如何發展可以傳承公司文化、符合管理實務需要的「高階主管薪酬管理原則」，是現在台灣公司薪酬委員會的課題。以往並無研究單獨探討金融業之薪酬委員會品質對高階經理人薪酬績效敏感度之影響。本研究以2011年至2017年上市及上櫃之金融業作為研究樣本，探討薪酬委員會品質對高階經理人薪酬績效敏感度之影響。實證結果發現，金融業之薪酬委員會成員專業背景對會計績效敏感度無顯著影響，輪為形式要件而己。而薪酬委員中具法官、檢察官、律師、會計師或其他與公司業務所需之國家考試及格領有證書之專門職業及技術人員，對高階經理人薪酬市場績效敏感度呈負向影響。薪酬委員會開會次數與高階經理人薪酬會計及市場績效敏感度呈正向連結。薪酬委員會規模愈大，委員間之意見越難統整，難以發揮其監督之功能，對高階經理人薪酬會計及市場績效敏感度呈負向影響。最後，薪酬委員兼任其他公開發行公司薪酬委員會成員家數與高階經理人薪酬市場績效敏感度呈負向連結。

The issue faced by the compensation committees for companies in Taiwan is how to develop the “principles of compensation management for senior managers” which can inherit company cultures and meet management practice requirements. No previous study has separately explored the effects of quality of compensation committees in finance and insurance industry on pay-performance sensitivity of senior managers. In this study, the listed and OTC companies in finance industry during the period from 2011 to 2017 were taken as the samples to explore the effects of quality of compensation committees on pay-performance sensitivity of senior managers. The empirical results show that, the professional background of members of compensation committees in finance and insurance industry has no significant effects on accounting-performance sensitivity, but is the form element. Moreover, in the members of compensation committees, the professionals and technicians who passed the national examinations and obtained the certificates required for judges, procurators, lawyers, accountants or other company businesses have negative effects on pay-market-performance sensitivity of senior managers. The number of meetings of compensation committees is positively related to compensation-accounting and market-performance sensitivity of senior managers. The larger the scale of the compensation committees are, the more difficult it is to unify the opinions of the members and to play its function of supervision, which has negative effects on compensation-accounting and market-performance sensitivity of senior managers. In the end, the number of the public companies which any member of a compensation committee concurrently serves as the member of the compensation committee in is negatively related to pay-market-performance sensitivity of senior managers.

目錄
第一章 緒論	1
第一節 研究動機與目的	1
第二節 研究架構	3
第二章 文獻探討與假說建立	5
第一節 我國目前薪酬委員設置之相關法規	5
第二節 公司治理與薪酬委員會設置	8
第三節 薪酬績效敏感度	13
第四節 薪資報酬委員會與薪酬之關係	18
第三章 研究方法	22
第一節 樣本篩選與資料來源	22
第二節 變數定義	23
第三節 研究模型	28
第四章 資料分析與實證結果	31
第一節 敍述性統計與相關係數分析	31
第二節 金融業薪酬委員會之品質對高階經理人會計薪酬績效之影響	36
第三節 金融業薪酬委員會之品質對高階經理人市場薪酬績效之影響	39
第五章 結論與建議	43
第一節 研究結論	43
第二節 研究限制與未來研究建議	44

表目錄
表 1 各國薪酬委員會之職權	7
表 2 設置薪酬委員會之相關理論	10
表 3 國內薪酬績效敏感度相關文獻	16
表 4 研究假說彙總	21
表 5 變數說明	27
表 6 敍述性統計	32
表 7 相關係數	34
表 8 薪酬委員品質對高階經理人會計績效-ROA交乘之迴歸結果(一)	37
表 9 薪酬委員品質對高階經理人會計績效-ROA交乘之迴歸結果(二)	38
表 10 薪酬委員品質對高階經理人市場績效-RET交乘之迴歸結果(一)	40
表 11 薪酬委員品質對高階經理人市場績效-RET交乘之迴歸結果(二)	41
表 12 實證結果彙總	42

圖目錄
圖 一 研究架構流程圖	4
圖 二 薪酬結構	13

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