本研究樣本為2014至2017年台灣證交所上市公司四年期間的資料，本研究探討金融業遭重大裁罰、糾正、罰款是否對公司績效會有影響，並得到以下的研究發現，其一、金融業受到重大裁罰及糾正時，對公司價值反而呈現正向的影響，其表示若公司有違反銀行法的情事發生，其對公司的績效的影響並非負面，其可能成因乃是若某些金融業可能過度積極地爭取業務甚至爭取灰色地帶的業務，是以雖受到有關單位的重大裁罰或糾正，然而卻不影響其公司績效的提升。其二、經理人及董監事持股比率愈高，對公司之向心力及監督功能愈能發揮，公司之績效表現及公司價值亦愈佳。其三、淨利率與權益資產比和公司價值呈正向顯著關係，顯示公司獲利越高及自有資金佔資產比重越高，則公司價值越高。

By employing the firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange over the period 2014-2017, we explore whether financial sanctions, corrections, and fines occurred for the firms falling into banking industry would affect their performance and reveal the following important findings. First, we reveal that the financial sanctions and corrections occurred for these firms would have positive impact on firm value. We argue that some firms may aggressively expand their business which might violate the regulation set by the authority. As a result,   even though sanctions or corrections are occurred for these firms, their firm performances might not be affected even better off. Second, the firms with higher managers’ holding ratio, directors’ holding ratio would have better performance, indicating the firm with better corporate governance would have better performance. Third, the firms with higher net profit ratio and higher equity over asset ratio would have higher firm value, implying that the firm with higher profitability and lower debt ratio would have higher firm value.

中文摘要 I
ABSTRACT Ⅱ
目  錄 Ⅲ
圖目錄 Ⅴ
表目錄 Ⅵ
第一章、緒論 1
第一節、研究背景與動機 1
第二節、研究目的 2
第三節、研究流程 4
第四節、研究架構 5
第二章、文獻探討 6
第一節、公司價值 6
第二節、違反法令 7
第三節、公司價值與公司治理或財報的關連性 8
第四節、公司價值與違反法令 9
第三章、研究假說與方法 10
第一節、研究資料與變數 10
第二節、研究假說與模型 14
第三節、研究方法 15
第四章、實證結果 18
第一節、敘述統計量 18
第二節、多元迴歸模型 20
第三節、Petersen迴歸模型 24
第五章、結論與建議 28
第一節、研究結論 28
第二節、管理與財務意涵 29
第三節、研究限制與建議 29
參考文獻	30

圖目錄	
圖1-1  研究流程圖 4

表目錄
表4-1  敘述統計量 18
表4-2  共線性VIF檢驗 19
表4-3  多元迴歸模型 20
表4-4  Petersen迴歸模型 24

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