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系統識別號 U0002-0307201408370100
中文論文名稱 高階經理人薪酬、公司治理與經營績效- 以台灣金融業為例
英文論文名稱 Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance -An Empirical Study of Financial Firms in Taiwan
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 保險學系保險經營碩士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Insurance
學年度 102
學期 2
出版年 103
研究生中文姓名 楊怡雯
研究生英文姓名 Yi-Wen Yang
學號 601560260
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2014-06-19
論文頁數 54頁
口試委員 指導教授-湯惠雯
委員-張眾卓
委員-何佳玲
中文關鍵字 公司治理  董事會  家族控制  高階經理人薪酬  經營績效  兩階段最小平方法 
英文關鍵字 Corporate Governance  Board of Director  Family Control  Executive Compensation  Operating Performance  Two-Stage Least Squares 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本研究探討2005年至2012年間台灣公開發行以上金融業之高階經理人薪酬對公司經營績效的影響,以及公司績效對高階經理人薪酬的影響。本研究亦檢視公司治理機制對高階經理人薪酬及公司績效是否扮演成功的制衡角色。由於高階經理人薪酬與公司經營績效間可能存在因果關係,本研究除使用普通最小平方法(ordinary least square method, OLS)進行迴歸方程式之參數估計外,另建置聯立方程模型,採用兩階段最小平方法(two-stage least squares method, 2SLS)檢測兩者的關係,以期獲得一致性的估計,降低估計過程中所產生之偏誤。
本研究實證結果發現,我國金融業之高階經理人薪酬與公司經營績效彼此間,具有正向之相互影響;較大規模的董事會具有較佳的監督效果,有助於公司績效的提升,而董監持股及經理人持股的增加,則與經營績效無關。雖然家族控制對公司績效並無顯著的影響,然而,受到家族控制的公司卻有顯著較高的高階經理人薪酬。此外,當管理者持股愈低,董事會很可能給付較高的薪酬作為激勵,以使其利益與公司之利益相結合。因此,本研究結果為高階經理人薪酬與公司經營績效之相關研究提供了新證據。
英文摘要 We investigate the impact of executive compensation on firm performance and examine whether the changes in firm performance affect executive compensation using publicly financial firms in Taiwan from 2005 to 2012. We also pay attention to whether corporate governance mechanisms play a successful role on monitoring executive compensation and firm performance. Due to a possibly causal relationship between executive compensation and firm performance, we establish simultaneous equation models estimated by a two-stage least squares method (2SLS) in addition to an ordinary least square method (OLS), hoping to get a consistent estimation and reduced biases.
Our empirical results show that executive compensation and firm performance of Taiwanese financial firms have a positive relationship with each other. Larger boards have better oversight and improve firm performance, while board shareholdings and managers’ ownership present no significant influence on firm performance. Although family-controlled firms have no significantly increased firm performance, these firms have higher executive compensation than those of non-family controlled firms. In addition, when managerial ownership is lower, the board is likely to pay higher compensation as an incentive to align managers’ interests with the firm’s interests. Accordingly, the results of the study provide new evidence for the research on executive compensation and firm performance.
論文目次 目錄
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 研究架構 3
第二章 文獻探討 5
第一節 高階經理人薪酬與經營績效之關聯性 5
第二節 公司治理、高階經理人薪酬及經營績效之關聯性 6
第三章 研究方法與研究模型 13
第一節 資料來源與樣本選取 13
第二節 研究變數 17
第三節 研究模型 23
第四章 實證結果與分析 26
第一節 敘述性統計 26
第二節 相關分析 33
第三節 平均數差異性檢定 36
第四節 實證迴歸結果分析 39
第五章 結論與建議 46
第一節 結論 46
第二節 建議 47
參考文獻 49


表目錄
表3-1:樣本選取過程 15
表3-2:研究期間樣本公司各年度之產業分布 16
表3-3:研究變數操作性定義彙總 22
表4-1:研究變數之敘述性統計量 28
表4-2-1:金融業高階經理人薪酬與績效變數分年度之基本統計量 31
表4-2-2:金控、保險、銀行、及證券業薪酬與績效變數分年度之基本統計量 32
表4-3:研究變數之PEARSON相關分析 34
表4-4:多元共線性診斷 35
表4-5-1:保險業與金控公司之平均數差異性檢定 37
表4-5-2:銀行業與金控公司之平均數差異性檢定 37
表4-5-3:證券業與金控公司之平均數差異性檢定 38
表4-5-4:保險業與銀行業之平均數差異性檢定 38
表4-6-1:資產報酬率對高階經理人薪酬之迴歸估計結果 42
表4-6-2:營業收入淨額自然對數對高階經理人薪酬之迴歸估計結果 43
表4-6-3:高階經理人薪酬對資產報酬率之迴歸估計結果 44
表4-6-4:高階經理人薪酬對營業收入淨利自然對數之迴歸之估計結果 45


圖目錄
圖1-1:研究架構 4
參考文獻 參考文獻
中文部分
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英文部分
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