1948至1949年，中國由於內部共產黨與國民政府之間處於敵對狀態，導致內局混亂並引發後續的內戰．然而，美國杜魯門政府在此時期卻扮演關鍵的角色．原因主要是因為杜魯門政府在二次大戰後對國民政府援助的承諾，卻因為共產黨在1949年10月贏得內戰，而起了變化，進而影響美國援華政策與國民政府之間的關係．
    本論文採用知名學者艾里遜(Graham T. Allison)所提出的決策模式理論，從「理性行為者模式」、「組織行為模式」及「官僚政治模式」等三個面向，探討杜魯門政府考量是否繼續援華之國際與國內因素，並提及1948援華政策(China Aid Policy)以及發表1949中國白皮書(China White Paper)對於美國援華政策的影響．另外，也將探討美國內部像是杜魯門政府內之國務院、國會以及國民政府等政府組織之間的爭論以及所採取的策略，以致能獲得最後的採用．此外，在決策過程中，各部門官員試圖追求組織利益的過程以及政府首長間相互競爭並和總統互動關係的結果，都可成為影響最後決策的重要因素。
    另外，在1948至1949年期間，杜魯門政府的態度也隨著中國情勢的轉變而有所改變．在國共內戰期間，美國一直傾向於持續援助國民政府的意願．然而，在國民政府處於節節敗退的情況下，杜魯門政府內部開始出現不同意見，並開始逐漸縮減對於國民政府的援助及基於美國利益考量，開始與中共方面有更進一步的發展．這對於當時的國民政府無不是極大的打擊，也促使國民政府全面的對美國展開積極的溝通，希望不會因此失去美國的援助．因此，杜魯門政府當時的處境，也因為受到各政府部門以及某些極具影響力的政府官員，而使得美國在援華政策上顯得搖擺不定，並顯示杜魯門政府在援華上所遇到的困難與窘境．
    此論文的目的是透過決策模式理論來分析杜魯門政府在援華政策上所做的改變，以試圖了解杜魯門政府內部最具影響力的政府官員和總統之間的關係及從1948 至1949年逐漸縮減美援的原因，並突顯美國以其利益為出發點而改變對華政策之走向．

During the period of 1948 to 1949, the ruling Nationalist government and Chinese Communists turned China into another battlefield by fighting to win the civil war. The Truman administration played a critical role during the civil war, due to U.S. continuous support for the Nationalists since World War II (WWII). However, as the Nationalists suffered from series of defeat that led to the Chinese Communists victory of the civil war in 1949, the U.S. began to shift its assistance towards the Nationalists that left great impact on Truman administration’s decision towards China aid policy and its relationship with the Nationalist government.  
    The thesis uses the decision-making theory of Graham Allison to analyze the main factors that caused the Truman administration to consider further assistance towards the Nationalist. By implementing the three main models of the theory: Rational Actor Model (RAM), the Organizational Behavior Model and the Governmental Politics Model, the thesis is based on this structure to discuss influential factors of 1948 China Aid Act and 1949 China White Paper and to explore the conflict and leading figures within the decision-making process.
    The aim of this thesis is to evaluate whether the U.S. decision will continue to support the defeated Nationalist government or began to withdraw its assistance for the Nationalists, due to U.S. interests concern. This decision undoubtedly arouse many debates within the White House, Congress, State Department, and the Nationalist government that finally led to the final release of the disputed China White Paper in 1949. At this point, the U.S. not only presented an adjustment and redefinition of aid to China but also indicated changes for its support to the Nationalist as well as the overall U.S policy in East Asia. 
    The use of the decision- making theory also seek to prove the theme of the thesis which is Truman administration decision to shift its China aid policy by gradually disengaging from, instead of fully involving in China, as to lessen support for the Nationalist government during the period from 1948 to 1949.

Content

Chapter One Introduction.……………………………………………………………. 1

1.1   Aims of the Thesis…………………………………………………………...1
1.2   Literature Review……………………………………………………………6
1.3   Research Questions………………………………………………………….8
1.4   Chapter Outline……………………………………………………………...9

Chapter Two Theoretical and Methodological Framework………………………….11

2.1   Rational Actor Model (RAM)……………………………………………...11
  2.2   Organization Behavior Model……………………………………………...17
  2.3   Governmental Politics Model………………………………………………20
  2.4   Chapter Outline…………………………………………………………….23

Chapter Three Rational Actor Model………………………………………………...25

  3.1   International Concern on U.S. Decision towards China Aid……………….25
  3.2   Domestic Pressure on U.S. Aid to China (Nationalists)……………………35
  3.3   Nationalist Effort in Seeking U.S. Aid……………………………………..42
  3.4   Conclusion………………………………………………………………….51

Chapter Four Organizational Behavior Model……………………………………….54

  4.1   The China Lobby (China Bloc) Persuasion………………………………...54
  4.2   State Department Response………………………………………………...61
  4.3   Conclusion………………………………………………………………….77

Chapter Five Governmental Politics Model………………………………………….81

  5.1   The Advantage of the Department of State (DOS)…………………………81
  5.2   Decision Made on China White Paper……………………………………..84
  5.3   Conclusion………………………………………………………………… 89

Chapter Six Conclusion………………………………………………………………91

Bibliography..............................................95

<English>:

I. Official Documents/ Publication

U.S. Department of State, 1949. U.S Relations With China, with Special Reference to The Period, 1944-1949. Washington D.C.: Office of Public Affairs.

U.S. Department of State, 1956. Foreign Relations of The U.S. Diplomatic Papers: 1941 China, VII. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. 

Congressional Quarterly, 1980. China: U.S. Policy Since 1945. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.

Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files, China: Internal Affairs, 1945-1949. (microfilm) Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, Inc., 1984. File number: 2040.12-3.

Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files, Taiwan: Internal Affairs, 1945-1949. (microfilm) Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, Inc., 1985. File number: 2040.12-6.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1948 Vol. 7. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1974.

FRUS, 1949 Vol. 8. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1974.

FRUS, 1949 Vol. 9. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1974.

IV. Article:

“Man on the Dike,” Time, Vol. LVI, No. 6, New York: Time Inc., August 7,1950.

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Pepper, Suzanne.1978. Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949. London: University of California Press.

Rosenau, James N. 1961. International Politics and Foreign Policy. New York: The Free Press.

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Tucker, Nancy B. 1983. Patterns In The Dust: Chinese- American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949-1950. New York: Columbia University Press.