在1961年「豬灣事件」慘敗後的一年裡，甘迺迪總統屢屢自問：「我怎會如此愚蠢，居然放任他們走到此步田地？」不僅當年的參加者納悶不已，同樣的問題也困惑著近五十年來研究本起案例的研究學者。儘管被視為美國史上最幹練的團隊之一，近乎全軍覆沒的外交慘敗，不僅令人大感詫異，更激起後人找尋失敗關鍵的興趣與必要。為此，本論文的目的即在探討美國於「豬灣事件」決策過程中的致命失誤，進而對此一經典案例中甘迺迪的角色定位與責任歸屬，做更深入的闡釋與分析。 
透過艾理遜教授所提出之決策理論三模式：「理性行為者模式」、「組織行為模式」、以及「政府政治模式」，本論文將試圖從國家利益、組織競爭、以及官員議價等角度，對本案例的最終決策做出聯結與剖析。
後世的批評多將中情局的誤判視為誤導總統的關鍵所在。惟透過筆者的研究發現，位居權力頂端的甘迺迪總統，才是該為慘敗負起全責的核心角色。回顧事件始末，甘迺迪不僅隻手扭轉了組織專業評估後的既定政策選項，更在決策過程中憑己偏好促成了最終定案。如此一來，背離常軌的運作不僅即刻升高失敗風險，也需為最終全軍覆沒的下場，一肩扛起最大責任。

“How could I have been so stupid as to let them proceed,” President John F. Kennedy repeatedly asked himself following the failure at the Bay of Pigs in April, 1961.  For more than forty-seven years, such question has not only been meditated by those former participants, but also been pondered by countless historians, policy analysts and researchers.  It was surprised that how the Kennedy administration, which was generally acknowledged as one of the best ones in the American history, could allow such a disaster to take place.  Therefore, the main purpose of this thesis is to figure out what went wrong with the United States in the Bay of Pigs invasion, thereby analyzing President Kennedy’s role in the decision-making process of this classic diplomatic fiasco.
By applying Graham Allison’s three decision-making models, namely, Rational Actor Model (RAM), Organizational Behavior Model (OBM), and Governmental Politics Model (GPM), this thesis would explore the case of Bay of Pigs fiasco from the perspectives of national interest, organizational struggle, and bureaucratic politics.  
The overwhelming majority of critics still believed CIA’s miscalculation was the crucial element to mislead president’s judgments. Nonetheless, taking the whole process and the eventual outcome of the Bay of Pigs case as evidence, JFK should actually take the major responsibility for this diplomatic disaster instead.  It was thus discovered, when a president pays too much attention to the formation of his own foreign policy wishfully and act willfully without showing respect for the advice and suggestions of the professionals and related organizations, the risk of such a diplomatic defeat would immediately increase.

目錄

第一章 緒論-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 

第一節 研究目的與探討重點----------------------------------------------------------2 
第二節 相關文獻討論-------------------------------------------------------------------5 
第三節 研究方法、範圍與限制------------------------------------------------------10 
第四節 章節安排------------------------------------------------------------------------11 
第五節 小結------------------------------------------------------------------------------13

第二章 理論架構與命題假設---------------------------------------------------------------15 

    第一節 理性行為者模式---------------------------------------------------------------16
    第二節 組織行為模式------------------------------------------------------------------22 
    第三節 政府政治模式------------------------------------------------------------------26 
    第四節 小結------------------------------------------------------------------------------30
 
第三章 理性模式下甘迺迪總統於「豬灣行動」的決策定位---------------------------32 

    第一節 甘迺迪上任前古巴赤化對美國的衝擊與影響---------------------------35 
    第二節 甘迺迪的政治風格與包袱---------------------------------------------------38 
    第三節 甘迺迪的理性抉擇------------------------------------------------------------44 
第四節 小結------------------------------------------------------------------------------57

第四章 運用組織行為模式分析甘迺迪團隊於「豬灣行動」中之決策過程-------59 

    第一節 國務院的組織立場與外交提案---------------------------------------------61 
    第二節 國防部的組織立場與軍事提案---------------------------------------------64 
    第三節 國家安全會議的沉默與影響------------------------------------------------72 
    第四節 中情局的組織立場與祕密行動　------------------------------------------75
第五節 小結------------------------------------------------------------------------------88
 
第五章 運用政府政治模式分析甘迺迪團隊於「豬灣行動」中之決策轉折---------92 

第一節 主要參與者的職位與背景---------------------------------------------------94 
    第二節 中情局首長干預決策之始末----------------------------------------------107 
    第三節 官員於議價過程中的妥協與退讓----------------------------------------117 
    第四節 行動前夕的決策轉折與影響----------------------------------------------127
第五節 小結----------------------------------------------------------------------------134

第六章 結論----------------------------------------------------------------------------------137

參考書目---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------148

參考書目
壹、	中文部分

一、書籍

陳一新。《斷交後的中美關係》。台北：五南出版社，1995。
楊日青、李培元、林文斌、劉兆隆譯，Andrew Heywood 著。Politics《政治學新
		論》。台北：韋伯文化事業出版社，1999。
閰學通、孫學峰。《國際關係研究實用方法》。北京：人民，2001。
戴萬欽。《甘迺迪政府對中蘇分裂之認知與反應》。台北：正中書局，1992。


二、碩士論文

洪士美。《美國國家安全會議：協調外交與國防政策功能之研究》。台北：淡江大
		學美國研究所，2006。
紀舜傑。《美國國務卿與國家安全顧問權限之研究》。台北：淡江大學美國研究所，
		1991。
郭芳如。《甘迺迪政府對豬灣行動的決策過程》。台北：淡江大學美國研究所，2004。
許惠玉。《中央情報局對政治決策之不當干預之研究》。台北：淡江大學美國
		研究所，2001。
潘少川。《後冷戰時期美國中央情報局角色與任務之研究》。台北：淡江大學美國
		研究所，1997。
羅民漢。《官僚政治對美國外交政策的影響》。台北：淡江大學美國研究所，1985。


三、報紙期刊

王萍，〈古巴社會主義道路及其發展前景〉，《拉丁美洲研究》，1996年第3期，
頁28-32。
宋曉平，〈古巴革命以來的古美關係〉，《拉丁美洲研究》，1990年第5期，頁40-45。
焦震衡，〈干涉與干涉的鬥爭-美國對古巴政策述評〉，《拉丁美洲研究》，1990年
		第5期，頁27-33。


貳、	英文部分

I. Governmental Documents & Official Sources

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United States Government Printing Office, 1991.
Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-63, Vol. V, Soviet Union. Washington 
D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1998.
Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-63, Vol. VI, Kennedy-Khrushchev 
Exchanges. Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1996.
Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963, Vol. X, Cuba.
		http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frusX/index.html.
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Kirkpatrick, Lyman B. Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation October 
1961. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ciacase/EXF.pdf.
Kornbluh, Peter. Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of 
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Taylor, Maxwell D. Operation ZAPATA: The “Ultra-Sensitive” Report and Testimony 
of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs. Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1981.


II. Books

Aguilar, Luis. ed. Operation Zapata: The “Ultra-Sensitive” Report and Testimony of 
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Allison, Graham T. & Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban 
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Blight, James G.. & Peter Kornbluh ed. Politics of Illusion: The Bay of Pigs Invasion
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Bradlee, Benjamin C. Conversation with Kennedy. New York: Pocket Books, 1976.
Castro, Fidel & José Ramón Fernández. Playa Girón/ Bay of Pigs: Washington’s first
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_______. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy. Washington D.C.: The Brookings
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Higgins, Trumbull. The Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower and the CIA at the Bay
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Hilsman, Roger. Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions. Westport: Greenwood 
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_______. The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Model and Bureaucratic Politics, third edition. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1992.
_______. To Move A Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of 
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Immerman, Richard. The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention.
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Johnson, Haynes. The Bay of Pigs: The Leaders’ Story of Brigade 2506. New York: 
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Kern, Montague, Patricia W. Levering & Ralph B, Levering. The Kennedy Crises:
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Kirkpatrick, Lyman B., Jr. The U.S. Intelligence Community. New York: Hill and 
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_______. The Real CIA. New York: Macmillan Co., 1968.
Love, Robert W, Jr. The Chief of Naval Operations. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
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Madden, John P. Operation Bumpy Road. Norfolk: Old Dominion University, 1988.
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_______. The Dynamics of World Power: A Documentary History of United States 
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III. Articles

Benedetto, Richard. “The Bay of Pigs: An Invasion of Bad Ideas.” USA Today, June 
		24, 1997.
Bentham James. “Unified Man.” Newsweek (Mar. 1959): 23-27.
Bohman, William. “The Keen General.” The New York Times. 16 Aug. 1960: 10.
Bundy, McGeorge. “November 1952: Imperatives of Foreign Policy.” Foreign Affairs, 
		Vol. 31 (Oct. 1952): 9-40.
Destler, I.M. “The Power Brokers: An Uneven History of the National Security
		Council.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84: No. 5.
Gleijeses, Piero. “Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs.”
		Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 27 (February 1995): 37-42.
Hawkins, Jack. “Classified Disaster: The Bay of Pigs Operation Doomed by 
Presidential Indecisiveness and Lack of Commitment.” National Review, Vol. 31 (Dec. 1996): 16-35.
Lijphart, Arend. “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method.”American 
		Political Science Review, Vol. 65: 682-693.
McCoy, Patrick. “Kennedy’s Cabinet.” U.S. News and World Report, Vol. 26. (Dec. 
		1960): 31-34.
Rusk, Dean. “The President.” Foreign Affairs (April. 1960): 355.
Sorensen, Theodore. “Kennedy’s Worst Disaster.” Look, Vol. 10 (Aug. 1965): 46-49.
Vandenbroucke, Lucin. “The Confessions of Allen Dulles: New Evidence on the Bay 
		of Pigs.” Diplomatic History, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Fall 1984): 243-278.