本文主要是探討於寡佔市場中，廠商在面對景氣的風險下，藉由投資產能所產生的策略性效果。廠商在對手決定產量前設置產能可以使自己成為Stackelberg領導者，甚至可以阻礙對手進入市場。本文首先探討在對手廠商無固定成本下廠商的產能投資行為，我們的結論是當景氣的風險增加，廠商會逐漸減少產能的設置而傾向於景氣顯現之後依實際的景氣水準與對手進行Cournot數量競爭，且單位產能投資成本增加也會有相同的效果。其次我們探討在對手廠商有固定成本下廠商透過設置產能阻卻對手進入市場的投資行為，我們發現當單位產能成本提高，由於會使廠商生產獨占產量較具策略優勢，因此廠商將傾向設置獨占產能阻卻對手進入市場。當風險提高，由於會使廠商生產阻卻進入產量較具策略優勢，因此廠商將傾向設置阻卻進入產能阻卻對手進入市場。

The purpose of my thesis is to describe the firm’s investing behavior under demand with uncertainty. We set up a 2-stage game；in stage 1, the incumbent firm decides its output capacity before the competitor entries into the market, in stage 2, the incumbent firm and its competitor engage in Cournot competition. There are two parts in this thesis. We discuss the incumbent firm’s investing behavior when the competitor has no fixed cost in the fist part, and the major conclusion of this part is that when the risky of climate increases, the firm will decrease to set the output capacity and prefer to join Cournot competition by the real level of climate. when marginal cost of investment increases, the firm will also decrease to set the output capacity. And we discuss the incumbent firm’s investing behavior when the competitor has fixed cost in the second part, and the major conclusion of this part is that when the risky of climate increases, the firm will prefer to set deter-entry capacity to prevent the competitor from entering market, or when marginal cost of investment increases, the firm will prefer to set monopoly capacity to prevent the competitor from entering market.

目錄
第1章  前言..........................................1
第2章  模型設定......................................4
第3章  面對風險下的廠商產能決策......................6
  3.1    廠商2無進入成本下廠商1的投資行為............6
  3.1.1  景氣差時廠商1為Stackelberg領導者，景
         氣好時二廠商皆為Cournot追隨者...............7
  3.1.2  任何景氣水準下廠商1皆為Stackelberg領
         導者.......................................11
  3.1.3	景氣差時二廠商皆不生產，景氣好時二廠商
         皆為Cournot追隨者..........................13
  3.1.4  小結.......................................14
  3.2    廠商2有進入成本下的廠商1投資行為...........18
  3.2.1  景氣差時廠商1生產獨占產量，景氣好時廠
         商1生產阻卻進入產量........................21
  3.2.2  任何景氣水準下廠商1皆生產獨占產量..........22
  3.2.3  任何景氣水準下廠商1皆生產阻卻進入產量......23
  3.2.4  小結.......................................25

第4章  結論.........................................29
  參考文獻..........................................30


圖次
圖2-1   廠商1邊際生產成本示意圖.....................5
圖2-2   廠商1反應曲線示意圖.........................5
圖3-1   兩家廠商賽局競爭過程圖示....................7
圖3-2   廠商行為結構之一............................8
圖3-3   廠商行為結構之二............................11
圖3-4   廠商行為結構之三............................14
圖3-5   廠商2無進入成本下的廠商投資行為圖示.........15
圖3-6   廠商1獨占產量與阻卻進入產量圖示.............20
圖3-7   廠商2有進入成本下廠商賽局競爭過程圖示.......20
圖3-8   廠商行為結構之四............................21
圖3-9   廠商行為結構之五............................23
圖3-10  廠商行為結構之六............................24
圖3-11  廠商2有進入成本下的廠商投資行為圖示.........25



表次
表 3-1  廠商2無進入成本下的廠商投資行為整理.........16
表 3-2  廠商2有進入成本下的廠商投資行為整理.........26

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