幾個國家加入一帶一路計畫，但經濟活動並不活躍。
•	由於中國竊取技術，美國對中國投資設限，投資規模在 2018已日益縮小。中國公司不遵守美國法律，違反貿易規則。
•	   中非關係優先發展順序無法一致，導致關係的不平衡 (參考數據圖 16, 17, 18，有關外資流向和股市。)
非洲國家面臨的障礙是某些層面依然發展落後，缺乏基礎建設運送貨物和服務。 而且大部分非洲國家仰賴單一經濟商品，例如奈及利亞非常依賴石油輸出。 中國大力協助奈及利亞建設鐵路，但是被批評無法幫助該國經濟多元化。
非洲本身生產力不足，必須從已開發國家進口商品，以滿足社會經濟之需求。 某些非洲國家政治不穩定、社會不安，無法應付多變的局勢； 雙邊或多邊的區域性經濟組織應此相繼成立。缺乏資金的支援也讓這些國家發展受限，政治的不穩定也被視為另一種障礙。 單一商品經濟體是一種挑戰；其他障礙包括基礎建設不足、研發不足和設備不足等。
如前所述，過去十年中，中國在非洲投資顯著減少，尤其是2015以後，如第四章數據所示。 投資主要分布於石油生產國家，例如奈及利亞和安哥拉，重點項目是能源和運輸。懷疑論者認為中國是在實施新殖民主義，但是某些非洲領導人反駁此論點。 南非總統 Ramaphosa認為從中國投資帶來的衝擊、運作方式和倡導的價值來看，新殖民主義並不存在。
2018年，專家爭辯有關中國對非洲的借貸是否能夠永續。有些國家例如吉布第、剛果和尚比亞非常依賴中國的貸款。貸款是否能夠拯救這些貧窮國家，還是增加它們發展的障礙。西方國家例如美、法、日，在非洲擁有軍事設施，對中國借貸非洲之事非常關切。
中國公司在非洲的投資層次並不高；小部份投資於服務業，例如金融和旅遊。至於製造業方面，也僅限於低端科技工業，例如基礎加工業 ，投資規模也不大。大部分中國公司缺乏海外運作經驗，員工也沒有專業管理和語文的訓練。
研究顯示，近年來非洲各國都研擬政策以吸引外資。 各國政府也相當注重環保和企業的社會責任。 中國企業必須延攬當地人才，以便了解並遵守這些政策法令。 中國公司在非洲面臨其他國企業的競爭。 由於文化價值觀的差異，企業活動遭受西方媒體的批評。 中國企業在非洲多屬小型公司；這些公司在和當地公司競爭時，時常導致衝突。由於文化價值觀的差異，許多中國投資人面臨勞資糾紛。 
中國的投資會引人注意是因為，它通常在政府成效不彰的國家，大規模投資開發當地自然資源。 這些國家包括剛果、安哥拉和蘇丹。相關研究資料顯示，絕大部分中國國營企業在非洲的投資都集中在這些國家。廣泛來說，中國只注重投資，對於當地政府的治理環境不感興趣。
研究資料顯示，在非洲的中國中小型企業大部分是私人企業，投資重心不在自然資源，大部份投資於服務業和製造業。  許多非洲國家歡迎中國公司投資當地的製造業和服務業，因此導致在 SSA區域更多投資但創造較少的就業機會(參考表格 5, 6, 7)。
非洲普遍缺乏基礎金融設施；近年來，金融建設逐步改善，中國也因此在奈及利亞和衣索匹亞獲利不少。非洲每年約獲取外援美金三百億，用來改善基礎建設，中國大概提供六分之一。 中國藉著對非洲的金援，設立多邊發展銀行； 私人投資則注重於當地的電信業。最近的官方投資點是非洲的運輸和能源 (參考第四章數據圖 16,17,18,表格 4)。
此外，中國也輸出很多勞工到非洲，和投資的金額或是他國在非洲的移民不成比例。此項結果因證據薄弱，尚屬推論。中國在非洲的移工估算超過一百萬。 這些移工當初是因為建設所需才飛到非洲；後來看見經濟機會，就此長住。非洲需要中國的投資和技術，但是移工卻剝奪限制當地人民的就業機會。 一般人認為中國公司只雇用中國人，這是不正確的。 不可否認，中國移工的數目非常龐大，也無法確定他們是否都有合法居留權。 (參考第四章數據圖 5,6,7,8 表格19,22,24)
另一項重要研究結果顯示，中非經濟關係的基礎正在轉移。經濟關係自2000以後急速成長，尤其是中國自有能源不足，把非洲投資重心放在自然資源以後。 2000初期，中國自然資源不足，勞力卻快速成長，因此製造業有發展優勢。
本文提供幾項建議用以改善中非關係。 本文的研究結果因某些資料不足或許有所瑕疵，但是提供的建議實用可行，尤其是對飽受批評剝削中非關係的中國而言。
2018三月，44個非洲國家簽署非洲大陸自由貿易協議。 此協議創造免關稅的非洲大陸，可望協助當地商業成長，促進非洲內部貿易，進一步解決非洲貿易困境。
非洲國家應努力將經濟多樣化，吸收高科技以促進發展，投資基礎建設和研發，提昇非洲整體的經濟發展。
非洲究竟無法單打獨鬥， 他們必須和已開發國家合作結為夥伴而不是競爭對手。 有關中非關係， B&R計畫可以結合非洲聯盟 2063計畫當中的基礎建設計畫。
非洲國家的另一項優先發展計畫是改善投資環境，例如基礎建設、交通運輸、整合軟體、海關效率、消除貪污，建立廉能政府、財產所有權等。 中國在非洲的經濟活動可望依據以往的經驗加以改進。
對中國政府和中國企業的建議：中國官方應該和各國政府合作，鼓勵雇用並訓練非洲員工，保障當地人的就業權益。
中國應把眼光放遠，中非關係要長期經營。 非洲經濟要多樣化，如此可促進雙方利益。藉著直接投資和致力於基礎建設，中國在非洲的發展過程中可扮演關鍵的角色。

Economic relations between China and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have grown phenomenally in recent years. Among the developing countries, China has become a leading source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in SSA and Chinese investment has diversified geographically to reach 44 countries in SSA. Different narratives have been provided to articulate China’s growing interest in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) for some elementary reasons such attraction is worth commuting on. For China as the second richest country in the world, is perceived to be aggressively taking the centre stage in the global economy. As for African states, China is the ideal commercial partner that seldom slaps special political pre-conditions upon its readily available suppliers, and frequently gives the continent diplomatic backing. China can be arguably mentioned that it uses what it is called dollar diplomacy. 
Dollar diplomacy can be defined as “the use of a country's financial power to extend its international influence, a form of foreign policy to further its aims through the use of economic power by guaranteeing loans made to foreign countries or is the power of a nation's financial resources”. Therefore dollar diplomacy can be attributed as the use of diplomatic influence, economic pressure, and military power to protect a nation's economic and business interests abroad. The engagement or involvement of China into African economies will be examined to assess if dollar diplomacy was or is at play.
Since 2000-2019 China has emerged as Africa’s largest trading partner, which is the period the paper will focus on until recently. Chinese direct investment in and lending to African countries has grown rapidly in the past few years. A mass of Chinese workers have moved to Africa in recent years, with estimates running as high as one million in pursuit of investment and trade. Some argues that China’s engagement in Africa led to faster growth and poverty reduction on the continent. Whereas some have a different view arguing that in the long run, China will desert Africa in a very dilapidated state. The statement can be argued to be true and it might not. The statement might have been said out of jealousy as seeing that China is penetrating the African market rapidly and aggressively so.
Furthermore, growth in Sub-Saharan African has been very impressive over the past decade, especially in the mid-2000 when GDP growth averaged close to 7% per annum. Note that growth has since slowed down, especially in 2015 and 2016. Both the high levels of growth and the subsequent slowdown are related to China.
While China’s deepening engagement with Africa has largely been associated with better economic performance, its involvement is not without controversy. This is particularly true in the Africa, as typical headlines portray an exploitative relationship: “Into Africa: China’s Wild Rush”; “China in Africa: Investment or Exploitation?” and “authors warns against ‘new colonialism’ in Africa.” 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the major factors affecting foreign direct investment (FDI) in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) with particular emphasis on Chinese FDI, and the influence of dollar diplomacy. The flow in Chinese involvement is relatively recent as China has found a new way to penetrate SSA countries economic markets like no any other continents has ever done. Thus one simple objective is to arrange evidence about the scale of China’s trade, investment, and its impact in Sub-Saharan Africa and what has attracted that investment into Africa. China’s economic engagement with Africa is a complex issue with numerous aspects. It is usually difficult to find good and comprehensive data on low-income countries, and much of Africa is low-income. However, more efforts will be done to secure the data to enable analysis in answering the questions concerned.
Many graphs and tables from different sources have been used to analyse the topic of the paper to ascertain its veracity or/and fallaciousness.
In general, China’s engagement with Africa is a win-win scenario for both sides as alluded at the latest concluded Forum for China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) that was held from 3-4 September 2018 in Beijing, China. So it would make sense to be more forthcoming with information. Still, there is some available information on and research into China’s trade, investment, and migration visà- vis Africa to draw some tentative conclusions and to make some recommendations for African countries and China. 
Put in general terms, the paper is concerned with assessing the effects of China FDI in SSA by looking at size and sectors of Chinese investment in Sub-Saharan Africa with specific mention of countries such as South Africa (SA), Kenya, Nigeria and Ethiopia from the period 2000 to 2019.  By doing so, the characteristic features of Chinese FDI in Africa will be examined.

While China’s deepening engagement with Africa has largely been associated with better economic performance, its involvement is not without controversy.    
This is particularly true, as typical headlines portray an exploitive relationship: “Into Africa: China’s Wild Rush”; “China in Africa: Investment or Exploitation?”, and some authors warns against ‘new colonialism’ in Africa.” The surge in Chinese involvement is relatively recent, so one simple objective is to marshal evidence about the scale of China’s trade, investment. 
China’s economic engagement with Africa is a complex issue with numerous facets. It is usually difficult to find good and comprehensive data on low-income countries, and much of Africa is low-income. This general problem is compounded by a tendency toward non-transparency on the part of the Chinese government and China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
Africa’s demographics are moving in the opposite direction. About half of Africa’s population is below the age of 20, which means the working-age population will surge over the next 20 years, and will probably continue growing until the middle of the century or later. Roughly speaking, Africa needs to create about 25 million jobs per year to employ its expanding workforce. Thirty years from now, it will need to create 30 million jobs per year. Africa’s demographics present both an opportunity and a challenge. It is unrealistic to expect the China-Africa economic relationship to change overnight. Nor would it be reasonable to expect large volumes of Chinese manufacturing to move to the continent in the near future. But if even small amounts of manufacturing shift, this could make a significant difference for African economies, which are starting out with an extremely low base of industrialization. And it is useful to have a long-term vision that an economic relationship that started out very much centred on natural resources should shift over time to a greater focus on human resources.
Specifically, the study draws some main conclusions, findings and recommendations. While findings are tentative given the weakness of some of the underlying data, it is still possible to make some fairly robust conclusions and recommendations for African countries and China, which most authors and organisations have been mostly critical of the deepening Africa-China relationship. Furthermore, whilst care has been taken in programming the analysis and presentation of data, abnormalities may occur because of the unavailability or difficulty in accessing data and information. Some investment project data and information are based on public information on company investment announcements and various websites. This general problem is multi-layered by a propensity toward non-transparency on the part of the Chinese government and China’s SOEs. In general, China’s engagement with Africa is a win-win scenario for both sides as it will be alluded in chapter one of this paper, so it would make sense to be more impending with information, however it is not the case with Chinese. 

The first tentative conclusion relates to the scale of China’s activities in Africa. Based on the analysis and figures provided above, the tracker, which captures Chinese investment around the world from 2000-2018, reveals that plans for investment and construction by Chinese state-owned enterprises have stalled because of pressure overseas and at home. Key points to be noted are as follows:
•	In 2008, Chinese invest was booming around the world while most of the economies were experiencing economic meltdown.
•	Chinese investment around the world fell sharply in 2018. The decline was most evident later in the year and among state-owned enterprises as some of the Chinese companies engaged in fewer power construction projects.
•	The number of countries in the Belt and Road Initiative keeps expanding in few SSA countries especially in East African region, but activity levels per country are flat. 
•	The US has restricted Chinese investment, but it was already small in size in 2018. Serious problems remain with Chinese overseas investments—for example, theft and the coercive transfer of technology. Firms violating the host country laws and not following the trade regulations of the host country.
•	Priorities of China and African countries not tallying therefore creating imbalances in the so called relationship between China and Africa. Refer to figure 16, 17 and 18 in chapter in terms of FDI flows and stocks.

Some Obstacles in African countries is that most of these African countries are still backward in many areas of development and lack a proper infrastructure for easy movement of the goods and services to drive its economies. Furthermore, most of the African economies are a single economic commodity, economy such a Nigeria that highly depended on oil. However, the Chinese are highly involved in Nigeria by helping them build their infrastructure particularly railway. Thus the Chinese have been highly criticized in this regard that they would instead be helping Nigeria diversify its economy. 
There is a low production supporting capacity in the economic and social spheres of the African countries making them highly dependent on developed countries to export finished products to them. There is a lot of unstable political situation and unfavourable security situation in some African countries making them highly vulnerable to any situation hence there are a lot of Economic Partnership Agreement (EPAs) signed between African countries and development countries be it bilaterally or multilaterally. Lastly, deficiency of local supporting funds due to economic constraint based on the challenges mentioned above. Political instability is also seen as an obstacle to the betterment of Africa. Single commodity economy in some countries is a challenge, lack of infrastructure and lack of research and development resources and facilities also poses as obstacles and challenges in Africa.
As it has been mentioned before, Chinese investment in Africa has noticeably decreased over the past decade; as seen in various figures in Chapter 4, where investments toward Africa sharply decreased after the 2015 FOCAC summit, where China committed US$60 billion to the continent. Investments have been geographically concentrated in oil rich countries, like Nigeria and Angola, and in the transport and energy sectors. While sceptics are weary of China’s interest in Africa, even citing neo-colonialism. Some African leaders are refuting this claim, as President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa, the co-chair of the FOCAC summit stated: “In the values that it promotes, in the manner that it operates, and in the impact that it has on African countries, FOCAC refutes the view that a new colonialism is taking hold in Africa, as our detractors would have us believe.”
There was an increasing debate in 2018 about whether China’s loans to African countries are long term sustainable? For examples, some countries in SSA such as Djibouti, the Republic of Congo and Zambia are excessively reliant on Chinese loans (in terms of the proportion of foreign debt held by China). Will these loans rescue these countries from the poverty stricken societies or these loans deepen their development problems. Therefore, this is worrying phenomenon particularly to the Western countries that maintain military facilities in the region, including France, Japan and the US.
Chinese companies’ investment is still at a relatively low level. Only a small proportion of investments are devoted to service sectors, such as finance and tourism. Investment in manufacturing sector mainly covers such low technology industries as retail trade and elementary processing sectors, and the investment scale is small. Most Chinese companies lack in international operation capability. Furthermore, most Chinese companies investing in Africa are lacking in overseas operation experiences, and short of versatile staff proficient in both business management and foreign language. 
There are several findings that have been identified with regard to this study. With the economic development in recent years, many African governments have issued a series of policies to attract foreign investment. And meanwhile, they attach more attention to such issues as environment protection and corporate social responsibility. Chinese enterprises need to acquire abundant human resources to understand and follow these policies. Chinese companies are faced with the competition from those transnational corporations operating in Africa. And because of the difference of culture and values, some activities in Africa are criticized by some western media. Many Chinese private companies run small businesses in Africa. In these relatively low-level sectors, Chinese investors may compete with local firms, which may even lead to conflicts. Due to big differences in culture background and business patterns, many Chinese investors are confronted with such problems as labor dispute, etc. Therefore, Chinese companies are facing fierce international competition.

China has drawn attention by making large resource-related investments in countries with poor governance indicators, such as DR Congo, Angola, and Sudan. These deals are certainly part of the picture when it comes to China’s engagement with Africa; MOFCOM data show large stocks of Chinese investment in those countries. But the more general relationship between Chinese direct investment and recipients’ governance environments is different. In this sense, Chinese investment is indifferent to the governance environment in a particular country. This is true both globally and across the African continent. 
Furthermore, another finding emerges from examining MOFCOM’s database on Chinese firms investing in Africa. MOFCOM’s database on Chinese firms investing in Africa, on the other hand, provides a snapshot of what small and medium-sized Chinese firms, most of which are private and working in Africa. Unlike the big SOE investments, these firms are not focused on natural resource extraction. The largest area for investment is service sectors, with significant investment in manufacturing as well. Many African economies are interested in attracting Chinese investment in manufacturing and services and some welcome this development. This lead to China investing more but creating less job in SSA refer to Table 5, 6 and 7.
Another finding relates to infrastructure finance. Africa has well-known infrastructure deficiencies, but in recent years infrastructure financing has expanded and helped many African countries begin to rectify these deficiencies, hence China capitalises on this sector in some economies such as Nigeria and Ethiopia. As noted above, in the past few years Africa has received about US$30 billion annually in external finance for infrastructure. China is providing about one-sixth of this amount. Chinese financing is a useful complement to other sources, particularly as traditional finance from multilateral development banks and bilateral donors is concentrated on water supply and sanitation. Likewise, private participation in infrastructure is primarily aimed at telecommunications. China has filled a niche by focusing on transportation and power. Refer to figure 16, 17,18 and table 4 in Chapter 4 of this page.
In addition, there are a lot of Chinese workers in Africa; the total is disproportionately high when compared to the amount of financing that China has provided and compared to migrants from other continents. This is a tentative conclusion because the data on this issue are particular weak. But estimates of Chinese migrants in Africa exceed one millions. Many migrants initially move to Africa as workers on Chinese projects in infrastructure and mining and then, perceiving good economic opportunities, stay on. Similar to the dilemma confronting the continent’s construction industry, African countries face a trade-off here: Chinese workers bring skills and entrepreneurship, but their large numbers limit African workers’ opportunities for jobs and training. The popular notion that Chinese companies only employ Chinese workers is not accurate, but the overall number of Chinese workers in Africa is large, and it is not clear that all of these workers are on the continent legally. Refer to figure 5, 6, 7, 8 and table 19, 22, 24 in chapter 4 of this paper.
Another important finding of the study is that the foundation for the Africa-China economic relationship is shifting. China’s involvement in Africa dating back decades, but the economic relationship accelerated after 2000, when China’s growth model became especially resource-intensive while its domestic supplies of energy and minerals were dwindling. In the early 2000s, China was poor in natural resources but boasted a rapidly growing labour force that gave the country comparative advantage in manufactures. 
The finding are followed by recommendations as a way forward to the challenges and faced by Africa – China Relations. While the findings above are timid given the flawless of some of the basic data, fairly vigorous recommendations can possibly be made for African countries and their civil societies and for China, which has been mostly critical of the excavating Africa-China relationship.
The African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), signed by 44 African countries in Kigali, Rwanda, in March 2018, might be a possible solution as it is meant to create a tariff-free continent that can grow local businesses, boost intra-African trade, rev up industrialization and create jobs. 
African countries should diversify their economies and adapt to technological advancement of doing things if they were to grow fast, invest a lot on infrastructure, research and development for a faster growing economies.
However, African countries cannot do all of these by themselves, they will need to work with other experienced and developed countries as partners than competitors. For example, with regard to China Africa relationship, the B&R initiative could be link with the infrastructure development programme which is goal number 10 from the African Union (AU) Agenda 2063 initiative.
Therefore, another priority for African countries is to improve investment climates. Good infrastructure in place, transport, and telecommunications is also needed, as is the “software” of integration: efficient customs administration, reasonable control over corruption, and secure property rights. China’s large-scale economic engagement in Africa is still a relatively recent phenomenon, and it makes sense that the engagement would evolve based on experience. 
Furthermore, recommendations for the Chinese government and Chinese firms include: China should work with African governments to encourage Chinese firms to hire and train African workers and to limit the flow of labor to amounts designated by African countries. 
Another recommendation for China is to step up this kind of engagement, an effort that would align with Chinese leaders’ tendency to take a long-term perspective. Africa and its partners stand to benefit if economies are diversified into manufactures and tradable services. Through infrastructure and direct investment, China can play a critical role in this process.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE: Introduction……………………………………….…………………1
1.1 Overview…………………………………………………………………….……….1
1.2 Definition of dollar diplomacy…………….…………………………………..……1
1.2.1 Can the Chinese rapid involvement into the African market be seen as new 
colonialism or is it a term used loosely to discredit China?....................................2  
1.3 China & Africa relationship in the past..………………………………………………3
1.4 Motivation………....……………………….…………………….…………..…….………8
1.5 Methodology……………………………………………………………………….….….10

CHAPTER TWO: Review of Related Literature on the Impact on FDIs ……………………………………………………………………………...11
2.1 Literature review……………...………………….………………………………………11
2.2 Economic history of China……………….…………..…….………………………….15
2.3 Chinese investment in Africa, while less extensive than often assumed, has the potential to generate jobs and development on the continent………...............16
2.4 Comparing Africa with the rest of the world……..……………………………..…..17
2.4.1 Global Chinese investment since 2005………………......…..………………17
2.5 Locational distribution of Chinese investment in Sub-Saharan Africa……..…21
2.6 Sectoral distribution of Chinese investment in Africa……………..….…..…..….22
2.7 Chinese investment in perspective………………………………….…………...…..26
	2.7.1 China’s FDI flows into Africa (2003-2014)……………………………………26
2.8 China’s FDI flows to Africa, large recipient countries and the rest of Africa…27
2.9 China and Africa: Future potential growth synergies…………..………………..30
2.9.1 Top 20 African destinations of China’s FDI flows (a) and stocks (b).….…30

CHAPTER THREE : Characteristics of Chinese investment in SSA....35
3.1 Describes the features and characteristics of Chinese investment in SSA…..35
3.2 China’s changing approach to Africa………………………....……………………..37
	3.2.1 South Africa Investment in China…………….……………………………….43
3.3 What is the implication of the relationship between Africa and china?............44
3.4 Agricultural technology demonstration centers……………..…………………….46
	3.4.1 Do the figures tally up?...............................................................................47

CHAPTER FOUR: Case Studies: Five Major Economies in SSA……..50
4.1 Mention of Chinese Investment in Africa in Major News Outlets 2000-2016….50
4.2 African Countries’ Growth Performance-GDP Annual Growth Rate in 2000-2015 (Percentage)…………………………………………………………………………….51
4.3 China’s Total Exports and Imports and Shares in World Trade………..….…....53
4.4 China’s Trade with Africa-Exports………………..…………………….…………….54
4.5 China’s Trade with Africa-Imports………………………..………….……………….55
4.6 China’s FDI to Africa and the Rest of World-Flows………………………………..56
4.7 China’s FDI in Africa, Total Africa, Large Recipient Countries and the Rest of Africa-Flows…………………………………………………………….……………………..58
4.8 China’s FDI in Africa, Total Africa, Large Recipient Countries and the Rest of Africa-Stock………………………………………………………………..………………….60
4.9 China’s Total FDI Flow by Sector Structure in 2004-2015 (Percentage)…….…61
4.10 China’s Total FDI Stocks by Sector Structure in 2004-2015 (Percentage)......62
4.11 Top Five Sectors in China’s FDI Stocks in Africa (Billion $US)……..…………63
4.12 Number of Chinese Workers in Africa by End of Year……………....………….64
4.13 Share of China’s FDI in Africa Total inward FDI Flows, Total Africa, Large Recipient Countries and the Rest of Africa (Percentage)……………………...……..66
4.14 Share of China’s FDI in Africa Total Inward FDI Stocks, Total Africa, Large Recipient Countries and the Rest of Africa…………………………………..…………66
4.15 Case studies – SSA Countries………………..……………………………………..67
	4.15.1 FDI Trends of the South African Economy……………………………..…..68
4.15.2 Chinese Companies investing in SA……………………………………..….69
4.15.3 Top 10 companies: number of projects……………………………….….…70
4.15.4 Top 10 Companies:  Jobs Created and Capital Investment…….………..71
4.16 Industry Analysis: Sectors…………………………………..…………......………..71
4.17 FDI trends by sector………………………...…………………………………..……..72
4.18 Industry Analysis: Business Activity…………………………..……………..……73
4.19 FDI Trends of the Kenya……………………………………………………………....74
	4.19.1 Economic Performance…………………………………………………...…..74
	4.19.2 Sectoral Analysis - Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing………...…...………75
	4.19.3 Manufacturing…………………………………………………………….……76
4.19.4 Transportation and Storage……………………………………………..……76
4.19.5 Accommodation and Food Service Activities……………………………….78
4.19.6 Information and Communication………………………………………..……78
4.19.7 Financial and Insurance Activities…………...………………………………78
4.20 China – Africa Development (CAD) Fund…………………...……………………..79
4.21 Special Loan for Small and Medium Sized African Enterprises (SMEs)……..80


CHAPTER FIVE: Conclusion and Recommendations ……………..…..81
5.1 Summary………………………………………………..………………………………….81
5.2 Some Obstacles in African Countries………………………………..………………….83
5.3 Challenges and Outcomes…..……………………..…………………………………….84
5.4 Recommendation……………………………………..…………………………………..91



REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………………….…..94







 
Figures and Graphs
Figure 1:	Global Chinese investment since 2005 …………………………...………..19
Figure 2:	Locational distribution of Chinese investment in Africa………...….….......22
Figure 3:	Sectoral distribution of Chinese investment in Africa………..…………….25
Figure 4: 	China’s FDI flows into Africa (2003-2014)…………..……………………...27
Figure 5: 	China’s FDI flows to Africa, large recipient countries and the rest 
of Africa…………………………………………………………………………29
Figure 6: 	Top 20 African destinations of China’s FDI flows (a) and stocks (b).……32
Figure 7: 	Mention of Chinese Investment in Africa in Major News Outlets 
2000-2016………………….…………………………………………………..51
Figure 8: 	African Countries’ Growth Performance-GDP Annual Growth Rate in 2000-2015 (Percentage)……………...………………………………...…….52
Figure 9: 	China’s Total Exports and Imports and Shares in World Trade……..…...53
Figure 10: 	China’s Trade with Africa-Exports ……………….………………………….54
Figure 11: 	China’s Trade with Africa-Imports……….…………………………………..56
Figure 12: 	China’s FDI to Africa and the Rest of World-Flows...................................57
Figure 13: 	China’s FDI to Africa and the Rest of World-Stocks…………………...….58
Figure 14: 	China’s FDI in Africa, Total Africa, Large Recipient Countries and 
the Rest of Africa-Flows……………………………………………..……….59
Figure 15: 	China’s FDI in Africa, Total Africa, Large Recipient Countries and the 
Rest of Africa-Stock……………………………………………………………60
Figure 16: 	China’s Total FDI Flow by Sector Structure in 2004-2015 
(Percentage)……………………………………………………………………61
Figure 17: 	China’s Total FDI Stocks by Sector Structure in 2004-2015 (Percentage)……………………………………………………………………62 
Figure 18: 	Top Five Sectors in China’s FDI Stocks in Africa (Billion $US)……………………………………………………………………..………64 
Figure 19: 	Number of Chinese Workers in Africa by End of Year ………..…………..65
Figure 20: 	Share of China’s FDI in Africa Total inward FDI Flows, Total Africa,
                      Large Recipient Countries and the Rest of Africa (Percentage)…………66
 Figure 21: 	Share of China’s FDI in Africa Total Inward FDI Stocks, Total Africa, 
Large Recipient Countries and the Rest of Africa………………………….67
Figure 22: 	Number of companies by year and percentage of all companies………………………………………………………………..…….69
Figure 23: 	Size of companies by turnover………….……………………………………72
Figure 23: 	Number of FDI projects by year and sector……………..………………….72
Figure 24: 	Number of FDI projects by year and business activity………..…...………73
Figure 26: 	Third Quarter GDP Growth Rates………………….………………………..75
 
TABLES

Table 1: 	Summary of China’s economic engagements in the world and in 
Africa under four categories…….…….…………………………...…………20
Table 2: 	The determinants of Chinese FDI in Africa……….……...…………………34
Table 3: 	Concessionality and preferentiality of the Chinese finance…….…………40
Table 4: 	The comparison of China’s FDI flows and FDI stocks per priority sector 
    		based on figure 16 and 17……………….………………...…………………63
TABLE 5: 	Headline FDI trends by year……………………...…………………………..68
TABLE 6: 	Top 10 companies: number of projects………..……………………………70
TABLE 7: 	Top 10 Companies:  Jobs Created and Capital Investment……………....71
TABLE 8: 	FDI trends by sector…………………………………………………………...72
TABLE 9: 	FDI trends by business activity…………………………………………..…..74

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Websites
www.brookings.edu/research/is-sub-saharan-africa-facing-another-system-sovereign-debt-crisis/ 
Yun Sun; Wednesday, September 5, 2018; AFRICA IN FOCUS; China’s 2018 financial commitments to Africa: Adjustment and recalibration; www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/09/05/chinas-2018-financial-commitments-to-africa-adjustment-and-recalibration/ 
Yun SunTuesday, January 30, 2018; AFRICA IN FOCUS; Foresight Africa viewpoint – China’s engagement in Africa: What can we learn in 2018 from the $60 billion commitment? www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/01/30/foresight-africa-viewpoint-chinas-engagement-in-africa-what-can-we-learn-in-2018-from-the-60-billion-commitment/
Yun SunWednesday, September 5, 2018; AFRICA IN FOCUS; China’s 2018 financial commitments to Africa: Adjustment and recalibration; www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/09/05/chinas-2018-financial-commitments-to-africa-adjustment-and-recalibration/   
Top China Travel; One Belt One Road Initiative; https://www.topchinatravel.com/silk-road/one-belt-one-road.htm