網路服務日漸繁盛，對於提供網路服務之企業及線上平台業者而言，如何提升使用者價值及流覽率為其重要課題。而網路服務產業多以併購為主，近年許多大型平台，如Google之蒐尋引擎、Tripadvisor之旅遊評論網站、Yahoo入口網站亦或Facebook之社群平台等，皆以增加使用者價值為出發，尋求多元網路服務以求增加使用者之使用率。而許多新興之網路服務供給企業則期以與線上平台業者進行合作，藉以增加使用者人數。在策略性合作關係中，根據麥肯錫公司於2000年統計，其失敗率高達60%。本研究以網路服務為基礎，以及策略性合作之觀點出發，發展出兩個研究問題首先，為以網路服務合作基礎出發，探討現上平台業者在面臨合作之篩選機制為何？接著，為當網路服務供給企業與線上平台業者之合作關係確認時，所能維持該項合作之長期誘因為何？期以透過兩研究問題，得出雙方合作下之篩選機制，進而達成服務聯盟之長期穩定的因子。並藉以合作關係取代網路公司之併購風潮。
本研究透過傳訊賽局之研究架構為出發，傳訊賽局主要解決資訊不對稱之動態賽局。透過資訊豐富度定義網路服務供給企業之類型，以及資訊強度為傳送訊號，使得大型平台或入口網站進而與之合作。並且假定線上平台業者之評估變數、網路服務供給企業之評估變數個五項，透過數理模型之假定，利用傳訊賽局之兩大均衡：分離均衡及混合均衡之概念進行變數概念推導。而透過變數推導及動態完美均衡之條件，進而找出合作之誘因。在變數方面，過往文獻皆以有形價值為主，本研究融入網路服務之特性，加入無形價值進行討論。根據模型推導結果，在合作之條件之下，網絡外部性以及服務價值為其主要影響合作之主要因子。當合作關係發生時，網絡外部性及服務價值兩部分大於成本因素時，便會使雙方有誘因進行長期合作，進而達成網路服務聯盟之概念誘因。而網絡外部性會使合作關係下形成正向循環，因此對於新創網路服務供給企業而言有利。對於線上平台業者而言，能提升使用者價值，乃藉以提供貼近顧客服務為出發，因此合作後，能提升使用者對於該線上平台業者之依賴性，進而達成雙方合作之穩固性。

Online services are increasingly flourishing decades. It is an important for online service providers and portal webiste or platfrom to improve customer value and increase browsing rate. In particular, mergers and acquisitions is the mainstream for online service field and certain platforms such as Google, Tripadvisor, or Facebookstarted to cooperate to other sevice providers to enhance customer value. According to the report of Mckinsey & Company’s (2000), 60% of failure rate in the tactical parnterships. This research proposes two research questions based on strategic cooperation. (1) whatis the criteria between platforms and online service provider before cooperation? (2) how to maintain the stability wihtin alliance and  what is the longterm incentive for partnership? 
Our framework is based on the concept of signaling game which is a dynamic game to solve the asymmetric information problems.  We use information richness as the type of online service providers and information intensity as the signals. Online service provider is the sender and the platform owner as a receiver. After receiving the signal, the receiver has to decide the best move for cooperation. For both of sender and receiver, we set five variables and assume the conditions for their movements in the game. This study proposed mathematical models and assumed the separating equilibrium and pooling by investigating the major factors in partnerships. In addition, past researches already used tangible variables to measure the senders’ type and payoffs. Our research integrated tangible and intangible variables to infer the type of sender and payoffs. The results of mathematical derivation showed the main incentives for cooperation are network externalities and users’ value. Once network externality and users’ values are greater than the costs, online service provider and platform owner may agree accept the cooperation. The network externality can increase the number of users for online service provider by cooperate with the platform owner. Platform owner not only can enhance the users’ value by providing online service to fit in users’ need, but also can increase the dependence on the platform. It is a win-win strategy for both sides. Finally, online service provider and platform owner have incentives for long-term partnerships which may be a concept of strategic alliance of online service.

目錄 
目錄................................................................................................................................ I 
表目錄.......................................................................................................................... III 
圖目錄.......................................................................................................................... IV 
第一章 緒論.................................................................................................................. 1 
第一節 研究背景 ................................................................................................... 1 
第二節 研究動機 ................................................................................................... 5 
第三節 研究問題 ................................................................................................... 7 
第四節 研究目的 ................................................................................................... 9 
第二章 文獻探討........................................................................................................ 11 
第一節 策略聯盟(Strategic Alliance) ................................................................. 11 
第二節 傳訊賽局(Signaling Game) .................................................................... 14 
第三章 研究方法........................................................................................................ 18 
第一節 研究架構 ................................................................................................. 18 
第二節 傳訊賽局 ................................................................................................. 20 
第四章 模型推導........................................................................................................ 31 
第一節 分離均衡(Separating Equilibrium) ......................................................... 36 
第二節 混合均衡(Pooling Equilibrium) ............................................................. 56 
第五章 綜合分析........................................................................................................ 74 
第一節 分離均衡 ................................................................................................. 75 
第二節、混合均衡 ............................................................................................... 81 
第六章 結論................................................................................................................ 85 
第一節 研究結論 ................................................................................................. 85 
第二節 管理與實務意涵 ..................................................................................... 88 
第三節 研究限制 ................................................................................................. 89 
參考文獻...................................................................................................................... 90 
英文部分 ............................................................................................................... 90 
網站部分 ............................................................................................................... 97 

表目錄 
表格2-1 傳訊賽局之相關應用整理 ......................................................................... 17 
表格3-1 四種賽局型態之均衡 ................................................................................. 20 
表格3-2 傳訊賽局元素對照表 ................................................................................. 26 
表格3-3 傳訊賽局之參數設定 ................................................................................. 29 
表格4-1 入口網站報酬之變數設定 ......................................................................... 32 
表格4-2 網路服務供給企業報酬之變數設定 ......................................................... 33 
表格4-3 分離均衡之報酬 ......................................................................................... 37 
表格4-4 分離均衡之報酬 ......................................................................................... 47 

圖目錄 
圖1-1 2013年各國服務業占GDP比率 ..................................................................... 1 
圖1-2 2014年各國網路經濟轉換GDP比重 ............................................................. 2 
圖1-3 2014年網路使用者的成長情況 ....................................................................... 2 
圖3-1 研究架構 ......................................................................................................... 18 
圖3-2 策略合作之傳訊賽局 ..................................................................................... 24 
圖4-1分離均衡 .......................................................................................................... 36 
圖4-2 分離均衡 ......................................................................................................... 46 
圖4-3 混合均衡 ......................................................................................................... 56 
圖4-4 混合均衡 ......................................................................................................... 65 
圖5-1 本研究傳訊賽局之決策樹 ............................................................................. 74 
圖5-2 分離均衡(1)之決策樹..................................................................................... 75 
圖5-3 分離均衡(2)之決策樹..................................................................................... 78 
圖5-4 混合均衡(1)之決策樹..................................................................................... 81 
圖5-5 混合均衡(2)之決策樹..................................................................................... 83

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