近年來，廠商的外包(outsourcing)決策已經成為業界與學術界的熱門議題。一般論及外包，成本降低大概是最常被提及的因素，但是，外包也會因為契約不完全，以致於在監控成本、搜尋成本、管理成本上需要額外的付出。外包的決策基本上就是在這些利弊互見的因素間尋求平衡點。
相較於現有的文獻，本文刻意排除加工成本、監控成本、管理成本等這一類不利於外包的因素，探討若承包廠商不見得具有全面性的成本優勢，且外包廠商可以透過研發來降低生產成本，外包廠商的外包程度受哪些因素影響。
基本上，本文發現：廠商間成本的差異、外包價格與研發強度決策的先後順序、外包廠商的家數，或多或少都會影響外包廠商的外包決策，但市場規模與外包程度間具有最清晰一致的關係。原則上，小市場支持完全外包、中等市場支持完全自產、大規模市場則支持部分外包。

In recent years, the manufacturers’ outsourcing decision-making already became a popular research subject. In general, cost reduction is probably the most often mentioned factor that benefits outsourcing decisions. However, the outsourcing contracts are incomplete, there are extra cost including monitoring cost, the search cost, the managed cost, etc., The optimal outsourcing decision is basically made from the trade off between these positive forces and negative forces.
In contrast to the existing literature, this article studies the outsourcing decision in a framework that there are no monitoring cost and management cost, there is no globally cost advantage between upstream firms and downstream firms, and the downstream, outsourcing firms can engage R&D to reduce theirs’ production costs.
Basically, this article finds out that although many factors, including cost difference、the decision order between outsourcing price and the R&D decision, the number of outsourcing manufacturers, influence firm’s outsourcing decision, but the market size has the clearest and consistent impact on firm’s outsourcing decision. In particular, the small market supports complete outsourcing, the medium market supports no outsourcing, and the large market supports partial outsourcing.

目錄
圖目錄....Ⅱ
第一章  序論....1
第二章  外包決策模型(一)：一家外包廠商，一家承包廠商....6
1. 賽局A：外包廠商先決定研發強度，承包廠商再決定外包價格....7
2. 賽局B：承包廠商先決定外包價格，外包廠商再決定研發強度....18
3. 賽局A和賽局B的均衡比較....23
第三章  外包決策模型(二)：兩家外包廠商，一家承包廠商....25
1. 賽局C：兩家外包廠商先決定研發強度，承包廠商再決定外包價格....27
2. 賽局D：承包廠商先決定外包價格，兩家外包廠商再決定研發強度....37
3. 賽局C和賽局D的均衡比較....43
第四章  綜合比較與結論....45
1. 先決定研發強度，再決定外包價格....45
2. 先決定外包價格，再決定研發強度....46
3. 結論與展望....47
REFERENCE	....48

圖目錄
圖(1)：賽局A和賽局B的決策流程圖....7
圖(2)：W>C1-X....8
圖(3)：研發強度增加，外包廠商的自產數量上限增加....10
圖(4)：賽局C和賽局D的決策流程圖....26
圖(5)：W>C1-X1=C1-X2....28
圖(6)：研發強度增加，外包廠商的自己生產數量上限增加....30
圖(A)：W>C1-X且C1>C2....12
圖(B)：W>C1-X且C2>C1....13
圖(C)：W≦C1-X且C1>C2....13
圖(D)：W>C1-X1=C1-X2且C1>C2....32
圖(E)：W>C1-X1=C1-X2且C2>C1....33
圖(F)：W≦C1-X1=C1-X2且C1>C2....33

Antras, Pol and Helpman, Elhanan “Global Sourcing,” Journal of Political Economy, June 2004, v. 112, iss. 3, pp. 552-80.
D'Aspremont, Claude and Jacquemin, Alexis “Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers,” American Economic Review, December 1988, v. 78, iss. 5, pp. 1133-37
Grossman, Gene M. and Helpman, Elhanan “Integration Versus Outsourcing in Industry Equilibrium,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 2002, v. 117, iss. 1, pp. 85-120.
Long, Ngo Van “Outsourcing and technology spillovers,” International Review of Economics and Finance, 2005, v. 14, iss. 3, pp. 297-304.
Rossini, G. “Outsourcing with labor management,” Economic Systems, December 2005, v. 29, iss. 4, pp. 455-66.
Rossini, G. and Lambertini, L. “Endogenous outsourcing and vertical integration with process R&D,” Department of Economics University of Bologna, September 2003, WP. 487.
Shy, Oz and Stenbacka, Rune “Partial Outsourcing, Monitoring Cost, and Market Structure,” Canadian Journal of Economics, November 2005, v.38, iss. 4, pp.1173-90.
Spencer, Barbara J. “International Outsourcing and Incomplete contracts,” Canadian Journal of Economics, November 2005, v. 38, iss. 4, pp. 1107-35.
Zhao, Laixun. “Unionization, Vertical Markets, and Outsourcing of Multinationals,” Journal of International Economir 2cs, Octobe001, v.55, iss. 1, pp.187-202.