本論文的研究主旨在探討美國柯林頓政府任內，介入以色列與巴勒斯坦之和平進程所採取的策略。以色列與巴勒斯坦之衝突自第二次世界大戰以來，逐漸成為中東衝突的核心問題。由於美國在中東地區有重大的國家利益存在，然而維護以色列之生存卻與拉攏阿拉伯國家兩利益互相衝突，所以最好兼顧兩美國利益的方式，就是調解以巴雙方的衝突。柯林頓政府享有調停以巴和談之最好時機，2000之大衛營回合談判更是歷來最接近最終和平之高峰會，可惜仍功敗垂成。
    柯林頓政府甫上任之角色為協助者，隨著美國投入的心血與日俱增，以及奧斯陸架構緩慢的進展中，美國逐漸成為主導談判架構的調停者。然而和平進程卻推行得十分不順利，以色列與巴勒斯坦的強硬派屢屢因意識形態之爭，而製造出破壞和解氣氛之負面行為。柯林頓總統與以巴領袖溝通的過程中，也充斥著各方因國內政治利益考量下，而片面妨礙和平進程的挑釁作為。
    在分析柯林頓政府所運用的調停策略，並配合檢視以巴的談判策略，可看出三方都有誤判形勢以致做出錯誤的決策，並共同該負擔和平失敗的責任。在以巴皆試圖壓縮對手並拉攏美國的情況下，柯林頓政府未能擺出強硬的姿態來督促雙方實踐和平協議，放任強硬份子輕易地找到藉口破壞和平。美國未能掌握調停的時間表，導致最具爭議性的耶路撒冷主權以及巴人回歸問題，在缺乏充分討論與互相了解下，倉促在最後關頭要求以巴雙方立刻解決，更是談判無法獲得共識的主因。柯林頓總統之立場也有失調停者該力求的中立態度，而與以色列較為友善，同時也未協助巴人爭取更合理之生活環境，導致以色列的違約行為一再得以重複，而巴人也將反以情緒轉嫁至美國身上。柯林頓政府未能掌握良機，而讓以巴和平轉變成暴力收場，實乃策略錯誤所造成之大憾。

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the strategy which Clinton administration had taken while mediating Israeli-Palestinian talks. The conflict between Israel and Palestine has gradually become the core issue of the Middle East disturbance. The U.S. found two of her national interests in the Middle East colliding, and the best way to both support Israel and promote good tie with Arab nations, is dissolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Clinton Administration enjoyed the best opportunity to reach a permanent peace agreement. The Camp David Summit in 2000 was the talk the nearest to the final peace, however; peace didn’t succeed.
    Clinton Administration started the first term as a facilitator. As the Oslo framework slowly proceeded, Clinton became a mediator who dominated the peace process. During the process of mediation, right wing hardliners of both Israel and Palestine constantly provoked against each. Conflict arose from time to time as a result. Even the political leaders of both sides enjoyed games of provocation in order to please each own constituency.
    Clinton Administration made several strategic mistakes. By investigating the negotiation strategy that Israel and Palestine took, it is clear that both sides including the U.S. should share responsibility for the failure of peace process. While Israel and Palestine competed against each and both tried to win the U.S. endorsement, Clinton failed to take a hard position on restraining both from violating peace process, which led to a vicious circle of deal breaking. Extremists could therefore easily find their actions influential. On top of that, Clinton Administration did not expedite the time frame of peace talk. Instead, the U.S. left the most controversial issues of Jerusalem and refuge return under little discussion or mutual understanding until the 2000 final status talk, which further sentenced the death of peace deal. Moreover, Clinton Administration was not a neutral mediator, but more clinging to Israel and ignoring the endurance of Palestinians. Such a position introduced more Israeli unilateral violation and lost favor from Palestinians. Miscalculation and wrong strategy deployment turned a possible peace deal into another violence cycle.

目次
第一章 緒論 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．1
第一節 研究動機 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．1
第二節 研究理論 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．3
第三節 研究架構 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．6
第四節 研究限制與文獻回顧 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．7
第二章 柯林頓政府調停以巴和談之背景．．．．．．．．．．．．．
第一節 以巴衝突之歷史簡述與名詞解釋 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．9
第二節 以巴內部局勢．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．22
第三節 冷戰結束後之中東局勢概觀 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．33
第三章 柯林頓政府之中東利益與立場 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．
第一節 後冷戰時代美國之中東利益 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．47
第二節 柯林頓政府之調停立場．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．59
第四章 柯林頓調停以巴和談之過程 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．
第一節 奧斯陸協定到臨時協定 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．64
第二節 拉賓遇刺暨納坦雅胡上台 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．81
第三節 希布倫協定到畏河協定．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．89
第四節 大衛營最終地位談判．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．102
第五章 柯林頓政府調停之分析 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．
第一節 柯林頓之調停特質 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．125
第二節 柯林頓政府之調停策略 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．126
第三節 調停之評估與檢討．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．135
第六章 結論．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．139
附錄．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．145
附錄一 安理會第242 號決議案
附錄二 安理會第338 號決議案
附錄三 奧斯陸協定
參考書目 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．161

一、	美國政府官方文件
U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 1990-2000.

二、	書籍
（一）	中文書籍
朱威烈。世界熱點：中東。台北市：五南圖書，民國82年。
西蒙．裴瑞茲(Shimon Peres)著；廖世德譯，新中東 。台北市：時報文化，1995年。
吳釗燮。中東的戰爭與和平：衝突降低與爭端解決。台北縣：志一文化，民國85年。
周煦。冷戰後美國的中東政策。台北市：五南圖書，民國90年。
陳志奇。巴勒斯坦人建國權利之研究。台北市：黎明文化事業公司，民國七十二年。
張翠容。中東現場。台北市：馬可孛羅文化，民國94年。
蕭曦清。中東風雲 。台北市：牧村圖書，民國92年。


（二）	英文書籍

Clinton, William Jefferson. My Life. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004.
Cobban, Helena. “The Palestinians and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,” in The Middle East after Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait, ed. Robert O. Freedman. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993.
Dban, Abba. Diplomacy for the Next Century. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
Enderlin, Charles. Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, trans. Susan Fairfield. New York: Other Press, 2003.
Feuerwerger, Marvin. “Israel, the Gulf War, and Its Aftermath,” in The Middle East after Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait, ed. Robert O. Freedman. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993.
Garfinkle, Adam. “The Jordanian Policy from the Intifada to the Madrid Peace Conference,” in The Middle East after Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait, ed. Robert O. Freedman. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993.
Goldberg, David Howard. Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interesting Group: American and Canadian Jews Lobby for Israel. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990.
Hudson, Michael C., ed. The Palestinian: New Directions. Washington DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1990.
Lewicki, Roy J. ,ed. Think Before You Speak. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996.
Maoz, Moshe. Syria and Israel: From War to Peace Making. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
McNaugher, Thomas L.. Arms and Oil: U.S. Military Strategy and the Persian Gulf. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985.
Ovendale, Ritchie. The Origins of the Arab Israeli Wars. London: Longman, 1992.
Peretz, Don. Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.
Peri, Yoram. “The Arab-Israeli Conflict and Israeli Democracy,” in Israeli Democracy Under Stress, ed. Ehud Sprinzak and Larry Diamond. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993.
Quandt,William B.. Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967. ,third edition. Washington, D.C :Brookings Institution Press; Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005.
Ross, Dennis. The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace. Washington D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004.
Shalev, Aryeh . Intifada: Causes and Effects. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.
Swisher, Clayton E.. The Truth about Camp David: the Untold Story about the Collapse of the Meddle East Peace Process. New York: Nation Books, 2004.
Truman, Harry S.. Years of Trial and Hope(1946-1952), vol.2. New York: The New American Library, 1965.

三、	期刊

（一）	中文期刊
鍾佳安。「從一九七三年至二OOO年美國石油危機與對策看經濟安全概念」。問題與研究，第41卷第6期（民國91年11-12月）。頁1-24。

（二）	英文期刊
Aruri, Naseer. “Oslo’s Muddled Peace.” Current History, 97:615 (January 1998), pp.7-13.
Dajani, Burhan. “the September 1993 Israeli-PLO Documents : A Textual Analysis.” Journal of Palestine Studies, 23:3 (Spring 1994): pp.5-24.
Hagopian, Elaine C. “Is the Peace Process A Process for Peace? A Retrospective Analysis of Oslo.” Arab Studies Quarterly, 19:3 (Summer 1997), pp.1-29.
Kemp, Geoffrey. “The Persian Gulf Remains the Strategic Price.” Survival, 40:4(Winter 1998-99), pp.132-140.
Khoury, Nabeel A.. “the Arab Lobby: Problems and Prospects.” The Middle East Journal, 41:3 (Summer 1987), pp.379-395.
Lewis, Samuel W. “The United States and Israel: Evolution of an Unwritten Alliance.” Middle East Journal, 53:3 (Summer 1999), pp.364-379.
Noyes, James H. “Does Washington Really Support Israel?” Foreign Policy, 106(spring 1997), pp.144-161.
Sick, Gary. “The Coming Crisis in the Persian Gulf.” The Washington Quarterly, 21:2(Spring 1998), pp.195-213.
四、報紙
中國時報
中華日報
聯合報
China Post
International Herald Trubune
New York Times
Washington Post