我國政府作業基金因其經營行為都擔負著政策執行任務，開發基金即係政府依促進產業升級條例第21條規定而設置之專責投資機構，所以本研究係在探討該基金被投資公司公司治理與經營績效及影響開發基金投資績效之關聯性，實證結果如次：
首先，本研究所建立之公司治理衡量指標與公司經營績效之相關性，實證結果大部分均獲得支持，顯著性也因各產業別而有所不同，支持被投資公司公司治理愈佳，該公司經營績效愈好，研究發現開發基金投資於創建期產業時首應注重股權結構，而成熟型產業則應著重董監事組成結構，另在公股持股比率與公司經營績效實證結果為正向影響，而公股董監席位比率與公司經營績效卻為負向影響，顯示公股所派任之董監事並未發揮應有之監督效果也未支持效率監督假說。
其次，在被投資公司公司治理愈佳，開發基金投資績效愈好方面，實證結果大部分均未獲支持，意謂著二者關聯性並不強，其原因應與該基金設立宗旨有關，因該基金是配合政府政策扶植新興重點產業，促進產業升級，扮演創導性角色，非以營利為目的，故一旦被投資公司營運正常上市上櫃，或達成基金投資目的後，即依退場機制轉讓、出售持股，收回資金循環運用，所以也支持部分學者之研究，在發生偏離程度且影響力愈大時，公股越可能為執行政策目標而偏離追求利潤最大化之目的，並不以獲取投資收益為主要考量，另研究發現監察人席位數與該基金投資績效為正向影響，董事席位數則為負向影響，因此為配合證交法第26條之3條文規定，該基金可考量爭取核派被投資公司之監察人席位數，以提高投資績效。
最後，被投資公司經營績效愈佳，開發基金投資績效愈好，實證結果被投資公司EPS與開發基金之國庫貢獻度間存在著正向影響但不顯著，表示被投資公司之每股盈餘多寡確實影響開發基金對國庫的貢獻。
結論，因該基金之投資係以扶植產業發展政策為主軸，故無法與一般公司及創投產業單純訴求投資績效之經營方式相提並論，因此，在評估開發基金投資績效時亦應將此一限制列入考慮。

The governmental operation funds in Taiwan have the task to bear the mission of policy implementation. The “development fund” is one of the governmental funds which established under the provision of Article 21 of Statute Governing Enhancement of Industry Upgrade. Therefore this research is a study of the relationship between corporate governance and operation performance of the companies invested by that fund, and the correlation with the investment performance of the development fund. The results are as follows:
Firstly, the empirical evidence supports the positive correlation between company governance and its performance. The significance varies in industries. The better the corporate governance of the investee, the better is its operation performance.  The research discovers that during the establishment period of industry, the development fund investment should first emphasize on the stock ownership structure. For mature industry, the fund should emphasis on the formation structure of directors and supervisors. Furthermore, the empirical evidence shows that the percentage of government shares positively effect on the company’s operation result. The ratio of government directors and supervisors has negative effect on company operation performance. This shows that directors and supervisors appointed by government share cannot bring out its supervision effect into the investee, and cannot support the efficiency supervision assumption.
Secondary, the empirical evidence do not support that investees’ company governance would have positive effect on the investment performance of the development fund.  That means the correlation between these two is not strong and its reason should be related to the purpose of establishment of that fund. It is because that fund is to cope with government policy to nurture emerging major industry, to enhance industry upgrade and to play a guiding role and is not based on operating profit as the purpose. Therefore once the operation of the invested company is listed in the market or over-the-counter normally or the purpose of fund investment can be achieved, then this will be transferred based on withdrawal system, the stockholding will be sold and the capital will be taken back for recirculation and utilization. Consequently, this can also support the research of part of the scholars that when there is occurrence of deviation level and the power of influence is stronger, it is more feasible that the government share will deviate from the purpose of seeking for maximization of profit due to execution of the policy goal instead of obtaining investment income as the main consideration.  Moreover the research discovers that the number of seats of supervisors and the investment performance of that fund has positive effect and the number of seats of director has negative effect. Therefore in order to cope with the provision of Article 26-3 of Securities Exchange Act, that fund can consider striving for appointing the number of seats of supervisor of the invested company so as to enhance the investment performance.
Finally, the better the operation performance of the invested company is, the better the investment performance of the development fund will be. The empirical result shows that between the EPS of the invested company and the level of contribution to the national treasury by the development fund, there is a positive effect but this is insignificant. This means that the more or less of the profit per share of the invested company actually will affect the contribution to the national treasury by the development fund.
Conclusion: as the investment of that fund is to nurture the industry development policy as the main axis, therefore it cannot be compared with the operation method of general company and venture capital industry that simply looking for investment performance. As a result, during the evaluation on the investment performance of the development fund, this limitation should be included in the consideration.

第壹章 緒論..........................................1
第一節 研究背景及動機................................1
第二節 研究目的......................................3
第三節 論文架構......................................4
第四節 研究流程......................................5
第貳章 文獻探討......................................6
第一節 政府基金簡介..................................6
第二節 開發基金及被投資公司概述......................11
第三節 公司治理......................................13
第四節 績效衡量......................................27
第參章 研究方法......................................30
第一節 研究架構......................................30
第二節 研究假說、實證模型及變數操作型定義............31
第三節 研究設計......................................37
第肆章 實證結果與分析................................38
第一節 基本統計資料分析..............................38
第二節 迴歸分析......................................43
第伍章 結論、建議與研究限制..........................59
第一節 結論..........................................59
第二節 建議與研究限制................................62
參考文獻
一、中文部分.........................................64
二、英文部分.........................................66

表            次
表2-3-1 公司治理衡量指標....................................23
表4-1-1開發基金產業別投資金額表...........................38
表4-1-2 被投資公司經營績效變數與控制變數之敍述統計量........39
表4-1-3 開發基金投資績效變數之敍述統計量....................40
表4-1-4 被投資公司公司治理衡量變數之敍述統計量..............41
表4-2-1公司治理衡量指標對被投資公司經營績效之pearson相
          關係數分析........................................43
表4-2-2 公司治理衡量指標對開發基金投資績效之pearson相關係
          數分析.............................................45
表4-2-3 被投資公司經營績效與開發基金投資績效之pearson相關
          係數分析..........................................46
表4-2-4 以 EPS 為績效衡量指標之迴歸分析.....................47
表4-2-5 以 ROA 為績效衡量指標之迴歸分析.....................51
表4-2-6 以 ROE 為績效衡量指標之迴歸分析.....................53
表4-2-7 開發基金投資績效衡量指標之迴歸分析..................55
表4-2-8 被投資公司經營績效對開發基金投資績效影響之迴歸分析..57
表4-2-9公司治理衡量指標與被投資公司經營績效及開發基金投資績
          效之關聯性彙總表.......................................58

圖            次
圖1-4-1  研究架構與流程....................................5
圖2-1-1  政府基金架構......................................10
圖2-3-1  世界銀行公司治理架構..............................14
圖3-1-1  研究架構..........................................30

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