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系統識別號 U0002-0401201615125800
中文論文名稱 建構產險公司業務品質管理系統之研究
英文論文名稱 The Research of Constructing the Business Quality Management System of the Property-Liability Insurance Company
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 管理科學學系博士班
系所名稱(英) Doctoral Program, Department of Management Sciences
學年度 104
學期 1
出版年 105
研究生中文姓名 許銘元
研究生英文姓名 Ming-Yuan Hsu
學號 895620226
學位類別 博士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2015-12-14
論文頁數 63頁
口試委員 指導教授-李旭華
委員-陳建勝
委員-范姜肱
委員-林倫豪
委員-陳瑞
委員-婁國仁
委員-曹銳勤
中文關鍵字 結構方程模型  逆選擇  事前道德風險  品質管理 
英文關鍵字 Structural equation model  Adverse selection  Ex-ante moral hazard  Quality management 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本論文主要在探討產險公司如何建立一個有效且完整的品質管理系統。以結構方程發展出核保及費率制定的核心變數並分別驗證汽車車體損失險及團體傷害保險兩個屬性不同的險種。就汽車車體損失保險而言,驗證結果得知,核保因素之未婚者、地區仍存在逆選擇的現象。未有充分證據顯示事前道德風險的存在。就團體傷害保險而言,費率因素中之團體人數對於實支實付平均保額及住院日額平均保額仍存在逆選擇的現象。住院日額平均保額對於損失率存在事前道德風險的現象。
英文摘要 This dissertation explores the development of an effective and complete quality management system by insurance companies. Using structural equation model to develop the core variables of underwriting and ratemaking. To verify these assumptions, this study examines auto physical damage insurance and group injury insurance, which are two different policies with varying features. In the case of auto physical damage insurance, the risk factors are claims, human, auto, road environment, and place factors. The results indicate that the variables in underwriting factors such as single, region imply the existence of adverse selection. There is no significant evidence to imply the presence of ex-ante moral hazard. For group injury insurance, the risk factors are underwriting, rates, and business factors. The number of groups in the rates of factors support for insured amounts for daily hospitalization indemnity indicate the presence of ex-ante moral hazard.
論文目次 目 錄
目錄 ……………………………………………………………………Ⅰ
表目錄………………………………………………………………… Ⅲ
圖目錄………………………………………………………………… Ⅴ
第一章 緒論 …………………………………………………………1
1.1 研究動機及目的 ……………………………………………1
1.2 研究架構與流程 ……………………………………………4
第二章 文獻回顧與探討 ……………………………………………6
2.1 核保與業務的品質管理…………………………………… 6
2.2 費率制度 ……………………………………………………8
2.3 各風險因素驗證文獻………………………………………10
2.4 資訊不對稱、逆選擇及道德風險…………………………11
2.5 業務品質管理制度的建立 ……………………………… 13
第三章 研究設計與實施 ……………………………………………18
3.1 研究樣本及變數定義………………………………………18
3.2 研究假設……………………………………………………35
3.3 研究模型……………………………………………………39
第四章 實證結果與分析 ………………………………………… 42
4.1 模型配適度的評估…………………………………………44
4.2 汽車車體損失保險實證結果與討論………………………47
4.3 團體傷害保險實證結果與討論……………………………49
第五章 結論與建議 ……………………………………………… 52
5.1 結論…………………………………………………………52
5.2 建議…………………………………………………………54
參考文獻 ………………………………………………………………55
中文文獻 ………………………………………………………………55
英文文獻 ………………………………………………………………58

表目錄
表1產險公司業務品質管理系統建構階段表………………………… 13
表2汽車車體損失保險與團體傷害保險核保作業流程比較表……… 16
表3產險市場各險種保費表…………………………………………… 18
表4產險市場汽車車體損失保險損失率表…………………………… 19
表5汽車車體損失保險各承保範圍簽單車數表……………………… 19
表6汽車車體損失保險變數操作型定義……………………………… 20
表7汽車車體損失保險被解釋變數件數百分比表…………………… 23
表8汽車車體損失保險各變數描述性統計量………………………… 24
表9產、壽險市場團體傷害保險費占比表…………………………… 26
表10產、壽險市場團體傷害保險損失率表 ………………………… 27
表11個案公司傷害保險市占率表 …………………………………… 27
表12團體傷害保險各變數操作型定義…………………………………28
表13團體傷害保險被解釋變數百分比表………………………………31
表14個案公司團體傷害保險承保與理賠件數比表……………………32
表15團體傷害保險各變數描述性統計量………………………………33
表16汽車車體損失保險研究假設表………………………………… 35
表17團體傷害保險研究假設表……………………………………… 37
表18結構方程式整體模型配適度指標表………………………………42
表19汽車車體損失保險整體模型配適度表……………………………44
表20團體傷害保險整體模型配適度表…………………………………45
表21汽車車體損失保險驗證結果表……………………………………47
表22汽車車體損失險各解釋變數關聯係數表……………………… 47
表23團體傷害保險驗證結果表……………………………………… 49
表24團體傷害保險被解釋變數關聯係數表………………………… 50

圖目錄
圖1 研究架構與流程圖 ………………………………………………4
圖2 汽車車體損失保險業務品質管理作業流程 ……………………14
圖3 團體傷害保險業務品質管理作業流程 …………………………15
圖4 風險因素及被解釋變數間的關聯性 ……………………………35
圖 5 汽車車體損失保險風險因素、承保範圍與理賠金額關聯……36
圖 6 團體傷害保險風險因素、保險金額與損失率關聯圖…………38
參考文獻 參考文獻
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