既存的企業社會責任(CSR)相關文獻中，大多數假定廠商最終目標是極大化自身利益，且少有文獻利用經濟學工具進行相關理論研究。
本文以一個雙佔、完全但非完美信息的兩階段動態賽局為基本框架，探討子賽局完美均衡下的CSR策略組合。廠商的類型有二：手段利他或目的利他；目的利他廠商將消費者剩餘納入自身的目標函數中，手段利他廠商則否。本文引入捐贈與販賣連結商品兩種類型的CSR投入選擇，探討在兩階段的動態賽局中，政府的稅制如何影響在均衡下的廠商CSR選擇。
本文所獲致的基本結論是：在一定條件下的數值範例中，政府的稅制工具變數以及相關的市場特質參數，會影響廠商的均衡CSR類型選擇。原則上，政府制定的營利事業所得稅率或免稅的捐贈額度越高，廠商越傾向於選擇捐贈的CSR投入方式。本文也顯示，依稅制政策與相關市場特質參數的不同，均衡下的CSR投入類型，可能是對稱的，也可能是不對稱的。

Among the existing studies of corporate social responsibility (CSR), most of them presume that the ultimate objective of manufacturers is maximizing its own profits and only a few studies adopt economic theoretical framework to explore issues of CSR.
Under the framework of a duopoly, two-stage dynamic game with complete but imperfect information, this paper investigates the subgame perfect equilibrium CSR strategy. We differentiate altruistic firms into two kinds of altruism: altruism as a means or as an end. We assume the objective function of firms of altruism as an end includes its own profits and consumer surplus, while firms of altruism as a means care only its own profits. This paper introduces charity donation and linked goods as two types of CSR inputs. One of the main purposes of this paper is to explore how government’s tax policies affect the equilibrium CSR patterns.
This paper concludes, through numerical examples, government’s tax policies and market characteristics will affect the equilibrium CSR patterns. Basically the higher the tax rate or the tax free charity donation is, the more firms tend to donate. In addition, this paper also shows that depend on government’s tax policies and market characteristics, the equilibrium CSR patterns can be symmetric or asymmetric.

目錄
第一章	緒論	1
第一節 研究動機與目的	1
第二節 論文架構	3
第二章 文獻回顧	4
第一節 CSR相關的理論研究	4
第二節 CSR相關的實證研究	5
第三章 理論模型	7
第一節 政府部分	7
第二節 消費者部分	8
第三節 廠商部分	9
第四章 Cournot均衡的理論分析	13
第一節 兩廠類型相同的情形	13
第二節 兩廠類型不同的情形	21
第五章 CSR均衡、數值分析與範例	28
第一節 給定CSR變數β、捐贈限額D，保留稅率t的情形	31
第二節 給定CSR變數β與稅率t，保留捐贈限額D的情形	41
第三節 給定稅率t，保留CSR變數β、捐贈限額D的情形	51
第六章 結論	62
參考文獻	64

圖目錄
圖 1 目的利他廠商（採連結商品）納入的消費者剩餘	11
圖 2 目的利他廠商（採捐贈）納入的消費者剩餘	12
圖 3 同為手段利他廠商的第一階段賽局	29
圖 4 同為目的利他廠商的第一階段賽局	30
圖 5 一廠手段利他、另一廠目的利他的第一階段賽局	30
圖 6 兩廠同為手段利他廠商的CSR均衡(1)	33
圖 7 兩廠同為目的利他廠商的CSR均衡(1)	35
圖 8 兩廠同為目的利他廠商的CSR均衡(2)	36
圖 9 兩廠同為目的利他廠商的CSR均衡(3)	36
圖 10 一廠手段利他、另一廠目的利他的CSR均衡(1)	39
圖 11 一廠手段利他、另一廠目的利他的CSR均衡(2)	40
圖 12 兩廠同為手段利他廠商的CSR均衡(2)	42
圖 13 兩廠同為手段利他廠商的CSR均衡(3)	43
圖 14 兩廠同為手段利他廠商的CSR均衡(4)	43
圖 15 兩廠同為目的利他廠商的CSR均衡(4)	45
圖 16 兩廠同為目的利他廠商的CSR均衡(5)	46
圖 17 兩廠同為目的利他廠商的CSR均衡(6)	46
圖 18 一廠手段利他、另一廠目的利他的CSR均衡(3)	49
圖 19 一廠手段利他、另一廠目的利他的CSR均衡(4)	49
圖 20 一廠手段利他、另一廠目的利他的CSR均衡(5)	50
圖 21 兩廠同為手段利他的CSR均衡博弈過程(1)	53
圖 22 兩廠同為手段利他的CSR均衡博弈過程(2)	54
圖 23 兩廠同為目的利他的CSR均衡博弈過程(1)	56
圖 24 兩廠同為目的利他的CSR均衡博弈過程(2)	56
圖 25 一廠手段、一廠目的利他的CSR均衡博弈過程(1)	59
圖 26 一廠手段、一廠目的利他的CSR均衡博弈過程(2)	59
圖 27 一廠手段、一廠目的利他的CSR均衡博弈過程(3)	60
圖 28 一廠手段、一廠目的利他的CSR均衡博弈過程(4)	61

表目錄
表 1 同為目的利他廠商的CSR均衡解集(1)	37
表 2 一廠手段利他、另一廠目的利他的CSR均衡解集(1)	40
表 3 同為手段利他廠商的CSR均衡解集	44
表 4 同為目的利他廠商的CSR均衡解集(2)	47
表 5 一廠手段利他、另一廠目的利他的CSR均衡解集(2)	50

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