珍珠港事件前，美國極力延緩美日雙方的持續衝突，以避免戰爭之爆發。但是，日本以南進政策為指導原則，逐漸與美國的政策及利益相悖，並影響到美國的遠東利益，美國迫不得已以經濟制裁之手段對付日本。儘管美國利用許多官方及非官方之管道，與日本相互溝通與協調，但最終仍不願意犧牲本身的利益與原則之下，導致珍珠港事件的爆發。因此，本文之研究目的在探討在珍珠港事件爆發前，羅斯福政府的決策過程。
在理論架構上，本文以艾里遜提出的決策理論三種模式為研究架構，包括「理性模式」、「組織行為模式」、以及「政府政治模式」，將以此分析羅斯福政府的國際互動、美國的利益考量、組織部門的文化與能力、以及官僚的議價過程。
在理性模式中，羅斯福政府受到國際利益、孤立主義與總統的個人因素影響下，強調歐戰為首要的利益考量，積極援助英國，並同時拖延日本發動戰爭，藉以維護遠東區的局勢。
在組織模式中，由於組織的獨特的能力與組織文化，筆者將針對國務院與戰爭部分別提出驗證。雖然國務院擁有豐富的外交經驗，但是一如往常的標準作業程序，導致其應變能力有限，因而無法即時因應美日危機。至於戰爭部，由於軍方的組織系統雜亂不彰、行政效率混亂，以至於缺乏迅速應變的反應能力，而直接影響到後續的軍事計畫與行動進展。
在政府政治模式中，決策參與者依據本身的立場與職位，透過議價優勢與行動管道，將使影響力大幅增加，進而掌握決策之主導權。雖然羅斯福總統仰賴各級官員提出意見，不過他仍然堅持必需拖延戰事的爆發。
因此，本文之主旨為：儘管美國為了維護本身的利益與立場與日本進行協商，以儘量拖延戰爭的爆發，但最後仍因無法犧牲自身的遠東利益與基本原則，而被迫投入太平洋戰爭。

Prior to the attack of Pearl Harbor in 1941, the United States endeavored to smooth over problems between Japan and the U.S. Basically, Japan’s “southward policy” conflicted with America’s foreign policy. The Roosevelt Administration maintained what I call “postponement policy” and hoped to defer the hostilities. In the end, the U.S. still could not stop the hostilities at the expense of its own national interests. Therefore, the main purpose of this thesis is to explore the decision-making process of the Roosevelt Administration prior to the attack of Pearl Harbor. This thesis is under the framework of Graham Allison’s three decision-making models, namely, Rational Actor Model (RAM), Organizational Behavior Model (OBM), and Governmental Politics Model (GPM), from the perspective of the Roosevelt Administration’s national interests, organizational culture and capability, and bureaucratic bargaining. 
To start with RAM, the Roosevelt Administration needed supporting Britain to resist Germany because the U.S. viewed the European War as its top priority. At the same time, the U.S. endeavored to defer Japan to go to war, and inclined to maintain the status quo in the Far East. 
As for OBM, Department of State (DOS) and Department of War (DOW) had different position and opinions due to the unique organizational culture and capabilities. DOS had rich foreign affairs experience and handled the problems with standard operation procedures. In this way, DOS insisted on its position and then could not achieve the breakthrough in the U.S.-Japan talks. Besides, DOW only offered limited military strength to the Fast East because of insufficient military force. Accordingly, DOW was unable to respond the crisis timely in the Pacific.  
With regard to GPM, President Roosevelt insisted a postponement policy must be maintained between the U.S. and Japan, having no desire to take military action against Japan. Hence, the U.S. only strived for time and hoped to prevent Japan from going to war.        
Consequently, the U.S. maintained a conversation with Japan, and deferred the bilateral hostilities to escalate as possible as it could, but eventually it could not but go to the Pacific War after the Pearl Harbor was attacked.

第一章	緒論	1
第一節	研究目的與主旨	1
第二節	相關文獻之探討	3
第三節	研究架構、方法與範圍限制	8
第四節	章節安排	10
第五節	小結	11
第二章    理論架構與命題假設	13
第一節    理性模式及假設	13
第二節    組織行為模式及假設	16
第三節    政府政治模式理論與假設	19
第四節    小結	22
第三章    以理性模式驗證羅斯福政府的對日決策過程	24
第一節	羅斯福的決策風格與時代重擔	24
第二節    羅斯福政府與日本對峙之利益考量	31
第三節	羅斯福政府如何因應逐步升高的對日情勢	45
第四節    小結	54
第四章    以組織行為模式驗證羅斯福政府的對日決策過程	57
第一節    國務院的立場及提案	57
第二節    戰爭部扮演的角色及提案	74
第三節    小結	88
第五章    以政府政治模式驗證羅斯福政府的對日決策過程	91
第一節	決策參與者的職位與影響	92
第二節	羅斯福援華政策的轉折	99
第三節	主張對日禁運與協商官員之爭辯	111
第四節	軍事防禦與準備	134
第五節	小結	148
第六章	結論	151
參考書目…	159
表目錄
表3-1羅斯福政府之於美日對峙決策過程的理性考量因素	56
圖目錄
圖5-1競爭式模式 (羅斯福)	93

壹、中文部份
一、書籍
古屋奎二編著。中央日報社譯。《蔣總統秘錄：中日關係八十年之證言》。第十二冊。台北：中央日報社，1977年。
陳一新。《斷交後的中美關係》。台北：五南圖書出版社，1995年。
陳水逢。《日本現代史》。台北：臺灣商務，1988年。
陶文釧。《中美關係史1911-1949》。上海：上海人民出版社，2004年。
郭榮趙。《中美戰時合作之悲劇：從珍珠港到雅爾達》。台北：中國研究中心，1979年。
黑伍德 (Andrew Haywood) 著，楊日青、李培元、林文斌及劉兆隆譯。《最新政治學新論》。台北：韋伯文化事業出版社，2002年。

二、論文
李太春。《一九三一年至一九四一年美國孤立主義對亞歐外交政策之影響》。台北：淡江大學美國硏究所碩士論文，1985年。
何貞汝。《珍珠港事變前羅斯福政府對華外交的檢討》。台中：中興大學歷史學硏究所碩士論文，1997年。
范之江。《由九一八事變到珍珠港事變美國對華政策》。台北：中國文化大學美國研究所，1978年。
宜野座伸治。《一九四一年美日交涉中中國問題之重要性》。台北：淡江大學美國硏究所碩士論文，1988年。
洪嘉麗。《七七事變後至珍珠港事變前美國遠東政策分析 : 一九三七~一九四一》。台北：台灣大學政治學硏究所碩士論文，1976年。
徐漢斌。《珍珠港事變前美日交涉經過之研究》。台北：政治大學外交所碩士論文，1967年。
顧芬妮。《日本突襲美國珍珠港之研究》。台北：台灣大學政治學硏究所碩士論文，1983年。

三、期刊
陶文釧。〈戰時中美關係的若干問題〉。《美國研究》，1995年第3期。頁7-30。

四、網際網路
吳翎君。《國內所藏美國政府檔案介紹》，
http://archwebs.mh.sinica.edu.tw/digital/data/PDF/8-1-2-3.pdf ( 2009年4月30日)。

貳、英文部分
Ⅰ. Published Official Documents
U. S. Congress Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Hearing before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946.
U.S. Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II. Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1943. 
------.Peace and War: United States Foreign Relation Policy, 1931-1941. Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1943.
------.Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1937, Vol. III, The Far East. Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1954.
------.Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1939, The Far East, Vol. III. Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1955.
------.Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1940, The Far East, Vol. IV. Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1955.
------.Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1941, General, The Soviet Union, 1941, Vol. I. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958.
------.Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Vol. V. Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1956.
------.Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1941, Vol. IV, The Far East. Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1956.
	
II. Books 
Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971.
------& Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Longman, 1999.
Beard, Charles A. President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948.
Borg, Dorothy & Shumpei Okamoto with the assistance of Dale K. A. Finlayson. Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973.
Barber, James D. The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House. Englewood Cliff, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1972.
Current, Richard N. Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1954.
Dallak, Robert. Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.
Dickinson, Matthew J. Bitter Harvest: FDR, Presidential Power and the Growth of the Presidential Branch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.  
Feis, Herbert. The Road to Pearl Harbor. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950. 
Drummond, Donald F. The Passing of American Neutrality, 1937-1941. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955.
Freidel, Frank. Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny. 1st ed. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1990.
George, Alexander L. Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980.
Goodwin, Doris K. No Ordinary Time: Franklin & Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.
Grew, Joseph C. Ten Years in Japan. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944. 
------Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years. Vol. 2. Boston Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952.
Halperin, Morton H. with the assistance of Priscilla Clapp and Arnold Kanter. Bureaucratic politics and Foreign Policy. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974.
Hilsman, Roger. The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic Politics. 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1993.
Heinrichs, Waldo. Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. 
Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 Vols. New York: Macmillan Co., 1948.
Iriye, Akira. Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967.
Langer, William L. & S. Everett Gleason. The Undeclared War, 1940-1941. New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Brothers, 1953.    
------The Challenge to Isolation. New York: Harper, 1952.
Layton, Edwin T. with Roger Pineau & John Costello. And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway ─Breaking the Secrets. New York: William Morrow & Company, 1985.
Matloff, Maurice & Edwin M. Snell. Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1953.
Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 5th ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978.
Morison, Elting E. Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson. New York: Atheneum, 1964. 
Neustadt, Richard E. Presidential Power and the Modern President: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. 5th ed. New York: Free Press, 1990.
Prange, Gordon W. At Down We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981.
Reischauer, Edwin O. The Japanese. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1981.
Roosevelt, Elliott Assisted by Joseph P. Lash. F.D.R.:Ｈis Personal Letters, 1928-1945. Vol. II. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950.
Sherwood, Robert E. Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History. Vol. I. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1948.
Rubin, Barry. Secrets of State: The State Department and the Struggle over U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal. Vol. 2. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959.
Schroeder, Paul W. The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations, 1941. Ithaca, N. Y.: Published for the American Historical Association by Cornell University Press, 1958.
Simon, Herbert A. Models of Man: Social and Rational. New York: Wiley, 1957.
Stimson, Henry L. & McGeorge Bundy. On Active Service in Peace and War. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947. 
Snyder, Glenn H. and Paul Diesing. Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977.
Tang, Tsou. America’s Failure in China, 1941-1950. 1st Phoenix ed. Vol. 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967, 
Tansill, Charles C. Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy 1933-1941. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952.
Watson, Mark S. Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations. Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Dept. of the Army, 1950.
Welles, Sumner. Seven Decisions that Shaped History. New York: Harper, 1951.
Wohlstetter, Roberta. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962.  

III. Periodicals 
Liphart, Arend. “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method.” American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 3 (September 1971): 682-693.  
Lindblom, Charles E. “The Science of Muddling Through.” Public Administration Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Spring 1959): 79-88.

IV. Internet
“Who was Frank Knox?” The Frank Knox Memorial Fellowships, Harvard University.   http://www.frankknox.harvard.edu/who.html (2009年3月10日)