本文旨在探討我國上市櫃公司之高階經理人薪酬與核心代理問題之關聯，並進一步的探討兩者的關聯程度在不同的生命週期下是否會有所影響。本文參考Anthony and  Ramesh(1992)方法並使用金成隆(2005)之作法以研發密度取代股利支付率作為生命週期判別因子，並以我國2009年至2016年之上市櫃電子產業公司做為樣本，進行實證分析。實證結果發現，席次偏離差對我國電子產業高階經理人薪酬顯著正影響，而高階經理人薪酬在成長期所受到核心代理問題之影響比成熟期與衰退期小，而衰退期之高階經理人薪酬受到核心代理問題影響比期成熟期更大。

This paper aims to discuss the relationship between managers’ remuneration and core agency problem in Taiwan, and measure whether the degree of association was affected by the life cycle. Based on the methodology in the studies of Chen-Lung Chin (2005), using R&D intensity, sales growth, capital spending rate, firm age as factors to determine the different stages of the life cycle. The study employs data of the firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange during 2009-2015. The results show that the core agent problem has significant positive effect on managers' remuneration of the electronics industry. In addition, regarding the seats deviation as the agent variable of the core agent problem to explore this effect during different stages of the life cycle, the results indicate that the core agent problem has significant negative on managers' remuneration at growth stage, while it shows significant positive on managers' remuneration at both maturity stage and decline stage. To be more precise, the effect at the growth stage is minimal throughout the life cycle, however the effect at the decline stage is maximal.

第壹章　緒論	                1
第一節　研究動機與背景	        1
第二節　研究目的         	4
第三節　研究流程	                5
第四節　研究架構	                6
第貳章　文獻探討與假說建立	7
第一節　核心代理問題	        7
第二節　生命週期          	10
第三節　薪酬	                15
第四節　假說發展	                20
第參章　研究方法	                23
第一節　觀念性架構	        23
第二節　研究期間、樣本選取與資料來源	24
第三節　變數定義與衡量	        26
第四節　實證模型            	35
第四章　實證結果分析	        37
第一節　敘述性統計	        37
第二節　相關分析	                41
第三節　迴歸結果分析       	43
第四節　額外測試	                49
第五章　研究結論與限制	        64
參考文獻	                        69
圖1-1　研究流程圖	        5
圖3-1　觀念性架構	        23
表3-1　 樣本篩選過程	25
表3-2　 生命週期各階段評分表	28
表3-3　 企業生命週期特性	29
表3-4　 變數定義與衡量彙總表	34
表4-1　 敘述性統計量	38
表4-2　 生命週期判別因子敘述性統計	39
表4-3　 生命週期判別因子平均數	40
表4-4　 Pearson相關係數表	42
表4-5　 不同生命週期下，核心代理問題對高階經理人薪酬影響之實證結果	45
表4-6　 不同生命週期下，核心代理問題對高階經理人薪酬影響之實證結果	48
表4-7　 Pearson相關係數表	54
表4-8　 敘述性統計量	56
表4-9　 不同生命週期下，核心代理問題對高階經理人薪酬影響之實證結果	58
表4-10　不同生命週期下，核心代理問題對高階經理人薪酬影響之實證結果	61
表4-11　不同生命週期下，核心代理問題對高階經理人薪酬影響之實證結果	63

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